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ARCHIVE: 'Phage List' - Archives (1988 - 1989)
DOCUMENT: phage #337 [Security checklist] (1 message, 1058 bytes)
SOURCE: http://securitydigest.org/exec/display?f=phage/archive/337.txt&t=text/plain
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From: page@swan.ulowell.edu (Bob Page)
To: phage
Date: Tue 12:00:11 06/12/1988 EST
Subject: Security checklist
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I happen to think it's critical in our environment to keep the source code available. History has shown that bugs fixes and improvements come from regular folks just as much as from system admin types. But the point should be made: most security considerations are not absolute; they are "thought questions". The writer does so only to be complete. You can't make a valid judgement to keep the resource open or to close it off until you know that it *could* be a problem. I would not have even considered recommending removing access from /usr/src, but I can see where the point should at least be brought up. The same can be said for most security issues, like /usr/lib/aliases for example. The sendmail docs says "we (ucb) leave it world writable, you might not, but we trust our users". In fact I keep our aliases files readable but not writable, and have the exact problem they describe: I have to manually edit the file when somebody wants a change. One of my staff wrote a daemon that gets requests (via mail) and changes the aliases file based on those requests with locks and passwords (on the aliases) to prevent anyone from changing random alias entries. (We do this because people need to change alias entries on a mail server where they don't have an account for example). On a different topic: we now know that many "cracker groups" have the source code to the Worm. I'm sure a half dozen folks within ULowell already have access to the code. It upsets me that I have to go to these groups to get the code rather than more legitimate channels. It should not be harder for people with white hats to get the code. ..Bob
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