The 'Security Digest' Archives (TM)

Archive: About | Browse | Search | Contributions | Feedback
Site: Help | Index | Search | Contact | Notices | Changes

ARCHIVE: 'Phage List' - Archives (1988 - 1989)
DOCUMENT: phage #286 [.forward vs aliases] (1 message, 678 bytes)
SOURCE: http://securitydigest.org/exec/display?f=phage/archive/286.txt&t=text/plain
NOTICE: securitydigest.org recognises the rights of all third-party works.

START OF DOCUMENT

From: der Mouse <mouse@larry.mcrcim.mcgill.edu>
To: phage
Date: Sun 02:03:34 20/11/1988 EST
Subject: .forward vs aliases
References: [Thread Prev: 284] [Thread Next: 288] [Message Prev: 285] [Message Next: 291]

> .forward should always override
> (/usr/lib/upas/namefiles|/usr/lib/aliases) for real people
> (non-system accounts).

I disagree.  It is not the mailer's business to try to second-guess the
mail admin.  For that matter, it's not the mailer's business to know
who's a real person and who isn't.

> what a person does with their own mail is their own business.

Usually but not always.  Remember, the owners of the machine get first
say, though they usually choose not to exercise this prerogative.  But
that's all beside the point unless you want to hypothesize a mechanism
by which the mailer can know what codes correspond to persons and what
codes don't.

Bottom line is: don't try to make the software second-guess the admin.
If the admin chooses to provide a system alias for a real user, who are
we to say we know better and refuse to listen to it?

					der Mouse

			old: mcgill-vision!mouse
			new: mouse@larry.mcrcim.mcgill.edu

END OF DOCUMENT