----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910060040.AA19770@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989100206060000> From: MISS026@ecncdc.BITNET (GREENY) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: re: Alarm systems Message-ID: <8910060040.AA19770@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 2 Oct 89 06:06:00 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 79 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Mon Oct 2 07:06:00 1989 > IR Detectors... What do these detect? They detect infrared energy in the area....a fresnel lens directs any and all infrared onto a pyrodetector, and some electronics determine whether or not it should be classified as an alarm or not....usually this is done via "Pulse counting" which is a method whereby the detector counts the number of pulses of energy that it has detected within a certain period of time (usually a{ 2-3 second period...)....At the security system which I consult for, we set this to TWO...makes for a good trade off between preventing false alarms due to air vents moving plants, and the ability to detect a person...NO they will not detect through the glass....although a good shot of sunlight right into the lens of the detector will trigger it....simple solution -- keep the drapes drawn... Glass breakage sensors -- what do these detect? There are two types: Ones which "listen" for the frequencies of breaking glass (audio discrimination) and the usual ones which sense low-level vibrations such as would be caused by someone attempting to pry open the windows... The Radio Shack ones work via mercury type switches that when shaken enough close a contact and trigger the alarm....they are not tooo reliable...The ones at the security company I consult for use Terminus sensors, and run them into a "processor" that makes heads or tails out of the signals comming from the detectors on the windows....Otherwise thunder and rumbling trucks would set them off all the time... My personal favorite is a sensor known as the "ShatterBox" by Sentrol which is an audio discriminator....of course if you have these armed at night and then break a glass, you will set off the alarm... My personal recommendation is to go with a system from a professional company because there is a lot of grunt work involved in fishing all the wires for a hardwired system (wireless systems are good, but another topic altogether..) and in choosing the best protection for your home. Also, if anything goes wrong, they get to fix it, and you wont have to listen to the wife (if you're married) saying "I told you it should have been done by a company! *whine*". Furthermore, they can and should be able to hook you up to a central monitoring station for a nominal fee (we charge $21.50/month) which will provide you with some neat features. 1) Assuming your phone lines dont get cut, then when the alarm goes off, it will send a packet of data via digital communicator to the central station over your phone line (it seizes the line even if someone is on the phone or it is off the hook) and tells them what zone got triggered....2) they call you back unless it's a panic zone and ask for a password....3) if you provide the correct one they dont send the police/fire dept/paramedics....4) if not, then they do... 5) if you arent there, they call a list of valid "keyholders" and tell them the alarm went off, and call the cops/fire dept/ambulance....6) you can have other sensors such as high/low temperature sensors, sump pump failure (flood) sensors, etc...wireless panic buttons (even with a hard wired system) and a variety of other goodies... Also, if the company you choose is up on things, then they will use recessed magnetic contacts that you will never see on the doors/windows...about the only thing you will see is the smoke detectors if you have fire coverage, and the shock sensors on the doors/windows (although these are practically invisible...), the control keypad(s) in the designated area, and the alarm CPU in the basement/closet of your home.... The CPU should have a battery backup, and recharge automatically. Stay away from the Radio Shack system, it uses lots of C or D cells and they are a pain...also, no digital communication is available, and they only offer their tape dialer which many police stations hate...also the panel is not zoned, which makes servicing a complete bear... More questions? Drop me some E-mail...I'm experiencing hard drive problems right now so I'm not on every day like I used to be, but I am here about 3 times a week... Bye for now but not for long... Greeny BITNET: MISS026@ECNCDC Internet: MISS026%ECNCDC.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU GEnie: GREENY Macnet: GREENY ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910101105.AA13107@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989100218330700> From: CI60UCU@VM.TCS.TULANE.EDU (Charlene Charette) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: Home Security Systems Message-ID: <8910101105.AA13107@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 2 Oct 89 18:33:07 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 74 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Mon Oct 2 19:33:07 1989 I used to work for a security company (residental and commerical) and one of my co-workers here at the University used to install residental and commerical systems (he still does installations on a part-time basis). The following answers are a combination of our knowledge: >What's a good book on do-it-yourself home security systems? Guy did not know of any good, current books available. >What are the trade-offs of do-it-yourself vs. a professional security >company? The main advantage is that the professionals are knowledgeable and experienced (providing they are not one of the many fly-by-night alarm company that are popping everywhere). The secondary advantage involves monitoring; alarm signals are sent to a central station who can then call the police, fire dept., your work number, etc. when your alarm goes off. >How do I protect my home without overtly annoying the neighbors, police, >etc. with false alarms. Most of the newer alarms allow you to set a time limit on sirens with 15 mins being the usual time limit. Some cities have ordinances on siren time durations and I would suggest that you check for these. (Some cities require that alarm systems be registered. You should check this also.) >Radio Shack sells "glass breakage detectors". These are ~1" diameter >"pucks" that stick to the glass and are wired to an alarm. >* What do these sense? These sense high-pitched sounds such as glass breaking. Alarm technicians test them by rattling keys. >* If they are in the corner of a picture window, and the > other side of the window is broken but the glass under the puck remains > intact will they trigger? Yes, it should; but it is dependant on the range of the detector. >* If they are impact-sensitive, will a truck or plane rumbling by set > them off? Yes, if they are too sensitive. Some can be adjusted, others not. >How about area detectors, infra-red or sonic? We have no pets to set >them off but: You may not have any pets to set them off, but I have seen them set off by rats and roaches (yes, we have *BIG* roaches here). Guy says they are good, but stay away from cheap detectors or you will be plagued with false alarms. >* Can IR detectors see movement through windows? Wouldn't want the >paper boy setting them off by mistake. No, the detectors don't sense "movement". They sense changes in heat. If you were to hold a large piece of cardboard in front of you and move it slowly in front of an IR detector, you could pass it undetected. >* How about changes in ambient IR levels caused by the sun coming in >through a window or the furnace going on or off? Yes, temperature changes will trigger the detectors. Don't point them at windows, fireplaces, air ducts, furnaces, etc. >* Are the sonic types sensitive to noises outside the house? They should be. >* Will, say, thunder shake the house enough to trigger a motion detector? It shouldn't. >I see both wired and wireless alarm systems for sale. Since I have good >attic and basement access, I am tending toward the wired sort. The >wireless types seem to need occasional battery replacement. Aside from >this are there reliability concerns wrt. either style? Guy advises staying away from wireless systems as they are not as reliable. Although he is not as familiar with the newer wireless sytems available, he said the older systems had no low battery indicator. A low battery can cause false alarms; and of course, a dead battery is useless. If you have any further questions, please feel free to ask. PS: Guy said if you pay his expenses he'd gladly come up and give you a hand. :-) ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100314373700> From: Paul=Zonfrillo%SQA%Banyan@thing.banyan.com 4-OCT-1989 22:17:37 To: SECURITY@vm.tcs.tulane.edu Subj: [879] re: Dongles are still alive Yes indeed, Dongles are alive and well! My company, Banyan Systems Inc. makes PC-based WAN/LAN software and uses such a device for copy protection as well as and upgrade. Our "server key" is a straight-thru device that sits on the pralell port. Users can also purchase additional "option keys" to enable additional operating systems options such as TCIP routing, that can be loaded on/off the server via these option keys . As far as reliability goes, in six years, we have NEVER had one burn out. (this is according to tech support). Our software encodes to the key after it has been loaded on the server. The option is also attractive because it does not take up any slots in the server. In short: Dongles seem to be an effective but unobtrusive form of copy protection. Paul Zonfrillo SQA Engineer, Banyan Systems Inc. Paul=Zonfrillo%SQA%BANYAN@thing.banyan.com ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100315321800> From: barry@ads.com 4-OCT-1989 23:12:18 To: security@ucbvax.berkeley.edu Subj: [1288] Internet cracker on the loose. There is a cracker on the loose in the internet. This is the information I have so far. Traces of the cracker were found at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton. He also left traces at one of the Super computer centers. Both CERT and the FBI have been called. The technique that is being used is as follows: 1) He has a modified telnet that tries a list passwords on accounts. Username forwards and backwards, username + pw, etc. 2) He seems to have a program call "ret", that is breaking into root. 3) He seems to be getting a list of victim machines via people's .rhosts files. 4) He copies password files to the machines that he is currently working from. 5) He is good about cleaning up after himself. He zeros out log files and other traces of himself. 6) The breakins are occurring bwtween 10pm Sunday night and 8am Monday morning. 7) He seems to bring along a text file of security holes to the machines he breaks into. 8) Backtracing the network connections seem to point to the Boston area as a base of operations. The sys admin at IAS found a directory with the name ".. " (dot dot space space). The files I mentioned above were found in this directory. Barry Lustig barry@ads.com Advanced Decision Systems (415) 960-7300 ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910131928.AA04803@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989100320040000> From: cc@sisl.co.uk (Chris Corbett) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Unix security products, A survey Message-ID: <8910131928.AA04803@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 3 Oct 89 20:04:00 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 47 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Tue Oct 3 21:04:00 1989 I am carrying out a survey of security products that are available for Unix machines. The idea is to collect together a review of the available products. It will be a "snapshot" of the various ways in which security can be added to unix, together with a brief description of the main features of each. This review would then be posted onto the net, and hopefully updated from time to time. I am focussing on the following areas: 1. Single level security products for Unix machines. Products that give a C2 level of assurance or something like it. 2. Multilevel security for unix machines. Products that give higher levels of assurance (B1 and up). 3. Products that support either of these levels of security over networks of machines. I am *not* collecting information on encryption devices/smart cards etc. In order to jolt your memory I am already aware of the following in each of these categories. 1. BOKS 2. The Addamax and Secureware kits for system V and BSD. (I would be interested to know of any manufacturer that has announced machines running either of these two); AT&T's MLS Unix; Unix System 5.4.2 which is said to be going to include B1 security as part of the standard product. 3. None (well its a much trickier problem). Any information or pointers that anyone can send me would be very welcome. Names of further people to talk to would also be useful. Thanks in advance. I should also state for the record that I am not associated commercially with any company that makes any products of this type. I am an interested third party who would like to get an overview of the current situation. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Chris Corbett cc@sisl.uucp +44 252 811818 Fax +44 252 811435 Secure Information Systems Ltd, Sentinel House, Harvest Crescent, Ancells Park, Fleet, Hampshire GU13 8UZ. UK. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100408253100> From: ORG5NMC@cms1.ucs.leeds.ac.uk 5-OCT-1989 16:05:31 To: SECURITY@pyrite.rutgers.edu Subj: [773] [771] Return-path: Date: Wed, 23 Aug 89 17:13:11 BST From: ORG5NMC@cms1.ucs.leeds.ac.uk To: SECURITY@pyrite.rutgers.edu > Why is there so little awareness of the way many third-party software > packages open vulnerabilities in even the perfectly managed C2 > commercial systems? I don't think its just a matter of third party software being poor security-wise. The vendor of the machines I work on (not IBM) seems to have a very poor record (security-wise) when it comes to their own "add on" s/w let alone third party. I see time after time new features introducing old bugs. On another subject (slightly related) what do readers think vendors should do to deter the writing of "home-grown" poorly written privileged s/w that effectively opens up systems? Is it just a matter of education or trying to make it difficult for s/w to make mistakes? Neill. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100408550000> From: Gary Buhrmaster 5-OCT-1989 16:35:00 To: security@ubvm Subj: [1165] [1163] Return-path: Date: Wed, 23 Aug 89 16:27:45 EDT From: Gary Buhrmaster To: security@ubvm In the IBM world, a promise to run 15% faster than the competition usually makes the sale to the DP manager. That manager is rarely concerned that the package happens to run faster because it runs the users in privleged mode, and the saleman is unlikely to volunteer that information. His competitor might, but he probably has his own hooks for some other function that he would prefer you not notice. It is getting better. While still a rare occurance, DP managers are learning to ask what special facilities or privleged functions that packages require, and then require that the package support the underlying security facilities. In the MVS world, that often means some sort of statement of integrity, and interface to RACF or ACF2. The driving force is often the EDP Auditor. While they may not understand computers (it is not their job,) they do exchange information between themselves as to what packages are the biggest abusers, and they do know the right questions to ask. After all, their interest is in understanding the risk of losing their companies assets, and programs that allow access to those assets without authorization are dangerous. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100409100300> From: Chess Ferrier 5-OCT-1989 16:50:03 To: misc-security@ukc.ac.uk Subj: [1499] REINIALISING PS/2 PASSWORDS HOW CAN A PS/2 PASSWORD BE REINITIALISED ? You use the REFERENCE DISK to set a PS/2 PASSWORD for the first time. You use OLDPW/NEWPW to change the current PASSWORD. But how do you re-invoke the password facility for the following situation: 1 The password had been set. 2 The password was removed by entering a blank value as a new password. (OLDPW/ ) You can no longer set the password via the REFERENCE DISK as it reports that the password is already set. You can not change the password from 'blank' to something else via the normal 'CHANGE PASSWORD' process as you are no longer required to enter a password when the system is turned on. The only way I know to over come this situation is to remove the PS/2's battery for about 20 minutes, and then rerun the system automatic configuration, and the REFERENCE DISK's SET PASSWORD facility. The above method is a real pain. I'm hoping that there is another way. Is there another way ? P.S. - Is there a way to find out the current power-on password value. Thanks in advance for any help. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr Chess Ferrier ESSO ENGINEERING (EUROPE) LIMITED. Apex Tower, High Street, New Malden, Surrey, KT3 4DJ. 01-949-8459 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- Automatic Disclaimer: The views expressed above are those of the author alone and may not represent the views of the IBM PC User Group. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100414401600> From: feo@cbnewsl.ATT.COM (francis.e.o brien) 5-OCT-1989 22:20:16 To: misc-security@att.att.com Subj: [496] Home Alarms I'm interested in installing my own home security system. My house is mostly pre-wired, which makes the installation of a wired system relatively simple. The only problem is finding systems. So far the choice is Radio Shack. I haven't located any other distributors of alarm systems who sell to the general public. Most places insist on installaing and of course providing a monitoring service. Can anyone provide me with the name of some dealers that I can deal with directly? Thanks. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100415124200> From: jearly@lehi3b15.csee.lehigh.edu (John Early) 5-OCT-1989 22:52:42 To: misc-security@rutgers.edu Subj: [2441] Re: Home Security Systems >What's a good book on do-it-yourself home security systems? If you find one, let me know, too. If you do-it-yourself, it is cheaper and more secure(only you know the details of your system) but you might not think of everthing the pro's might. Personally, I don't let ANYBODY know the details of the systems I install, and I would not trust ANY company that doesn't have a good rep. >How do I protect my home without overtly annoying the neighbors, police, >etc. with false alarms. Don't have false alarms--seriously, they ARE annoying, and unless the only function an alarm system does is call YOUR phone, you will annoy someone. Some police dept. don't mind having auto-dialers call them, some do...check with the local and/or state police. >Radio Shack sells "glass breakage detectors". These are ~1" diameter >"pucks" that stick to the glass and are wired to an alarm. >* What do these sense? They are mercury switches (can be set to be normal open or closed) and change state when tilted more than a certain (preset) degree. If someone can break (or cut) just part of a window, they won't sense it. They are most sensitive to rotational motion around the center axis, so I did one installation where the window loop is always active, but the windows can be opened or closed without triggering the sensor...and trucks won't set them off. Do your best to hide them so that a potential intruder won't notice them and take precationary steps. >How about area detectors, infra-red or sonic? We have no pets to set >them off but: Some IR detectors are sensitive enough to measure through glass...most aren't. Sunlight WILL set them off...seen that happen more than once. Ultrasonic motion detectors shouldn't detect noise, per se, but if the thuder knocks a book off a shelf (had that happen to me once) it will. >I see both wired and wireless alarm systems for sale. I always use closed loop wired systems. And redundant systems in special areas. Don't forget to check back-up batteries at least 1/month! I think that any DIY can manage a good security system, if s/he thinks it out ahead of time, and tries to think like an intruder. Pay attention to small details--e.g. don't install an auto-dialer then forget to protet your phone wire entrance. Radio shack has good stuff...probably enough for the average home security needs. Hope this helps. John Early jearly@lehi3b15.csee.lehigh.edu JPE1@Lehigh.Bitnet ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100415411400> From: letni!doug@texbell.swbt.com (Doug Davis) 5-OCT-1989 23:21:14 To: misc-security@attctc.dallas.tx.us Subj: [2684] Re: Home Security Systems >* What do these sense? These are mercury filled switches which you can set the "sensitivity" by providing the inital tilt of the switch. I use them in my car for things like tee-tops. (substatute velcro for the double stick tape) and they work reall well. For glass breakage they are only moderate I would suggest them only if tape is to obnoxious and you can't affored the "real ones" based off of piezo elements. >* Can IR detectors see movement through windows? No, not unless they were paper thin, Ultra sonics can't even see thru that. >* How about changes in ambient IR levels caused by the sun coming in >through a window or the furnace going on or off? Usually two slow in both cases, I once walked across a room that was protected via IR detectors, it took half an hour to cross 20 feet, but I won the bet. I suspect sonics are foolable in a similer fashion, but *I* can't do it. >* Are the sonic types sensitive to noises outside the house? Not unless its very very loud and in their detection range. >* Will, say, thunder shake the house enough to trigger a motion detector? I use both and we have lots and lots of thunder storms, the shaking of the house has never set them off.. Books falling from the shelf across the room will though. IR detectors love heating element furnaces, and steam radiators, generally anything that changes temperature quickly will set them off. Ultrasonic detectors love ceiling fans, and air vents (if they are set too sensitive) >I see both wired and wireless alarm systems for sale. Yeas, most wireless "broadcast" somehow, and like any RF signal it is subject to distortion caused by outside interference. Also someone else my have an alarm system using the same codes and/or frequencys that could cause yours to appear to false alarm. While wired alarms are subject to "rodent abuse." Like when the squirrel that has made your attic its home desides to "borrow" a chunk of alarm wire for its nest. Wired is by far more reliable, and more work ;-) Think closed loop, that *IS* the way to go, also the more loops the better, that way you can still have a partial alarm system when a loop goes out.. Thats not good, but it's thousands of times better than not having an alarm. Look real carefully at off the shelf "base units" most of them are low grade trash, generally in this area you get what you pay for. doug -- Doug Davis/1030 Pleasant Valley Lane/Arlington/Texas/76015/817-467-3740 {sys1.tandy.com, motown!sys1, uiucuxc!sys1 lawnet, attctc, texbell} letni!doug "Everything in this article is a Jolt Cola hallucination and in no way exhibits any signs of being remotely connection to any reality." ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100416083200> From: simsong@prose.cambridge.ma.us (Simson L. Garfinkel) 5-OCT-1989 23:48:32 To: security@rutgers.edu Subj: [3550] home security I am in the process of installing a rather sophisticated security and access control system in my home. Deadbolts and strike reinforcement are a good first step, but the reality is that if somebody kicks hard enough, they will probably just take the frame out of the wall, unless you have a steel frame around a steel door. It's really not worthwhile to go to that trouble, though, because people will just come through the windows unless you have bars or security screens on them. If your goal is to keep somebody out physically, you will probably have to turn your house into a fortress. What's a good book on do-it-yourself home security systems? _The_Truth_About_Self_Defence_, available from the Police bookshelf, 603-224-6814, 800-624-9049. What are the trade-offs of do-it-yourself vs. a professional security company? Assuming you want central office monitoring, it is generally easier to get hooked up with a professional system. Most systems cost in the $1K-$2K price range, and they do a very good job, so unless you have done this stuff a lot, you are probably better off with something professional. It's also a question of how much you value your time, how close what you want is to what is available off-the-shelf, and wether or not you want to use a radio-controlled system. How do I protect my home without overtly annoying the neighbors, police, etc. with false alarms. Don't have false alarms. They are typically caused by friends setting the system off, wind blowing doors open, auto-headlights setting off IR detectors, and things like that. Radio Shack sells "glass breakage detectors". These are ~1" diameter "pucks" that stick to the glass and are wired to an alarm. * What do these sense? Vibration. Other units can actually detect the sound of breaking glass. * If the other side of the window is broken but the glass under the puck remains intact will they trigger? Yes. * If they are impact-sensitive, will a truck or plane rumbling by set them off? Only if it breaks the glass. * Can IR detectors see movement through windows? Wouldn't want the paper boy setting them off by mistake. Not unless you have windows made out of NaCl. Salt windows are typically only found in laboratories, in circles of 1", for IR spectroscopy. * How about changes in ambient IR levels caused by the sun coming in through a window or the furnace going on or off? Depends on the detector. Some of the newer detectors will only trigger if two or three beams are broken in succession, and these tend not to go off with slow changes in temperature. * Are the sonic types sensitive to noises outside the house? Ultrasonic detectors are generally not used anymore, since they are very susceptable to background things that make ultrasonics (like pipes). * Will, say, thunder shake the house enough to trigger a motion detector? Not of you have an IR detector, since they detect moving heat sources, rather than just movement. I see both wired and wireless alarm systems for sale. Wireless systems scare me, because of the potential for jamming. With wireless systems, there is a version which is called supervised wireless, in which the central station constantly polls the remotes and asks them if they are still working, and gives you an alarm when they fail. The more expensive ones will even send out messages when their batteries start to go. On the other hand, you can move a wireless system if you do. And they are much cheaper to install. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100416401100> From: GREENY 6-OCT-1989 0:20:11 To: Subj: [4241] re: Alarm systems > IR Detectors... What do these detect? They detect infrared energy in the area....a fresnel lens directs any and all infrared onto a pyrodetector, and some electronics determine whether or not it should be classified as an alarm or not....usually this is done via "Pulse counting" which is a method whereby the detector counts the number of pulses of energy that it has detected within a certain period of time (usually a{ 2-3 second period...)....At the security system which I consult for, we set this to TWO...makes for a good trade off between preventing false alarms due to air vents moving plants, and the ability to detect a person...NO they will not detect through the glass....although a good shot of sunlight right into the lens of the detector will trigger it....simple solution -- keep the drapes drawn... Glass breakage sensors -- what do these detect? There are two types: Ones which "listen" for the frequencies of breaking glass (audio discrimination) and the usual ones which sense low-level vibrations such as would be caused by someone attempting to pry open the windows... The Radio Shack ones work via mercury type switches that when shaken enough close a contact and trigger the alarm....they are not tooo reliable...The ones at the security company I consult for use Terminus sensors, and run them into a "processor" that makes heads or tails out of the signals comming from the detectors on the windows....Otherwise thunder and rumbling trucks would set them off all the time... My personal favorite is a sensor known as the "ShatterBox" by Sentrol which is an audio discriminator....of course if you have these armed at night and then break a glass, you will set off the alarm... My personal recommendation is to go with a system from a professional company because there is a lot of grunt work involved in fishing all the wires for a hardwired system (wireless systems are good, but another topic altogether..) and in choosing the best protection for your home. Also, if anything goes wrong, they get to fix it, and you wont have to listen to the wife (if you're married) saying "I told you it should have been done by a company! *whine*". Furthermore, they can and should be able to hook you up to a central monitoring station for a nominal fee (we charge $21.50/month) which will provide you with some neat features. 1) Assuming your phone lines dont get cut, then when the alarm goes off, it will send a packet of data via digital communicator to the central station over your phone line (it seizes the line even if someone is on the phone or it is off the hook) and tells them what zone got triggered....2) they call you back unless it's a panic zone and ask for a password....3) if you provide the correct one they dont send the police/fire dept/paramedics....4) if not, then they do... 5) if you arent there, they call a list of valid "keyholders" and tell them the alarm went off, and call the cops/fire dept/ambulance....6) you can have other sensors such as high/low temperature sensors, sump pump failure (flood) sensors, etc...wireless panic buttons (even with a hard wired system) and a variety of other goodies... Also, if the company you choose is up on things, then they will use recessed magnetic contacts that you will never see on the doors/windows...about the only thing you will see is the smoke detectors if you have fire coverage, and the shock sensors on the doors/windows (although these are practically invisible...), the control keypad(s) in the designated area, and the alarm CPU in the basement/closet of your home.... The CPU should have a battery backup, and recharge automatically. Stay away from the Radio Shack system, it uses lots of C or D cells and they are a pain...also, no digital communication is available, and they only offer their tape dialer which many police stations hate...also the panel is not zoned, which makes servicing a complete bear... More questions? Drop me some E-mail...I'm experiencing hard drive problems right now so I'm not on every day like I used to be, but I am here about 3 times a week... Bye for now but not for long... Greeny BITNET: MISS026@ECNCDC Internet: MISS026%ECNCDC.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU GEnie: GREENY Macnet: GREENY ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910100830.AA11924@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989100416585000> From: CTM@cornellc.BITNET (Homer) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: Home Security Systems Message-ID: <8910100830.AA11924@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 4 Oct 89 16:58:50 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 10 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Wed Oct 4 17:58:50 1989 The radio shack motion sensors for windows are mercury switchs. They depend on the sensor being thorougly moved to another postion to set the switch off. In this sense it is impossible to set them off with mild vibrations. You have to really destroy the glass where they are. They can be set to almost tripped. This would make them more likely to trip, but if they move the wrong way they wont go off. Its a circular tube with merc in it and a switch at one end. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100519110800> From: noam@neabbs.UUCP (NOAM KLOOS) 7-OCT-1989 2:51:08 To: hp4nl!misc-security Subj: [1892] datacrime II CATE'S CURE FOR DATA CRIME On or after the 12th of October, an undetermined number of computer 'viruses' are scheduled to start erasing the data of their unsuspecting hosts. One virus in particular, known as 'DATACRIME II', is an especially nasty specimen, as it not only spreads very rapidly, but also formats the hard disk of any computer it infests, permanently destroying all of the contents. DATACRIME was first detected in the Netherlands, and the leading computer publication of that country, PERSONAL COMPUTER MAGAZINE, commissioned computer expert Rikki Cate to write an 'antidote' program for its readers. Cate, an American who lives in the Netherlands, is a programmer specialized in this kind of work. Cate's Cure was an overnight sensation. Featured on radio, television and in Holland's leading newspapers, thousands of copies were distributed within the first few days and it has already inspired a number of hastily composed imitations. Even the Dutch police have begun distributing a version of their own. Cate's Cure, however, claims superiority to all of these. It is much faster, it actually removes the virus, it repairs damaged programs, it automatically searches all the directories on the hard disk, and it provides permanent protection against formating of the hard disk or new infections by the virus. None of the other programs released have any of these features. This is believed to have been confirmed in an independent test carried out by the Dutch Railways. In view of the huge demand and the clear anxiety indicated by that, Cate has decided, with the approval of PCM, to make the antidote more widely available on disk. Additional information can be obtained from her directly by calling 31-20-981963 in Amsterdam. Fax: 31-20-763706, telex 12969 neabs nl, Fido 2:280/2, electronic mail 31-20-717666, all marked to her attention. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910190310.AA06086@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989100603560000> From: MASROB@UBVMSC.CC.BUFFALO.EDU (CNSM CCR - Rob Rothkopf) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: RE: Home Alarm Installations, R.S. Setups Message-ID: <8910190310.AA06086@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 6 Oct 89 03:56:00 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 53 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Fri Oct 6 04:56:00 1989 I've installed a burglar alarms using all Radio Shack equipment; The whole deal is fairly inexpensive ($120? for the main unit, $100 phone dialer, switches, etc) and wiring is straightforward (well, as straightforward as wiring a system can be :-). However, if you have any pets, motion/heat/pressure mat sensors are out of the picture. A note of caution... be careful not to pinch wires when running them and stapling them to walls.. this can build resistance in the circuit and cause false alarms (a closed system trips when the total circuit resistance exceeds a certain level). The vibration sensing switches are prone to strong winds, airplanes, truck horns triggering them; therefore, use on windows instead of foil tape (for cosmetic reasons) would have to be more than one for a big pane to be effective with all the switches having fairly low sensitivity. Still, I encountered something interesting with these switches wired in series: the alarm is being triggered for no apparent reason, calm winds, everyone inside sitting around the house. When the resistance in the circuit was checked I found it to be over 500 ohms more than what it should have been.. troubleshooting the circuit I found the resistance in each switch to vary, one by over 100 ohms... seconds later the same switch read 7 ohms.?! Hmm... So far this problem hasn't been fixed *but* resistance in the circuit still seems like something to look out for.. make sure not to staple through wires inadvertently! RE: the mercury glass breakage switches - Usually for windows people have three options if they're using the closed circuits: either the mercury switch, vibration switch or foil tape. In a previous posting it was said that the mercury switch is impractical and it should be hidden so a burglar doesn't see it. I disagree. Part of the effectiveness of the system is its visibility (it even comes with window stickers). The foil tape most often used is ineffective on big windows (e.g. glass doors) if put around the perimeter. While the tape *is* sensitive to breakage, if the middle is cut carefully, entrance can be obtained without the alarm being triggered. The "glass breakage sensor" follows the same theory that the glass will be broken enough to cause a shift triggering the alarm. 5 of one, etc. It's more a matter of cosmetics at that point. Also, as silly as it might seem to put a vibration sensor on a wall or room, there *have* been cases where burglars have broken in that way.. if you're running a wire already it might be worth an extra few dollars to drop a vibration sensor here and there on some wall areas.. Overall, the Radio Shack support staff was VERY helpful and cooperative when exchanging parts, etc. Prices are reasonable and there are enough accessories to build virtually any setup you would want... Many loops make debugging/altering the system much easier (as someone already pointed out [good suggestion!])... Hope this info. is helpful to someone.. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910230913.AA28344@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989100616540000> From: TIHOR@ACF6.NYU.EDU (Stephen Tihor) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Grumann Breakin Message-ID: <8910230913.AA28344@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 6 Oct 89 16:54:00 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 6 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Fri Oct 6 17:54:00 1989 Kid with a Wargames dialer popped in to a small Gruman engineering system. Grumann seems to have been very sloppy since what the CBS newspeople who interviewed me ("Indpendant Computer Expert") said was that he go into a privileged maintenance account. Presumably FIELD. Of course Grumann does their own maintenance so its propbably their fault not DEC's if its a guessable password. But they let the kid in, tracked him back, and had him arrested. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910190150.AA05034@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989100619595000> From: JEFF@utcvm.BITNET (Jeffrey R Kell) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: Home Alarms Message-ID: <8910190150.AA05034@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 6 Oct 89 19:59:50 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 6 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Fri Oct 6 20:59:50 1989 Are their any alarm systems that will interface with a PC? I've seen plenty of 'switch controllers' but don't recall seeing anything that resembled alarm sensors (though presumably if you can sense a switch open/closed, the same logic applies to alarm sensors). ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910230915.AA28389@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989100807460000> From: MISS026@ecncdc.BITNET (GREENY) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: re: wireless systems Message-ID: <8910230915.AA28389@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 8 Oct 89 07:46:00 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 29 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Sun Oct 8 08:46:00 1989 > there is a version which is called supervised wireless, in which the central > station constantly polls the remotes ... Nope.....not the Central Monitoring Station, but rather the alarm CPU in your basement/utility closet....every 10-15 seconds the sensor puts out an "I'm here " signal to the CPU, and the CPU remembers it.....if it doesn't get a blip then it waits another 15 seconds or so and sees if it gets one again...if it doesnt, then it sends a signal to the Central Monitoring Station saying "Supervisory on Zone ##" where ## is the number of the zone that died... of course if someone is sophisticated to jam your xmitters (319.5 MHZ for those of you wondering...) then they could also just cut your phone line and unless you have a cellular dialer, or high security connection then you are out of luck.... Also, the newer wireless systems (such as the ITI SX-V) has sensors that have the brains to send a "Hey CPU, my battery is dying" signal to the CPU so that the CPU can call the central monitoring station, and then they will call either you and your dealer, just your dealer, or just you....then your dealer can come out and replace the batteries for you -- or if you can find the proper equivilent then you can do it yourself... l8r... bye for now but not for long Greeny BITNET: MISS026@ECNCDC Internet: MISS026%ECNCDC.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU GEnie: GREENY MacNEt: GREENY ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910241940.AA04012@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989100823360000> From: XA3I@purccvm.BITNET (Robert Allinson) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Personal Computer Viruses Message-ID: <8910241940.AA04012@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 8 Oct 89 23:36:00 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 13 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Mon Oct 9 00:36:00 1989 I am puzzled by the statement made by certain individuals. The statement was made that a virus can be put on an un-formatted disk and it can "virusize" your personal computer!!! Is this true? Is it possible to put a virus on an un-formatted disk? s this tru even transfer a virus If so, HOW? It does not make sense. In my view you have to format the disk in the first place to install data on it! correct? Please reply to : Robert Allinson XA3I@PURCCVM [Moderator tack-on: Depends on the type of PC, of course. Replies to him only, please... _H*] ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100900251200> From: Homer 10-OCT-1989 8:05:12 To: "Security List." Subj: [480] Re: Home Security Systems The radio shack motion sensors for windows are mercury switchs. They depend on the sensor being thorougly moved to another postion to set the switch off. In this sense it is impossible to set them off with mild vibrations. You have to really destroy the glass where they are. They can be set to almost tripped. This would make them more likely to trip, but if they move the wrong way they wont go off. Its a circular tube with merc in it and a switch at one end. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100900591600> From: Bob Dixon 10-OCT-1989 8:39:16 To: security@pyrite.rutgers.edu Subj: [542] Re: AT&T_Alarms Some things to think about concerning RF security systems. What frequency range do they use? Do they generate RFI? Are they susceptible to interference from other transmitters located nearby (such as 1kw in the house? Can the remote units be tested automatically from the central unit? Are the remote units battery powered? If so, is battery failure detected? Can the receiver be rendered ineffective by a local transmitter on the same frequency? Bob Dixon Ohio State University ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100901295000> From: 10-OCT-1989 9:09:50 To: security@pyrite.rutgers.edu Subj: [840] How to track people down? This may or may not be an appropriate topic. If not, please excuse the posting... I am about to make an attempt to find some 200 people. The only information I have to go on is their full name and an old (5-10 years) address. My question is basically, how? What types of information would be helpful and available? What types of information is public? Are there any on-line services which would be useful in locating people? If so, what types of information is readily available? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Brad Haynes | Internet: bhaynes@ducvax.auburn.edu c/o U.P.E. | Bitnet: BHAYNES@AUDUCVAX 106 Dunstan Hall | Auburn University, Alabama 36849 | (205) 826-0479 | ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100902070200> From: howard@hasse.ericsson.se (Howard Gayle) 10-OCT-1989 9:47:02 To: misc-security@sunic.sunet.se Subj: [1025] Email addresses on business cards risky? Several of my friends recently joined a medium-size Swedish firm. (Name withheld, but it is definitely *not* Ericsson.) They all wanted to have their electronic (email) addresses on their business cards, but the firm's security manager would not allow this. He claimed that the host names in the addresses would, collectively, reveal sensitive information. I am very skeptical of this claim. By collecting a reasonably large sample of cards, one could probably estimate the number of file servers at the firm, but I don't see how that could help a cracker. The firm does not do classified or military work, and is not on the Internet (Nordunet). Has anyone heard of similar policies at other firms? Does anyone see any real risks of email addresses on business cards? As usual, please email to me; I'll summarize if response warrants. -- Howard Gayle TN/ETX/T/BG Ericsson Telecom AB S-126 25 Stockholm Sweden howard@ericsson.se uunet!ericsson.se!howard Phone: +46 8 719 5565 FAX : +46 8 719 9598 Telex: 14910 ERIC S ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100902370900> From: Frank Tompkins 10-OCT-1989 10:17:09 To: security@ohstvma Subj: [1575] site policies Greetings: As a new subscriber to this list, please redirect me if the following question(s) are better answered elsewhere. We have a TCP/IP based campus network, growing rapidly for about a year and a half, that has primarily been used by academic types (faculty & students). There is growing pressure to allow administrative users access to MVS mainframe (via IBM's 5798-FAL product offering, dialing to VM VTAM). The physical implementation includes thick and thin ethernet cabling, a Proteon router, some fiber cable, IBM type 1?? cabling, a bridge here and there, and a 56kb link to the rest of the Internet. My two part question, the results of which I will refer to my management to help them decide some policy issues, is as follows: 1) Other than the well known ease with which thick Ethernet cables can be tapped and passing data extracted, are there other weak spots (security wise) that we should be aware of regarding the physical links, and 2) What are the policies (briefly) that other campuses have regarding allowing confidential administrative data to flow over Internet links. Please answer directly to me to avoid wasting network bandwidth with what is probabily a thoroughly hacked over issue. If there is enough interest, I will post a summary. Also, if there are any archived documents or discussions regarding this issue, please direct me to them. Thank you all. Frank Tompkins (TOMPKINS@AKROMVM) / (TOMPKINS@VM1.CC.UAKRON.EDU) Systems Programmer University of Akron Akron, Ohio 44325-3501 ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100903034100> From: Charlene Charette 10-OCT-1989 10:43:41 To: security@pyrite.rutgers.edu Subj: [3622] Re: Home Security Systems I used to work for a security company (residental and commerical) and one of my co-workers here at the University used to install residental and commerical systems (he still does installations on a part-time basis). The following answers are a combination of our knowledge: >What's a good book on do-it-yourself home security systems? Guy did not know of any good, current books available. >What are the trade-offs of do-it-yourself vs. a professional security >company? The main advantage is that the professionals are knowledgeable and experienced (providing they are not one of the many fly-by-night alarm company that are popping everywhere). The secondary advantage involves monitoring; alarm signals are sent to a central station who can then call the police, fire dept., your work number, etc. when your alarm goes off. >How do I protect my home without overtly annoying the neighbors, police, >etc. with false alarms. Most of the newer alarms allow you to set a time limit on sirens with 15 mins being the usual time limit. Some cities have ordinances on siren time durations and I would suggest that you check for these. (Some cities require that alarm systems be registered. You should check this also.) >Radio Shack sells "glass breakage detectors". These are ~1" diameter >"pucks" that stick to the glass and are wired to an alarm. >* What do these sense? These sense high-pitched sounds such as glass breaking. Alarm technicians test them by rattling keys. >* If they are in the corner of a picture window, and the > other side of the window is broken but the glass under the puck remains > intact will they trigger? Yes, it should; but it is dependant on the range of the detector. >* If they are impact-sensitive, will a truck or plane rumbling by set > them off? Yes, if they are too sensitive. Some can be adjusted, others not. >How about area detectors, infra-red or sonic? We have no pets to set >them off but: You may not have any pets to set them off, but I have seen them set off by rats and roaches (yes, we have *BIG* roaches here). Guy says they are good, but stay away from cheap detectors or you will be plagued with false alarms. >* Can IR detectors see movement through windows? Wouldn't want the >paper boy setting them off by mistake. No, the detectors don't sense "movement". They sense changes in heat. If you were to hold a large piece of cardboard in front of you and move it slowly in front of an IR detector, you could pass it undetected. >* How about changes in ambient IR levels caused by the sun coming in >through a window or the furnace going on or off? Yes, temperature changes will trigger the detectors. Don't point them at windows, fireplaces, air ducts, furnaces, etc. >* Are the sonic types sensitive to noises outside the house? They should be. >* Will, say, thunder shake the house enough to trigger a motion detector? It shouldn't. >I see both wired and wireless alarm systems for sale. Since I have good >attic and basement access, I am tending toward the wired sort. The >wireless types seem to need occasional battery replacement. Aside from >this are there reliability concerns wrt. either style? Guy advises staying away from wireless systems as they are not as reliable. Although he is not as familiar with the newer wireless sytems available, he said the older systems had no low battery indicator. A low battery can cause false alarms; and of course, a dead battery is useless. If you have any further questions, please feel free to ask. PS: Guy said if you pay his expenses he'd gladly come up and give you a hand. :-) ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100903345600> From: (Marshall D. Abrams) 10-OCT-1989 11:14:56 To: security@pyrite.rutgers.edu Subj: [4029] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference formerly the Aerospace Computer Security Applications Conference December 4-8, 1989 Westward Look Hotel, Tucson, Arizona Sponsored by IEEE Technical Committee on Privacy and Security American Society for Industrial Security Aerospace Computer Security Associates Conference Highlights Keynote Speaker Luncheon Speakers ----------- ---------------- Senator Dennis DeConcini Mr. Charles. T. Force (D - Arizona) NASA Mr. Dave Fitzsimmons Cartoonist, Arizona Daily Sun Distinguished Lecture in Computer Security "INFOSEC: Where Are We Going?" --------------- Mr. Stephen T. Walker Trusted Information Systems Tutorial Program Monday, 4 December 1989 "Secure System Design - An Introduction" Mr. Morrie Gasser, DEC "Database Security" Ms.Teresa Lunt, SRI Tuesday, 5 December 1989 "Secure System Design - Advanced" Dr. Virgil Gligor, University of Maryland "A New Approach to Network Security" Mr. Jerome Lobel, Lobel Consulting "Computer Crime" Ms. Gail Thackeray, Arizona Assistant Attorney General Technical Program Wednesday - Friday, 6-8 December 1989 Technical Paper Sessions + Architecture for Trusted Systems + Network Security + Cryptographic Applications + Architecture and Mechanisms + Security Policy and Models + Risk Management + Software Development for Security + Data Base Security I & II + Security for Command and Control + Audit Applications + Trusted Distribution Panel Sessions + Computer Crime + Data Base Design for MLS + TCB Subset Issues + Human Issues + Gemini Users + International INFOSEC Standards + Integrity + Shoot Out at the OSI Security Corral + Civil Sector Security + Security Standards for Open Systems + Space Station Information Security + Data Integrity and Security for Computer Aided Acquisition and Logistics Support (CALS) Special Events Biosphere II: a prototype of the Earth for the future Sonora Desert Museum: living animals and plants of the Sonoran Desert Region Additional Information For a copy of the advance program, which includes rates, schedule, registration form, and special activities, contact: Diana Akers, Publicity Chair, (703) 883-5907 akers%smiley@gateway.mitre.org Victoria Ashby, Co-Chair, (703) 883-6368 ashby%smiley@gateway.mitre.org The MITRE Corporation, 7525 Colshire Dr., McLean, VA 22102 If your organization wishes to consider placing a related exhibit at the conference, a limited number of spaces are available on a first come - first serve basis. For information, contact: Robert D. Kovach, Exhibits Chair, (202) 453-1182, rkovach%nasamail@ames.arc.nasa.gov Advance Programs will be available early September. Please request one at that time. Conference proceedings and videotape of the Distinguished Lecture will be available. Program Subject To Change ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100912284000> From: 10-OCT-1989 20:08:40 To: security@pyrite.rutgers.edu Subj: [325] Request of DES implementation Hello there, I would much appreciate it if U could send me the DES Unix implementation. I am a freshman in Ohio Wesleyan University and I have also implemented the DES in C, but I don't know how efficiently... I would like 2 check it with mine... Thank U in advance, John Haritos, 1989 Bitnet%"JAHARITO@OWUCOMCN" ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100913124300> From: nagle@well.sf.ca.us (John Nagle) 10-OCT-1989 20:52:43 To: misc-security@uunet.uu.net Subj: [594] Re: Dongles are still alive Dongles are dead. There are many ads for them in PC Tech Journal, but no mainstream package uses them. Market resistance to them is severe. The Software Publisher's Association dropped their scheme for an industry-standard unit some several years ago. However, it's worth noting that the Nitendo Game System has a hardware protection device that makes it extremely difficult to make a third-party game cartridge. Attempts to reverse-engineer this system have been successfully made, but they require opening up chips and using a scanning electron microscope. John Nagle ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989100913581200> From: ddefend@urbana.mcd.mot.com (Dan Defend) 10-OCT-1989 21:38:12 To: misc-security@ncar.ucar.edu Subj: [5686] Dialback modem summary I previously posted a query regarding security modems with dialback capability. Thanks to all who responded. Listed below is a summary of responses that I received. ----- Dan Defend Motorola Microcomputer Division ARPA: ddefend@urbana.mcd.mot.com UUCP: uunet!uiucuxc!mcdurb!ddefend ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: Dialback Modem Summary ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: Check out Datagram DCE224. Datagram Corp. 11 Main St. E. Greewich, R.I. 02818. They have been bought by Memotech, of Canada, I believe. My sales rep is Rick Wester, in San Ramon, CA. 415-831-4838. I have two of these units, they are cheap and work well. -- ...uw-beaver!pilchuck!phred!jeffp {Jeff Parke} Genie : JEFFP | DELPHI : JEFFPARKE | CIS : 71511,1512 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: From hughes@hughes.network.com Sun Jul 2 17:43:05 1989 Cermetek Security modem, Cermetek Microelectronics Inc, Sunnyvale, Ca, 800-862-6271 * Note: This modem provides a separate (secret) dialback line but max. * speed is 1200 baud. Holds up to 25 passwords/callback numbers. I have used this modem years ago. It was great until you had a large bank of phones. We then used the "Defender". ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: From security@pyrite.rutgers.edu Tue Jul 4 14:01:55 1989 "FINAL CLOSEOUT/SRICE SLASHED! Lockheed-Getex modems now priced below our cost! ..300/1200-baud ..Choice of security levels including selective and nonselective callback ..Non-hayes compatible and any computer...that has industry standard RS-232C port " can use it "... NOW $29 + $4 S/H Item # H-4206-7344-195 COMB 1-800-328-0609 I have got two of them. I am using one of them right now, with a Lear Siegler Terminal. The other one is for my PC. ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: From: uiucuxc!uts.amdahl.com!kelly (Kelly Goen) try NEC and Cermetek they both make callback models the NEC allows additionally modem adminstration from a remote site i.e. another NEC however... all phone line comm is essentially insecure BOA knows this but they still use the modems and my code for it!!grin!! ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: No modem which uses a simple dialin line for dialout is secure. There is no way for the modem to ensure that when it makes the phone line offhook that the dial tone it hears is from the phone company rather than from a spoofing intruder. There are special phone lines (ie, "ground-start"), but they require that the modem use circuitry which supports that ability. The simplest way to handle the problem is to use one or several incoming lines for callback requests, then use separate modems on separate phone lines to place the outgoing calls. Some phone companies also allow phone lines which do not allow incoming calls, and these can be used for the callback lines. I think there may be security modems which do support exactly this, but they are so expensive it may be simpler to roll your own ct/login. --- Scot E. Wilcoxon sewilco@DataPg.MN.ORG {amdahl|hpda}!bungia!datapg!sewilco Data Progress UNIX masts & rigging +1 612-825-2607 uunet!datapg!sewilco I'm just reversing entropy while waiting for the Big Crunch. ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: From uiucuxc!uxc.cso.uiuc.edu!iuvax!ames!garp!/dev/null Tue Jun 20 09:33:04 1989 Why do you want a dial-back modem? Security? Or simply to avoid long distance charges? I suggest that you implement this with host software. It's a lot cheaper. -simson ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: Two methods, 1) A product called "Defender", a modem or rack or modems where each person has an ID, and that ID relates to a telephone number. After you call in and give your phone number (fron the terminal), the Defender calls you back. There is another option that instead of typing your number in with a terminal, you can put it in with a touch tone phone. That option eliminates hackers searching for a modem. 2) Another system involves an electronic card that puts out a 5 digit password that changes every minute. By having to put in your "PIN" number and this 5 digit code, it ensures that the caller (from wherever) 1) is you (because of the PIN) and is in possetion of the electronic card (Because of the 5 digit password). I forgot the name of the 2nd system. The Defender is available in single modem prices. (I don't know how much). Jim Hughes Hughes@network.com ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: From: virchaux%CLSEPF51.BITNET@cunyvm.cuny.edu (Jacques Virchaux EPFL-SIC) As we actually use this kind of modem without the dial-back capability, it seems to be interesting for you : OSI8224A. As there are a lot of possibilities and new series including speed up to 9600 bauds, I give you the address : Octocom Systems, Inc. 255 Ballardvale Street Wilmington, MA 01887 * Note: Octocom modem only calls back one number until you physically * reset the modem to call another. If you need more than this simple dial-back, maybe you want to know a complete security system, which can be used with simplest modems : DataLOCK 4000. MicroFrame, Inc. 2551 Route 130 Cranbury, New Jersey 08512 (609) 395-7800 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910241947.AA04425@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989101009551900> From: datri@convex.UUCP ("Anthony A. Datri") Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: re: email addr on business card Message-ID: <8910241947.AA04425@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 10 Oct 89 09:55:19 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 15 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Tue Oct 10 10:55:19 1989 I can't see this at all. For one, "file server" is kind of a loose thing. The cards we fill out for free subscriptions to trade rags routinely ask for the numbers of machines at your site; I can't see how that could possibly be of any use. I introduced the idea of email addresses on business cards at a previous employer, but then, they were more backwards than I want to think about. The form here at Convex that you fill out to get cards has a blank on it for your address. If a company has a consistent namespace and nicely done mailers, everyone's card should say foo@company.com anyway, which wouldn't tell anyone more than the fact that you had one machine, which they could have figured out anyway. Even so, nothing's stopping them from scribbling their addresses on the back of the card anyway. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910310300.AA00350@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989101018050000> From: JWM%JHUDEV@jhuvms.BITNET (Joe Meister) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: RE: How to track people down? Message-ID: <8910310300.AA00350@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 10 Oct 89 18:05:00 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 8 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Tue Oct 10 19:05:00 1989 You might want to try a credit bureau. You will not be able to get credit information, but they often offer services that can trace name and address changes. It might cost from $2-$4 per find. Avoid services that charge just for looking. Also, some services will look for you, and others provide on-line lookups. Finally, we are an institutional user, I am not completely sure that individuals can use the service. Also, it is incredibly easier to use social security numbers. Good luck. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910310354.AA06259@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989101018110000> From: A01MES1@niu.BITNET (Michael Stack) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: How to track people down? Message-ID: <8910310354.AA06259@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 10 Oct 89 18:11:00 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 9 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Tue Oct 10 19:11:00 1989 I know this isn't exactly a "high-tech" answer, but our high school reunion committee made good use of city telephone directories they found at a local library. It means lots of phone calls, and it won't help with names changed through marriage, but the results were impressive. Only about five percent of our graduating class was not found twenty-five years later, and we'd be silly to believe that at least some of those didn't want to be found. Michael Stack Northern Illinois University ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910310516.AA15643@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989101021070000> From: JEWALSH@fordmurh.BITNET (Jeffrey Walsh) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: How to track people down... Message-ID: <8910310516.AA15643@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 10 Oct 89 21:07:00 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 27 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Tue Oct 10 22:07:00 1989 As far as I know, and I'm not sure if this is a NY state law or a federal law, but most information held by a college/university registrar concerning name, address of record, phone number, etc., is not confidential, unless the student/alumnus specifies so. If these people have or have had a relationship with an institution of higher learning, this might be one avenue. There's always the notion of posting something in the personals of a well-read paper (eg - Village Voice) where people look for that type of thing. If the group has something in common, focus in on that -- they might be peeved if last names are involved. The key here is, of course, where do you think they are geographically centered? If anyone in the group has even a remote connection with the military, try using the locators (usually free) in the branch publications: Army Times, Air Force Times, Navy Times... Even if they've served in a unit five years ago and aren't in anymore, there's the chance that someone who served with them might still be and be able to relay you information on their whereabouts. I'm not sure about the confidentiality laws that you queried about. Sorry. If you want the address for the locator service of the service papers, write me at the address below. Jeff Walsh "JEWALSH@FORDMURH" Fordham University ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989101021585700> From: 12-OCT-1989 5:38:57 To: SECURITY@pyrite.rutgers.edu Subj: [738] Unix crypt in Canada > I seem to recall that Unix systems exported from the United States >have a weaker form of crypt() Weaker, yes, you could say that: SunOS shipped to Canada doesn't have crypt at all. The version is called "3.5EXPORT" (I haven't opened my 4.x boxes yet :-). Haven't noticed any other differences, but of course I don't work with the native version. Must be that immense border we share with you-know-who, although it'd be a heck of a cold swim with a 1/4" cassette clenched in your teeth. And now that you mention it, the guy I work with did take a vacation in Cuba a year ago... Chip Campbell VAX System Manager, Physics Division Ontario Cancer Institute, Toronto Bitnet: syschip@utoroci also bitnet: @ociphy.oci.utoronto.ca ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989101022290300> From: jimkirk@outlaw.uwyo.edu (Jim Kirkpatrick) 12-OCT-1989 6:09:03 To: security@pyrite.rutgers.edu Subj: [1228] Privacy vs on-line library First, this may be more of a talk.politics item, but then there have been previous discussions here about privacy vs Social Security number etc. Earlier this year I remember reading articles about the government wanting libraries to turn over records of who checked out what book, apparently so they could find out if anybody has been reading subversive material. Libraries (via whatever library associations exist) told the government to piss off, and they weren't going to hand over such records (or keep them) because it violated freedom of privacy and freedom of information. I applaud this. Our University library recently joined a regional conglomerate to obtain on-line library catalog access (CARL - Colorado Area Regional Library, or something like that), which also includes things like an on-line encyclopedia. However, to use the encyclopedia, one must enter their bar code from their library card. I tend to object to this on the same grounds as stated above, that they have no business keeping records of who looks at which databases. I can walk into the library and read the bloody thing without presenting an ID, why should on-line use be made more restrictive? Any comments on the privacy issues here? ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989101210454200> From: Edward J. Rovera 13-OCT-1989 18:25:42 To: security@pyrite.rutgers.edu Subj: [1755] User forms for RACF changes We are just now getting into running RACF on our MVS system and one of the problems I (as the de facto Security Administrator) am encountering is that the folks making requests to me for access to protected resources invariably do not provide sufficient information. This necessitates my responding with 'what do you mean?' and the possibility of the requester doing the same thing means *really* dragging the process out. What I'd like to find are some references to books or papers on how to design the paper (or electronic) forms used by people (usually resource owners or their agents) to submit requests to the RACF Security Administrator. I'd also like to know how other RACF sites using centralized administration deal with the entire process of granting and restricting access to protected resources. References to papers or books on this topic would also be welcomed. I would think that this might not be of general interest to list readers so if you could respond directly to me, those on the SECURITY list who are not RACF users would probably appreciate it. Anyone who *is* interested in whatever I learn is welcome to contact me for copies. Thank you in advance for any assistance. - Ed Rovera +-------------------------------------+ | Ed Rovera | | UUCP: ...!ucbvax!ucsfcgl!cca!er9006 | | BITNET: EJR9006@UCSFVM | | Voice: (415) 476-3119 | | US Mail: | | University of California, | | San Francisco | | Information Technology Services | | San Francisco, Ca. 94143-0704 | | SHARE Installation Code: UCS | +-------------------------------------+ ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989101211270400> From: cc@sisl.co.uk (Chris Corbett) 13-OCT-1989 19:07:04 To: inset!ukc!misc-security Subj: [2012] Unix security products, A survey I am carrying out a survey of security products that are available for Unix machines. The idea is to collect together a review of the available products. It will be a "snapshot" of the various ways in which security can be added to unix, together with a brief description of the main features of each. This review would then be posted onto the net, and hopefully updated from time to time. I am focussing on the following areas: 1. Single level security products for Unix machines. Products that give a C2 level of assurance or something like it. 2. Multilevel security for unix machines. Products that give higher levels of assurance (B1 and up). 3. Products that support either of these levels of security over networks of machines. I am *not* collecting information on encryption devices/smart cards etc. In order to jolt your memory I am already aware of the following in each of these categories. 1. BOKS 2. The Addamax and Secureware kits for system V and BSD. (I would be interested to know of any manufacturer that has announced machines running either of these two); AT&T's MLS Unix; Unix System 5.4.2 which is said to be going to include B1 security as part of the standard product. 3. None (well its a much trickier problem). Any information or pointers that anyone can send me would be very welcome. Names of further people to talk to would also be useful. Thanks in advance. I should also state for the record that I am not associated commercially with any company that makes any products of this type. I am an interested third party who would like to get an overview of the current situation. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Chris Corbett cc@sisl.uucp +44 252 811818 Fax +44 252 811435 Secure Information Systems Ltd, Sentinel House, Harvest Crescent, Ancells Park, Fleet, Hampshire GU13 8UZ. UK. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910270110.AA04392@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989101214381000> From: @cloud9.Stratus.COM (cme, Carl Ellison) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: Privacy vs on-line library Message-ID: <8910270110.AA04392@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 12 Oct 89 14:38:10 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 21 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Thu Oct 12 15:38:10 1989 > . . . I can walk into the library and read the > bloody thing without presenting an ID, why should on-line use be made > more restrictive? It sounds like an accounting measure to me. Is your department charged for database usage? What I would push for is the same privacy which the census provides -- make sure no record is released (or, better, kept) of individual data, releasing info only when no specifics about individuals can be deduced from it. You might do that here by having a group ID card to be scanned -- one giving just the department ID (or whatever the accounting entity is). If you can trust the local programmers, you could depend on them to accumulate no data about *what* you're accessing -- only about how long you use the service. If you can't trust the programmers you need a pay-phone type of facility. That could be with a coin box or a time meter (like the little boxes you used to walk around with for Xerox machines -- the ones with your own odometer style copy counter). ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910270209.AA04962@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989101215380300> From: WRT@cornellc.BITNET ("Bill Turner, Cornell University Library") Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: Privacy vs on-line library Message-ID: <8910270209.AA04962@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 12 Oct 89 15:38:03 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 31 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Thu Oct 12 16:38:03 1989 As the primary technical support person for a library system, I would like to point out that there are not necessarily any privacy issues involved here. The question is whether the system is storing the ID's when they are entered, and if so, what happens to them. A good example - any library staff member can certainly (and appropriately!) find out who has what books checked out, and what books any given individual has checked out. A few programmers can even construct the borrowing history of a given individual (a moment's thought about how a library works will tell you this). The fact that something CAN be done does not imply that it is being done. A better question is whether your ID number can be, and is, correlated to your Social Security number. There's probably no good reason why it should be, although often systems are designed by people who are completely insensitive to privacy issues. Finally, however, I find your attitude that somebody owes you free online use of whatever services are offered rather amusing. If you don't want to identify yourself, walk down to the library and use the books. Presumably there are billing issues involved, where somebody is subsidising your online use of an encyclopedia, and asking you to identify yourself for that reason. I'm sure that if you went to the source and offered to establish a fund to pay for completely open use, they'd be happy to set it up. Remember that the provider of the service (the encyclopedia) has something to say about who uses it. I would guess that CARL has a site license that says they may make it available to their own community, but not the world at large. It may be that your ID is validated against a table and no information stored about your access, except possibly a counter indicating the total number of accesses for the encyclopedia. An encyclopedia company that did NOT have such a licensing strategy would quickly go broke, because of selling only one copy of each edition which somebody would put online. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910251056.AA00825@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989101216373900> From: jonhaug@IFI.UIO.NO (Jon Haugsand) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: Privacy vs on-line library Message-ID: <8910251056.AA00825@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 12 Oct 89 16:37:39 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 34 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Thu Oct 12 17:37:39 1989 Ah, at last some interesting discussion... I am currently doing my master thesis, and part of the work is definition and classification of security and security policies. I have some problems with 'privacy' In a book discussing the Norwegian privacy act [Dj\o nne 1987: "Personregisterloven, med kommentarer"], privacy is defined as: 'A person has personal interest in 1) discretion, 2) information correctness, 3) knowing what information processing that may cause consequences for him/her, and 4) sanctity of private life. And moreover: 5) the interface to the authorities should keep "a human face", 6) the vulnerability of databases should be minimized, and 7) people should be protected from unreasonable use of power by the authorities.' (Abstracted and translated by me.) The central point in the act itself is to 1) enable individuals to determine data collected on him or her, to get incorrect information corrected and to get irrelevant information deleted, and 2) regulate who is allowed to collect, process and store what information in electronic computers. (There are more, but this is what I myself find 'central'.) If security is defined as "a system's ability to maintain confidiality, integrety and availability of information", where does privacy fit? Another question: Do you agree with the above 'definition' of privacy? Does your contry's privacy act (if you have one) agree? --- --- --- Jon Haugsand Ifi, Univ. of Oslo, Norway jonhaug@ifi.uio.no ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910251228.AA01344@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989101216404600> From: jimkirk@OUTLAW.UWYO.EDU (Jim Kirkpatrick) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: Privacy vs on-line library Message-ID: <8910251228.AA01344@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 12 Oct 89 16:40:46 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 48 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Thu Oct 12 17:40:46 1989 Responding to my recent query on library systems, Michael Chinni asks -- >Question, does your library card identify you as Jim Kirkpatrick, or >does it just identify you as being from your university? To clarify, the library card is actually just a bar-code sticker slapped on the back of my normal University ID card. Thus the card itself identifies ME, has my picture, and social security number (printed AND embossed!). Also, to clarify, to access either the on-line encyclopedia or a database of newspaper/magazine articles, I must enter my bar code number AND my last name (I found it only looks at the first 10 characters, but those 10 must be correct). So it has a table of bar codes and who they were assigned to (that's reasonable, when you check out a book and don't return it they need to know who to send the goons after :-). >> they have no business keeping records of >> who looks at which databases. >What makes you think that this is required because they are keeping >records of who looks at what? I admit the above was an overstatement. I don't know that they are keeping records of who looks at what, or if they are simply authenticating and counting usage. But I don't know they AREN'T keeping track, either. > assumes that nobody NOT from the university >will use it (or at least the use will be minimal). I would suggest that unauthorized use of the online encyclopedia is likely to be minimal as well. > I agree with you that the keeping of a database of who looks at what is >wrong, but I disagree with your assumption that this is the reason that the >bar code is required. It was a wrong assumption from the view that I don't KNOW they are keeping track, but I don't KNOW that they AREN'T. Any such system CAN be abused almost trivially and without notice to the users. One example is the repeated use over the past hundred years or so of gun registration lists to confiscate guns, despite a government's insistence such lists would never be used that way (WWII Germany was particularly brutal in this regard). I do not mention this to compare guns with books, but just to point out that governments will and do abuse their power to gain access to information they want. I would rather it be impossible for the information to exist, than to be assured (by people who don't even understand the system) that such records aren't being kept. "The price of freedom is eternal vigilance" or something like that. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910210242.AA01086@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989101406120000> From: MISS026@ecncdc.BITNET (GREENY) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: re: RF security systems WAS: AT&T Alarms Message-ID: <8910210242.AA01086@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 14 Oct 89 06:12:00 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 50 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Sat Oct 14 07:12:00 1989 > what frequency range do they use? 340 MHz or 319.5 MHz are the ones that I have seen... > Do they generate RFI? Doesn't everything nowdays? :-U Seriously though, they don't generate anything too much...or believe me, we'd have heard about it from our clients... > Are they suceptable to interferrence from other transmitters nearby... Not really, the signals are coded with a "House Code" that each transmitter has to be individually programmed to use, and there are about 10,000 possibilities for these....'course anything is possible... > Are the remote units battery powered? If so, is battery failure detected? YES! Why else would you want to install a wireless system, if you had to run wires to the individual sensors for power? Just add two more wires, and presto! you have a hardwired alarm... In reality, the sensors send a special signal to the CPU when their battery starts to die (3-5 years on the lithium ones in there now...), and the CPU calls the Central Station and tells them....then the Central station contacts your dealer....Your CPU also informs you that the battery is dying when you attempt to arm the alarm (you get a TROUBLE signal on Zone ##).... Also, the zones are all supervised, and the sensors send a signal to the cpu every 60 seconds or so saying "YO! I'm Here!"....if not, then a SUPERVISORY signal shows up... > Can a receiver be rendered inneffective by a transmitter on the same > frequency? Yes, but since all the xmitters are supervised, and since the transmissions are coded, all the bogus transmitter would do would be to jam the signal, and if the central station gets 47 Supervisory signals in 5 minutes from the same alarm panel, then they will call the police... Oh yeah, all the above is referencing ITI products.... bye for now but not for long Greeny BITNET: MISS026@ECNCDC Internet: MISS026%ECNCDC.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU GEnie: GREENY MacNet: GREENY Disclaimer: Nope, no way, it just couldn't be -- my fault.. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910182050.AA29546@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989101423233100> From: rogerc@sauron.columbia.ncr.com (Roger Collins) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: USA Today: "Hackers can tap into free trip" Message-ID: <8910182050.AA29546@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 14 Oct 89 23:23:31 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 40 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Sun Oct 15 00:23:31 1989 A relative sent me this recent clipping from USA Today (sorry, don't have the date). ----------------------------- snip-snip ------------------------------ Attention, hackers: Here's your chance to break into a computer system and walk away with a grand prize. The "hacker challenge" dares any hacker to retrieve a secret message stored in a KPMG Peat Marwick computer in Atlanta. [... stuff deleted ...] This challenge is being sponsored by LeeMah DataCom Security Corp., a Hayward, Calif., consulting firm that helps companies boost computer security. The winner gets an all-expense paid trip for two to either Tahiti or St. Moritz, Switzerland. Hackers with modems - devices that connect PCs to phone lines - must dial 1-404-827-9584. Then they must type this password: 5336241. >From there, the hacker is on his own to figure out the various access codes and commands needed to retrieve the secret message. The winner will be announced Oct. 24 at the Federal Computer Show in Washington. ----------------------------- snip-snip ------------------------------ I tried to dial the number and got a sound I had never heard before. My Hayes Smartmodem 2400 didn't recognize it either. Does anyone else have more info. about this contest? Got any ideas why I can't get connected? What operating system is it? -- Roger Collins NCR - Engineering & Manufacturing Columbia Domain: rogerc@ncrcae.Columbia.NCR.COM Uucp: (ncrsd | ncrlnk)!ncrcae!rogerc ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910270651.AA07738@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989101516452000> From: tkoppel@ISIS.CS.DU.EDU (Ted Koppel) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: Privacy vs on-line library Message-ID: <8910270651.AA07738@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 15 Oct 89 16:45:20 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 39 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Sun Oct 15 17:45:20 1989 First, Jim, I'm writing as a person who values and respects the privacy of user records. When I became a librarian I signed off on the idea that people's records are not to be shared, and so on. What I am writing is not necessarily the official policy of CARL. Still, I'll address your issues: a. In the case of the encyclopedia and other databases that are made available on Online Catalogs, we are required by the database supplier's contract to limit the use of certain databases to the primary user population of our members. What that means is that, for instance, a U Wyoming student/faculty/staff person has full access to that database (the encyclopedia, for instance), but a citizen of the state of Wyoming (not known to the University..) does not have access. If we don't restrict access to only the primary user population, then the database provider can accuse us of breach of contract, and ultimately has the right to yank the database from us. Sadly, the 'limit access on your online system' strategy is being em- braced more and more by the database suppliers (see the discussion on the Library PACS-L Bitnet mailing List). I don't see it getting better, either, because the databse suppliers are scared that too much online use is going to transalate into fewer print subscriptions, which is what really pays their bills. By the way, the CARL privacy issue is not what you think. When you come into a password-controlled database, we set a switch to "1"; when you exit, we turn it back to "0". (You can't use a password controlled database on the same password at the same time). CARL doesn't log who used what database at what time - sure, we could, but no, we're not doing so. Final note, Jim - if you're on one of the hardwired terminals at Wyoming, you're not asked for a password at all. (The hardwired terminals are all located in the various libraries there). Only the remote dialups need passwords. -- Ted Koppel CARL - Colorado Alliance of Research Libraries = BITNET: TKOPPEL@DUCAIR UUCP: uunet!isis!tkoppel or tkoppel@du.edu ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989101616174000> From: Jim.Thompson@central.sun.com (Jim Thompson Sun Dallas IR) 17-OCT-1989 23:57:40 To: hackers_guild@ucbvax.berkeley.edu Subj: [1878] Another Virus (sigh) FYI: it seems the NASA DECnet network SPAN is under attack from a DECnet virus. DCA, in its typical overreaction, has hit the explosive bolts on the ARPA-Milnet mailbridges, effecting TCP/IP traffic on the Internet. It helps to keep in mind that the Internet is not the only place where worms/viruses are a major problem. Date: Mon, 16 Oct 1989 17:54:34 PDT From: Vince Fuller To: barrnet-people@argus.stanford.edu, barrnet-alert@argus.stanford.edu FYI. The mailbridges are apparently still up and advertising routes, but are refusing to forward any packets. What this means for us is that our default route through Ames is useless and that automatic fall-over to SRI is not possible (because BR8 is still generating default). As a temporary measure, I have disabled EGP on BR8 so that we can follow the default through SRI (this will allow us to get to ARPANET-connected sites, which are few but better than nothing...) --Vince P.S. Sorry for the duplicates, but this seemed like it needed maximum distribution. Subject: Re: Mailbridges closed. Date: Mon, 16 Oct 89 16:22:51 -0700 From: "Milo S. Medin" [NASA ARC NSI Project Office] cc: nsfnet-cert@merit.edu, vcerf@nri.reston.va.us There is an active SPAN DECNET worm that is cracking poorly configured systems at this time. If this is why DCA closed the MailBridges, there is some serious bogosity going on! This virus ONLY propagates via DECNET. Milo Date: Mon, 16 Oct 89 18:19:12 EST From: Hans-Werner Braun To: nsfnet-cert@merit.edu Subject: Mailbridges closed. Cc: vcerf@nri.reston.va.us We got a call from Vint Cerf that DCA has closed the Mailbridges because of some apparent attack of worms or martians or huns or something like that. We do not have further information at this time, as far as I know. -- Hans-Werner ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989101617250400> From: ecd@sei.cmu.edu (Edward DeHart) 18-OCT-1989 1:05:04 To: misc-security@rutgers.edu Subj: [2357] Ultrix 3.0 breakins CERT Advisory October 17, 1989 DEC/Ultrix 3.0 Systems Recently, the CERT/CC has been working with several Unix sites that have experienced breakins. Running tftpd, accounts with guessable passwords or no passwords, and known security holes not being patched have been the bulk of the problems. The intruder, once in, gains root access and replaces key programs with ones that create log files which contain accounts and passwords in clear text. The intruder then returns and collects the file. By using accounts which are trusted on other systems the intruder then installs replacement programs which start logging. There have been many postings about the problem from several other net users. In addition to looking for setuid root programs in users' home directories, hidden directories '.. ' (dot dot space space), and a modified telnet program, we have received two reports from Ultrix 3.0 sites that the intruders are replacing the /usr/bin/login program. The Ultrix security hole being used in these attacks is only found in Ultrix 3.0. Suggested steps: 1) Check for a bogus /usr/bin/login. The sum program reports: 27379 67 for VAX/Ultrix 3.0 2) Check for a bogus /usr/etc/telnetd. The sum program reports: 23552 47 for VAX/Ultrix 3.0 3) Look for .savacct in either /usr/etc or in users' directories. This may be the file that the new login program creates. It could have a different name on your system. 4) Upgrade to Ultrix 3.1 ASAP. 5) Monitor accounts for users having passwords that can be found in the /usr/dict/words file or have simple passwords like a persons name or their account name. 6) Search through the file system for programs that are setuid root. 7) Disable or modify the tftpd program so that anonymous access to the file system is prevented. If you find that a system that has been broken into, changing the password on the compromised account is not sufficient. The intruders do remove copies of the /etc/passwd file in order to break the remaining passwords. It is best to change all of the passwords at one time. This will prevent the intruders from using another account. Please alert CERT if you do find a problem. Thank you, Ed DeHart Computer Emergency Response Team Email: cert@sei.cmu.edu Telephone: 412-268-7090 (answers 24 hours a day) ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989101703052800> From: jordan@morgan.com (Jordan Hayes) 18-OCT-1989 10:45:28 To: misc-security@uunet.uu.net Subj: [1090] security of FAXen A funny thing happened to my office-mate Doug and I the other day. His phone rang, and he answered it ... after a few seconds, the following transpired: Doug: "Hey, Jordan -- what calls you up and beeps at you?" Jordan: "Huh?" Doug: "C'mere ..." I was too late. It had already hung up. 30 seconds later, his phone rang again. Doug: "Here it is again! C'mere!" Jordan: (listening for a second) "Hey, it's a FAX machine calling you ... let's forward it to our machine ..." So we got an unintentional FAX. It was pretty interesting. It was from an Advertising Firm with some Very Large Clients. It was the monthly sales report. We're happy to report that they are doing quite well for themselves! Needless to say, they were trying to send a FAX to somewhere in Virginia, Area Code 703, and they neglected to dial ``1'' first. In New York City, we have so many telephones that we have prefixes that are XnX where ``n'' is 0 or 1, so they look like area codes if you don't dial 1. Is there any work being done in the area of security or authentication for FAXen? /jordan ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989101703453500> From: rogerc@sauron.columbia.ncr.com (Roger Collins) 18-OCT-1989 11:25:35 To: misc-security@backbone.usenix.org Subj: [1463] USA Today: "Hackers can tap into free trip" A relative sent me this recent clipping from USA Today (sorry, don't have the date). ----------------------------- snip-snip ------------------------------ Attention, hackers: Here's your chance to break into a computer system and walk away with a grand prize. The "hacker challenge" dares any hacker to retrieve a secret message stored in a KPMG Peat Marwick computer in Atlanta. [... stuff deleted ...] This challenge is being sponsored by LeeMah DataCom Security Corp., a Hayward, Calif., consulting firm that helps companies boost computer security. The winner gets an all-expense paid trip for two to either Tahiti or St. Moritz, Switzerland. Hackers with modems - devices that connect PCs to phone lines - must dial 1-404-827-9584. Then they must type this password: 5336241. >From there, the hacker is on his own to figure out the various access codes and commands needed to retrieve the secret message. The winner will be announced Oct. 24 at the Federal Computer Show in Washington. ----------------------------- snip-snip ------------------------------ I tried to dial the number and got a sound I had never heard before. My Hayes Smartmodem 2400 didn't recognize it either. Does anyone else have more info. about this contest? Got any ideas why I can't get connected? What operating system is it? -- Roger Collins NCR - Engineering & Manufacturing Columbia Domain: rogerc@ncrcae.Columbia.NCR.COM Uucp: (ncrsd | ncrlnk)!ncrcae!rogerc ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989101716544000> From: Michael Van Norman 213_825_1206 19-OCT-1989 0:34:40 To: security@pyrite.rutgers.edu Subj: [214] Re: REINIALISING PS/2 PASSWORDS Next to the speaker on the earlier PS/2's is a pair of jumper pins. If you short these while the machine is being powered up, the password will be cleared from memory. This is the easiest way I know of to do it. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989101717384700> From: Jeffrey R Kell 19-OCT-1989 1:18:47 To: security@pyrite.rutgers.edu Subj: [272] Re: Home Alarms Are their any alarm systems that will interface with a PC? I've seen plenty of 'switch controllers' but don't recall seeing anything that resembled alarm sensors (though presumably if you can sense a switch open/closed, the same logic applies to alarm sensors). ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989101718280400> From: Marc Cygnus 19-OCT-1989 2:08:04 To: misc-security@uunet.uu.net Subj: [1109] IR sensors: can they be tripped w/ a lo pwr IR laser? Glass usually absorbs a quantifiable amount of the IR energy passing through it... could, then, a fair- to high-quality IR sensor be made to trip by either focusing a 3'-4' spot of IR energy on an opposing wall or a finer spot directly on the device itself? The IR source I've in mind would be from a relatively low power IR laser (in the range of 10 - 100 mW). This is a serious question. I've in mind risk assessment... in the case where a company or institution might be victims of harassment (albeit of a very technical nature). Any ideas? If anyone could give me an idea of the (wavelength) sensitivity band of one or more detectors (if you _know_; please, no guesses or approximations based on the fact that the detector senses `infra-red'... I can do that, too :-), it would help. -marcus- -- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- "Opinions expressed above are not necessarily those of anyone in particular." `...but do YOU own a | ARPA: cygnus@vax1.acs.udel.edu homemade 6ft Tesla?' | UUCP: {yourpick}!cfg!udel!udccvax1!cygnus ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989101719071600> From: CNSM CCR _ Rob Rothkopf 19-OCT-1989 2:47:16 To: security@pyrite.rutgers.edu Subj: [3044] RE: Home Alarm Installations, R.S. Setups I've installed a burglar alarms using all Radio Shack equipment; The whole deal is fairly inexpensive ($120? for the main unit, $100 phone dialer, switches, etc) and wiring is straightforward (well, as straightforward as wiring a system can be :-). However, if you have any pets, motion/heat/pressure mat sensors are out of the picture. A note of caution... be careful not to pinch wires when running them and stapling them to walls.. this can build resistance in the circuit and cause false alarms (a closed system trips when the total circuit resistance exceeds a certain level). The vibration sensing switches are prone to strong winds, airplanes, truck horns triggering them; therefore, use on windows instead of foil tape (for cosmetic reasons) would have to be more than one for a big pane to be effective with all the switches having fairly low sensitivity. Still, I encountered something interesting with these switches wired in series: the alarm is being triggered for no apparent reason, calm winds, everyone inside sitting around the house. When the resistance in the circuit was checked I found it to be over 500 ohms more than what it should have been.. troubleshooting the circuit I found the resistance in each switch to vary, one by over 100 ohms... seconds later the same switch read 7 ohms.?! Hmm... So far this problem hasn't been fixed *but* resistance in the circuit still seems like something to look out for.. make sure not to staple through wires inadvertently! RE: the mercury glass breakage switches - Usually for windows people have three options if they're using the closed circuits: either the mercury switch, vibration switch or foil tape. In a previous posting it was said that the mercury switch is impractical and it should be hidden so a burglar doesn't see it. I disagree. Part of the effectiveness of the system is its visibility (it even comes with window stickers). The foil tape most often used is ineffective on big windows (e.g. glass doors) if put around the perimeter. While the tape *is* sensitive to breakage, if the middle is cut carefully, entrance can be obtained without the alarm being triggered. The "glass breakage sensor" follows the same theory that the glass will be broken enough to cause a shift triggering the alarm. 5 of one, etc. It's more a matter of cosmetics at that point. Also, as silly as it might seem to put a vibration sensor on a wall or room, there *have* been cases where burglars have broken in that way.. if you're running a wire already it might be worth an extra few dollars to drop a vibration sensor here and there on some wall areas.. Overall, the Radio Shack support staff was VERY helpful and cooperative when exchanging parts, etc. Prices are reasonable and there are enough accessories to build virtually any setup you would want... Many loops make debugging/altering the system much easier (as someone already pointed out [good suggestion!])... Hope this info. is helpful to someone.. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8910182021.AA29054@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989101719331600> From: ecd@SEI.CMU.EDU (Edward DeHart) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Ultrix 3.0 breakins Message-ID: <8910182021.AA29054@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 17 Oct 89 19:33:16 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 58 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Tue Oct 17 20:33:16 1989 CERT Advisory October 17, 1989 DEC/Ultrix 3.0 Systems Recently, the CERT/CC has been working with several Unix sites that have experienced breakins. Running tftpd, accounts with guessable passwords or no passwords, and known security holes not being patched have been the bulk of the problems. The intruder, once in, gains root access and replaces key programs with ones that create log files which contain accounts and passwords in clear text. The intruder then returns and collects the file. By using accounts which are trusted on other systems the intruder then installs replacement programs which start logging. There have been many postings about the problem from several other net users. In addition to looking for setuid root programs in users' home directories, hidden directories '.. ' (dot dot space space), and a modified telnet program, we have received two reports from Ultrix 3.0 sites that the intruders are replacing the /usr/bin/login program. The Ultrix security hole being used in these attacks is only found in Ultrix 3.0. Suggested steps: 1) Check for a bogus /usr/bin/login. The sum program reports: 27379 67 for VAX/Ultrix 3.0 2) Check for a bogus /usr/etc/telnetd. The sum program reports: 23552 47 for VAX/Ultrix 3.0 3) Look for .savacct in either /usr/etc or in users' directories. This may be the file that the new login program creates. It could have a different name on your system. 4) Upgrade to Ultrix 3.1 ASAP. 5) Monitor accounts for users having passwords that can be found in the /usr/dict/words file or have simple passwords like a persons name or their account name. 6) Search through the file system for programs that are setuid root. 7) Disable or modify the tftpd program so that anonymous access to the file system is prevented. If you find that a system that has been broken into, changing the password on the compromised account is not sufficient. The intruders do remove copies of the /etc/passwd file in order to break the remaining passwords. It is best to change all of the passwords at one time. This will prevent the intruders from using another account. Please alert CERT if you do find a problem. Thank you, Ed DeHart Computer Emergency Response Team Email: cert@sei.cmu.edu Telephone: 412-268-7090 (answers 24 hours a day) ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989101915524800> From: "W. K. (Bill) Gorman" <34AEJ7D@cmuvm.bitnet> 20-OCT-1989 23:32:48 To: Security Digest Subj: [262] locks (again) We are considering the purchase of a vault for secure storage of such items as tapes, etc. How secure are Sargent & Greenleaf combo locks? What do we get for their "anti-manipulation" feature - just an extra key lock that immobilizes the combination dial? ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989101916262600> From: (Stephen Tihor) 21-OCT-1989 0:06:26 To: Subj: [453] Grumann Breakin Kid with a Wargames dialer popped in to a small Gruman engineering system. Grumann seems to have been very sloppy since what the CBS newspeople who interviewed me ("Indpendant Computer Expert") said was that he go into a privileged maintenance account. Presumably FIELD. Of course Grumann does their own maintenance so its propbably their fault not DEC's if its a guessable password. But they let the kid in, tracked him back, and had him arrested. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989101917035500> From: GREENY 21-OCT-1989 0:43:55 To: Subj: [720] re: Home alarm distributors > I haven't located any other distributors of alarm systems who sell to the > general public... most can't according to the sales agreements that they have, or cant according to some vague laws. There are companies out there though that do sell alarm equipment try the following company and ask for a catalog: MCM Electronics 650 Congress Park Drive Centerville, OH 45459-4072 (513) 434-0031 FAX: (513) 434-6959 1-800-543-4330 Hope this helps... Bye for now but not for long... Greeny BITNET: MISS026@ECNCDC Internet: MISS026%ECNCDC.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU GEnie: GREENY MacNet: GREENY Disclaimer: I just picked the catalog out at random from my book rack...I'm not endorsing anything....or anyone... ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989101917314700> From: GREENY 21-OCT-1989 1:11:47 To: Subj: [1397] re: wireless systems > there is a version which is called supervised wireless, in which the central > station constantly polls the remotes ... Nope.....not the Central Monitoring Station, but rather the alarm CPU in your basement/utility closet....every 10-15 seconds the sensor puts out an "I'm here " signal to the CPU, and the CPU remembers it.....if it doesn't get a blip then it waits another 15 seconds or so and sees if it gets one again...if it doesnt, then it sends a signal to the Central Monitoring Station saying "Supervisory on Zone ##" where ## is the number of the zone that died... of course if someone is sophisticated to jam your xmitters (319.5 MHZ for those of you wondering...) then they could also just cut your phone line and unless you have a cellular dialer, or high security connection then you are out of luck.... Also, the newer wireless systems (such as the ITI SX-V) has sensors that have the brains to send a "Hey CPU, my battery is dying" signal to the CPU so that the CPU can call the central monitoring station, and then they will call either you and your dealer, just your dealer, or just you....then your dealer can come out and replace the batteries for you -- or if you can find the proper equivilent then you can do it yourself... l8r... bye for now but not for long Greeny BITNET: MISS026@ECNCDC Internet: MISS026%ECNCDC.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU GEnie: GREENY MacNEt: GREENY ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989101918134700> From: Marcus 21-OCT-1989 1:53:47 To: misc-security@uunet.uu.net Subj: [1640] home security Radio Shark is pretty expensive considering the quality and options they sell. Try some place like Aritech. (1-800-432-3232 for a catalog and make up a security company name for your mailing address) They carry much more stuff, and have the advantage of *KNOWING* their merchandise. (Try going to your local Radio Shark and asking them about how the controller *works*) They have good technical support, too. As far as the other poster's remark that a do it yourselfer might miss something the pros might not: That's true, but a do it yourselfer can do a lot of things the pros won't think of, or recommend. Examples are: wireless units with magnets between the VCR and the TV (move them and the alarm goes off - I don't sit with my alarm on when I watch movies), wireless units in the jewelry box (a fun one), wireless (or wired, at that) units between stereo components and stereo cabinet, etc. When I worked for a burgular alarm company, we never did anything like that because we could not rely on our customers not setting the darn things off constantly. Things that do it yourselfers *DO* forget: Horns/sirens outside, but not wired into the loop so that they can be disabled safely. Bells outside in cabinets where they can be reached (even if the bell cabinet is alarmed,a bell can be totally silenced with a can of polyurethane spray insulation) Making perimeter alarm units hidden. If they can't see them, they can't be scared off by them. We used to use a mix of perimeter alarms and then at least 1/3 as many interior alarms - stuff like between the doors to the master bedroom, computer room, etc. --mjr(); ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989101918433700> From: GREENY 21-OCT-1989 2:23:37 To: Subj: [1979] re: RF security systems WAS: AT&T Alarms > what frequency range do they use? 340 MHz or 319.5 MHz are the ones that I have seen... > Do they generate RFI? Doesn't everything nowdays? :-U Seriously though, they don't generate anything too much...or believe me, we'd have heard about it from our clients... > Are they suceptable to interferrence from other transmitters nearby... Not really, the signals are coded with a "House Code" that each transmitter has to be individually programmed to use, and there are about 10,000 possibilities for these....'course anything is possible... > Are the remote units battery powered? If so, is battery failure detected? YES! Why else would you want to install a wireless system, if you had to run wires to the individual sensors for power? Just add two more wires, and presto! you have a hardwired alarm... In reality, the sensors send a special signal to the CPU when their battery starts to die (3-5 years on the lithium ones in there now...), and the CPU calls the Central Station and tells them....then the Central station contacts your dealer....Your CPU also informs you that the battery is dying when you attempt to arm the alarm (you get a TROUBLE signal on Zone ##).... Also, the zones are all supervised, and the sensors send a signal to the cpu every 60 seconds or so saying "YO! I'm Here!"....if not, then a SUPERVISORY signal shows up... > Can a receiver be rendered inneffective by a transmitter on the same > frequency? Yes, but since all the xmitters are supervised, and since the transmissions are coded, all the bogus transmitter would do would be to jam the signal, and if the central station gets 47 Supervisory signals in 5 minutes from the same alarm panel, then they will call the police... Oh yeah, all the above is referencing ITI products.... bye for now but not for long Greeny BITNET: MISS026@ECNCDC Internet: MISS026%ECNCDC.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU GEnie: GREENY MacNet: GREENY Disclaimer: Nope, no way, it just couldn't be -- my fault.. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8911052339.AA00777@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989101920192200> From: OPER014@umuc.BITNET Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: ps/2 Message-ID: <8911052339.AA00777@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 19 Oct 89 20:19:22 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 21 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Thu Oct 19 21:19:22 1989 I know that shorting the 2 pins by the speaker will get you into a password protected ps/2, but I dont think it actually reinitializes the password... Its my understanding that that feature is for repair persons, and they would not necessarily be want to erase it. Please, somebody tell me if im wrong... Also a note to the more security conscious- As an occasional practical joke I gain entrance to peoples PS/2s by shorting those 2 pins with a paper clip through vent holes in the case. (I have only tried this on Model 50s). So you may want to place some kind of shield inside the box... locked, of course. incidentally, this was 'fixed' on the 50z- you have to move a jumper from one pair to the other in a group of three pins... the jumper is large enough to cover the shorted pins completely. --------------------------------------------------------------- oper014@umuc @umuc.umd.edu Jim Whats that red button do? ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8911052352.AA00875@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989102120064200> From: deh@MORDOR.ENG.UMD.EDU (Douglas Humphrey) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: locks (again) Message-ID: <8911052352.AA00875@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 21 Oct 89 20:06:42 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 32 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Sat Oct 21 21:06:42 1989 To a large extent, S&Gs are the best ( or one of the best). We have them on a Mosler and and older Remington safe, both GSA certified storage containers for classified materials, the Remington at Secret and the Mosler higher than that. The Mosler is a double safe, with an S&G MP on the outside, and a special S&G on the inside (built to somebodies specifications). Your local Mosler lock people will support the S&Gs with no problem, doing yearly maintenance, etc. and getting you out of a jamb (pun intended) when you need it... I am not sure what you mean by "anti-manipulation" feature; ours are MP locks, Manipulation Proof, but that really has to do with the internals on the lock, not an external locking pawl or anything like that. By the way, don't make the mistake that a lot of people do and fail to get yearly maintenance done on the lock(s). Sure, they most likely won't need it, and you will be throwing around $100/year to the wind, except for the day that the damned thing jams on you, and you discover the extreme cost of having your safe/vault drilled... Remember that these things are designed specifically to make it hard to do this. The estimate to have one of our drilled by Mosler was many hundreds of dollars, plus materials costs (14 diamond tipped bits, 2 drills [they figure that they will burn out 2 doing this] and other assorted things) plus the cost for them to weld in a plug of hardened steel and then the possibility (if you are a cleared storage facility) that the Government folks are not going to like the plug job and require that you buy a new safe door and have it put on... Big Bucks... Doug Digital Express, Inc. P.S. We didn't have to have it drilled, we were just asking... ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8911030224.AA09856@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989102200530000> From: JAHARITO@owucomcn.BITNET (JohnH) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: A big excuse from somebody I don't even know... Message-ID: <8911030224.AA09856@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 22 Oct 89 00:53:00 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 10 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Sun Oct 22 01:53:00 1989 Sorry for bothering the list, but it's the only think I can do... Somebody who his name I forget, wrote to me asking for my DES implementetion I replied to him and said I would send you something which I didn't... The reason is that after I replied your mail message, I deleted it and thus couldn't remember your username and address to send you the files... I apologize for that and ask you to send me your address again to send you the file. Again, really sorry, I apologize John Haritos. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102303144800> From: kent@wsl.dec.com 24-OCT-1989 10:54:48 To: howard@hasse.ericsson.se (Howard Gayle) Subj: [163] Re: Email addresses on business cards risky? Cc: misc-security@sunic.sunet.se DEC also won't let us put 'internal' hostnames on our business cards. We all think it's stupid, too, since everyone just writes the address on the back. chris ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102303453600> From: Robert Allinson 24-OCT-1989 11:25:36 To: Subj: [585] Personal Computer Viruses I am puzzled by the statement made by certain individuals. The statement was made that a virus can be put on an un-formatted disk and it can "virusize" your personal computer!!! Is this true? Is it possible to put a virus on an un-formatted disk? s this tru even transfer a virus If so, HOW? It does not make sense. In my view you have to format the disk in the first place to install data on it! correct? Please reply to : Robert Allinson XA3I@PURCCVM [Moderator tack-on: Depends on the type of PC, of course. Replies to him only, please... _H*] ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102304213800> From: Andrew Klossner 24-OCT-1989 12:01:38 To: misc-security@tektronix.tek.com Subj: [750] Re: datacrime II "In view of the huge demand and the clear anxiety indicated by that, Cate has decided, with the approval of PCM, to make the antidote more widely available on disk. Additional information can be obtained from her directly ..." I can't think of a better way to spread a virus than to launch a separate virus, publicize its dangers, then release an antidote containing the new virus. And who can make a better antitode to the first virus than its author? This is all purely hypothetical, I know nothing of Rikki Cate and have no reason to suspect her ... but you've got to be paranoid in this field. -=- Andrew Klossner (uunet!tektronix!frip.WV.TEK!andrew) [UUCP] (andrew%frip.wv.tek.com@relay.cs.net) [ARPA] ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102304570300> From: "Anthony A. Datri" 24-OCT-1989 12:37:03 To: security@pyrite.rutgers.edu Subj: [812] re: email addr on business card I can't see this at all. For one, "file server" is kind of a loose thing. The cards we fill out for free subscriptions to trade rags routinely ask for the numbers of machines at your site; I can't see how that could possibly be of any use. I introduced the idea of email addresses on business cards at a previous employer, but then, they were more backwards than I want to think about. The form here at Convex that you fill out to get cards has a blank on it for your address. If a company has a consistent namespace and nicely done mailers, everyone's card should say foo@company.com anyway, which wouldn't tell anyone more than the fact that you had one machine, which they could have figured out anyway. Even so, nothing's stopping them from scribbling their addresses on the back of the card anyway. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102305303200> From: stodol@diku.dk (David Stodolsky) 24-OCT-1989 13:10:32 To: misc-security@dkuug.dk Subj: [2142] Re: Personal Health Security System > Person then deletes this AIDS info. from their card. VOILA! No more > record of their AIDS infection. Information is updated daily. If you can not show a current health certificate, encoded with a digital signature of a doctor, people give you plenty of room, unless they wish to take their chances. I will send the complete proposal to those interested, or post it, if I get three or more requests. It is about ten pages. -------------------------------------------- Secure Distributed Databases for Epidemiological Control Abstract The project's objective is to develop a personal computer-based system for control of infectious agents. The overall goal is a better understanding of affects of enhanced social facilitation and health education on disease transmission. A new theory for real-time epidemiological control, based on contact tracing, is used to design a cryptographicly secure distributed- database system providing situationally specific risk assessments that are based upon personal histories. Personal computer systems negotiate exchanges of information that permit preselection of conversation partners. The techniques used yield unprecedented protection for user's identities and data. The systems permit self- administration of questionnaires and distribution of health information, as well as communication with selected conversation partners. Information on changing health status and risk related behaviors are routinely gathered during system operation. In addition to giving users situationally specific risk assessments, these data permit new types of epidemiological analysis. A pilot project devoted to design and development of a prototype system is specified in detail. The plan includes discussions with potential organizational participants in the proposed experiment and other interested parties. -- David S. Stodolsky, PhD Routing: <@uunet.uu.net:stodol@diku.dk> Department of Psychology Internet: Copenhagen Univ., Njalsg. 88 Voice + 45 31 58 48 86 DK-2300 Copenhagen S, Denmark Fax. + 45 31 54 32 11 ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8911052324.AA00648@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989102316034600> From: gwyn@BRL.MIL Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: locks (again) Message-ID: <8911052324.AA00648@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 23 Oct 89 16:03:46 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 11 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Mon Oct 23 17:03:46 1989 >How secure are Sargent & Greenleaf combo locks? >What do we get for their "anti-manipulation" feature - just an extra key >lock that immobilizes the combination dial? It depends on the model, but in general S&G makes pretty good combination locks. "Anti-manipulation" usually indicates just what it says, that the lock design includes features especially aimed at making manipulation (the art of opening a combination lock without knowing the combination a priori) difficult. One such feature would be additional (shallow) fake notches around the periperhy of the wheels. The best feature is one that prevents using the actuator handle to apply drag to the wheel pack. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8911090814.AA08750@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989102317421200> From: nagle@well.sf.ca.us (John Nagle) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: REINIALISING PS/2 PASSWORDS Message-ID: <8911090814.AA08750@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 23 Oct 89 17:42:12 GMT Sender: usenet@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 7 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Mon Oct 23 18:42:12 1989 >Next to the speaker on the earlier PS/2's is a pair of jumper pins. >If you short these while the machine is being powered up, the password >will be cleared from memory. How convenient. Was this designed in, or is it a flaw? John Nagle ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102402151300> From: hubcap@hubcap.clemson.edu (Mike Marshall) 25-OCT-1989 9:55:13 To: misc-security@gatech.edu Subj: [294] Re: Privacy vs on-line library * Any comments on the privacy issues here? They gotta do it that way. Your organization is site licensed to have access to that database. If Joe Blow walks off the street into the campus library and uses the database, it would violate the license agreement. -Mike hubcap@clemson.edu ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102402405200> From: jonhaug@ifi.uio.no (Jon Haugsand) 25-OCT-1989 10:20:52 To: security@rutgers.edu Subj: [1480] Re: Privacy vs on-line library Ah, at last some interesting discussion... I am currently doing my master thesis, and part of the work is definition and classification of security and security policies. I have some problems with 'privacy' In a book discussing the Norwegian privacy act [Dj\o nne 1987: "Personregisterloven, med kommentarer"], privacy is defined as: 'A person has personal interest in 1) discretion, 2) information correctness, 3) knowing what information processing that may cause consequences for him/her, and 4) sanctity of private life. And moreover: 5) the interface to the authorities should keep "a human face", 6) the vulnerability of databases should be minimized, and 7) people should be protected from unreasonable use of power by the authorities.' (Abstracted and translated by me.) The central point in the act itself is to 1) enable individuals to determine data collected on him or her, to get incorrect information corrected and to get irrelevant information deleted, and 2) regulate who is allowed to collect, process and store what information in electronic computers. (There are more, but this is what I myself find 'central'.) If security is defined as "a system's ability to maintain confidiality, integrety and availability of information", where does privacy fit? Another question: Do you agree with the above 'definition' of privacy? Does your contry's privacy act (if you have one) agree? --- --- --- Jon Haugsand Ifi, Univ. of Oslo, Norway jonhaug@ifi.uio.no ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102403302400> From: "Michael J. Chinni, SMCAR_CCS_E" 25-OCT-1989 11:10:24 To: Jim Kirkpatrick Subj: [2113] Re: Privacy vs on-line library Cc: security@pyrite.rutgers.edu Jim, Question, does your library card identify you as Jim Kirkpatrick, or does it just identify you as being from your university? > that they have no business keeping records of who looks at which databases. What makes you think that this is required because they are keeping records of who looks at what? > I can walk into the library and read the > bloody thing without presenting an ID, why should on-line use be made > more restrictive? You can walk into the library and read the thing, because the library is supported by the university and assumes that nobody NOT from the university will use it (or at least the use will be minimal). I can think of a very good reason that some form of ID is required. I assume (I may be wrong on this part) that your card identifies what library it is for. I also assume that your library pays a fee for access to this network (or at least for access to the encyclopedias). The network needs to prevent unauthorized access by people from non-member libraries. To do this it requires you to enter your library card bar code as a means to verify that you are indeed from a member library and are therefore authorized to use that system. Another reason (variation on the above) is that the member libraries are billed based on the usage by their people. This requires that the network know what library you are from when using this system. I agree with you that the keeping of a database of who looks at what is wrong, but I disagree with your assumption that this is the reason that the bar code is required. /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/ Michael J. Chinni Chief Scientist, Simulation Techniques and Workplace Automation Team US Army Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center User to skeleton sitting at cobweb () Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey and dust covered workstation () ARPA: mchinni@pica.army.mil "System been down long?" () UUCP: ...!uunet!pica.army.mil!mchinni /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/ ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102404110100> From: jimkirk@outlaw.uwyo.edu (Jim Kirkpatrick) 25-OCT-1989 11:51:01 To: MCHINNI@pica.army.mil Subj: [2471] Re: Privacy vs on-line library Cc: SECURITY@pyrite.rutgers.edu Responding to my recent query on library systems, Michael Chinni asks -- >Question, does your library card identify you as Jim Kirkpatrick, or >does it just identify you as being from your university? To clarify, the library card is actually just a bar-code sticker slapped on the back of my normal University ID card. Thus the card itself identifies ME, has my picture, and social security number (printed AND embossed!). Also, to clarify, to access either the on-line encyclopedia or a database of newspaper/magazine articles, I must enter my bar code number AND my last name (I found it only looks at the first 10 characters, but those 10 must be correct). So it has a table of bar codes and who they were assigned to (that's reasonable, when you check out a book and don't return it they need to know who to send the goons after :-). >> they have no business keeping records of >> who looks at which databases. >What makes you think that this is required because they are keeping >records of who looks at what? I admit the above was an overstatement. I don't know that they are keeping records of who looks at what, or if they are simply authenticating and counting usage. But I don't know they AREN'T keeping track, either. > assumes that nobody NOT from the university >will use it (or at least the use will be minimal). I would suggest that unauthorized use of the online encyclopedia is likely to be minimal as well. > I agree with you that the keeping of a database of who looks at what is >wrong, but I disagree with your assumption that this is the reason that the >bar code is required. It was a wrong assumption from the view that I don't KNOW they are keeping track, but I don't KNOW that they AREN'T. Any such system CAN be abused almost trivially and without notice to the users. One example is the repeated use over the past hundred years or so of gun registration lists to confiscate guns, despite a government's insistence such lists would never be used that way (WWII Germany was particularly brutal in this regard). I do not mention this to compare guns with books, but just to point out that governments will and do abuse their power to gain access to information they want. I would rather it be impossible for the information to exist, than to be assured (by people who don't even understand the system) that such records aren't being kept. "The price of freedom is eternal vigilance" or something like that. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8911030128.AA09030@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989102413330000> From: KAPLANB@iubacs.BITNET (Brian Kaplan) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: RE: Personal Computer Viruses Message-ID: <8911030128.AA09030@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 24 Oct 89 13:33:00 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 7 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Tue Oct 24 14:33:00 1989 Doesn't make any sense. As soon as one formats a disk, all the tracks and sectors become available for data and if there was a virus written on the unformatted disk, it would be overwritten. One could always be safe and use one of the Norton Utilities and erase the disk to government specs. I would worry about it. Bye for now. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102516295100> From: rlearn@relay.nswc.navy.mil 27-OCT-1989 0:09:51 To: security@pyrite.rutgers.edu Subj: [361] RE: Privacy vs on-line li I suspect the check is simply to verify that you are a legitimate member of the "conglomerate" and not just anyone with a desire to use the "encyclopedia" feature for which your library is paying. Who says they are going to keep score on all the users which would be a library unto itself and cost some body some money? Who would pay for that service? ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102517075400> From: cme<%cloud9.Stratus.COM@rutgers.edu> (Carl Ellison) 27-OCT-1989 0:47:54 To: linus!misc-security<%encore.UUCP@rutgers.edu> Subj: [1009] Re: Privacy vs on-line library > . . . I can walk into the library and read the > bloody thing without presenting an ID, why should on-line use be made > more restrictive? It sounds like an accounting measure to me. Is your department charged for database usage? What I would push for is the same privacy which the census provides -- make sure no record is released (or, better, kept) of individual data, releasing info only when no specifics about individuals can be deduced from it. You might do that here by having a group ID card to be scanned -- one giving just the department ID (or whatever the accounting entity is). If you can trust the local programmers, you could depend on them to accumulate no data about *what* you're accessing -- only about how long you use the service. If you can't trust the programmers you need a pay-phone type of facility. That could be with a coin box or a time meter (like the little boxes you used to walk around with for Xerox machines -- the ones with your own odometer style copy counter). ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102517401700> From: johnw@watnext.waterloo.edu (John Wieczorek) 27-OCT-1989 1:20:17 To: misc-security@watmath.waterloo.edu Subj: [1017] Re: Privacy vs on-line library IMHO the issue here is the management of a finite, money consuming resource in very much the same manner as your userid is on your system. The arguement can then be made that anyone can walk off the street into your universities library and read the book manually. This is a valid point, but if a large group of non-students began to use the library resources to the point that it impeded legitimate users (students) the University would then have to do one of two things; increase their expenditures to support the activities of people unrelated to them, or cut them off. Your membership in your Universities library system is your ride ticket, though it may just as easily be used to monitor the materials you read. Life's a bitch, but it is unrealitic to expect that you can use shared computing reasources without the possiblity of footprints. Ultimatley, your previous options are and will remain open, 1) go there physically have a seat and read or 2) buy a copy of the book. John Wieczorek ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102518085900> From: "Bill Turner, Cornell University Library" 27-OCT-1989 1:48:59 To: Nick Gimbrone , security@pyrite.rutgers.edu Subj: [2012] Re: Privacy vs on-line library Cc: John Rudan , Tom Boggess As the primary technical support person for a library system, I would like to point out that there are not necessarily any privacy issues involved here. The question is whether the system is storing the ID's when they are entered, and if so, what happens to them. A good example - any library staff member can certainly (and appropriately!) find out who has what books checked out, and what books any given individual has checked out. A few programmers can even construct the borrowing history of a given individual (a moment's thought about how a library works will tell you this). The fact that something CAN be done does not imply that it is being done. A better question is whether your ID number can be, and is, correlated to your Social Security number. There's probably no good reason why it should be, although often systems are designed by people who are completely insensitive to privacy issues. Finally, however, I find your attitude that somebody owes you free online use of whatever services are offered rather amusing. If you don't want to identify yourself, walk down to the library and use the books. Presumably there are billing issues involved, where somebody is subsidising your online use of an encyclopedia, and asking you to identify yourself for that reason. I'm sure that if you went to the source and offered to establish a fund to pay for completely open use, they'd be happy to set it up. Remember that the provider of the service (the encyclopedia) has something to say about who uses it. I would guess that CARL has a site license that says they may make it available to their own community, but not the world at large. It may be that your ID is validated against a table and no information stored about your access, except possibly a counter indicating the total number of accesses for the encyclopedia. An encyclopedia company that did NOT have such a licensing strategy would quickly go broke, because of selling only one copy of each edition which somebody would put online. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8911092239.AA03613@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989102521590200> From: davecb@nexus.yorku.ca (David Collier-Brown) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: Privacy vs on-line library Message-ID: <8911092239.AA03613@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 25 Oct 89 21:59:02 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 20 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Wed Oct 25 22:59:02 1989 >Another reason (variation on the above) is that the member libraries >are billed based on the usage by their people. This requires that the network >know what library you are from when using this system. The libraries are both charged by information providers and funded by supporting organizations based on use and/or membership. When working for a supplier of some slight note, I was surprised at the conflicting needs to keep track of usage information for funding purposes (and for book-replacement estimates), and the need to **not** keep track of readership information for particular books. And yes, both are legally mandated and prohibited in differing justistictions (:-}). --dave -- David Collier-Brown, | davecb@yunexus, ...!yunexus!davecb or 72 Abitibi Ave., | {toronto area...}lethe!dave Willowdale, Ontario, | Joyce C-B: CANADA. 416-223-8968 | He's so smart he's dumb. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102522192900> From: royf%pwcs@uunet.uu.net (Roy Forsstrom) 27-OCT-1989 5:59:29 To: misc-security@uunet.uu.net Subj: [1969] Re: Privacy vs on-line library >Earlier this year I remember reading articles about the government wanting >libraries to turn over records of who checked out what book It was the FBI hoping to find out if Soviet/East Block embassy employees were requesting tech/engineering materials at Columbia University. I wrote to my congressman about it and got a letter back from the FBI in DC. I helped install an on-line catalog/Library Information System called PALS at a small college here in Minnesota. Our initial setup didn't require password or barcode numbers to access the system although the feature was available. The reason to use the access code is MONEY! It cost the college about 2.5 cents per transaction. At the time, we weren't implementing circulation on the system,so students and faculty didn't have barcodes. Since the town was allowed to use the library also, we didn't want to restrict their access right off the bat. Keeping tract of who requests what is possible, if you want to spend the time and money. Most libraries don't have either. [An interesting side note, Len Deighton's latest book "Spy Hook" tells of an database that logs attempts to retrieve restricted data.] >Any comments on the privacy issues here? Remember when Bork was a candidate for the Supreme Court? A video store released a list of movies his family had rented over the past year. I think some laws were passed rather quickly after that. Sweden and England have very strict laws about who can do what with computer data. One English mailing list I'm on asked me to sign a release because they keep the list on a computer. -----------------------------------+------------------------------------------- Roy Forsstrom 612-298-5569 | Traveling makes one modest. You see Public Works Computer Services | what tiny place you occupy in the world. pwcs!royf royf@pwcs.StPaul.GOV | -Flaubert -----------------------------------+------------------------------------------- ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102522494400> From: tkoppel@isis.cs.du.edu (Ted Koppel) 27-OCT-1989 6:29:44 To: misc-security@ncar.ucar.edu Subj: [2079] Re: Privacy vs on-line library First, Jim, I'm writing as a person who values and respects the privacy of user records. When I became a librarian I signed off on the idea that people's records are not to be shared, and so on. What I am writing is not necessarily the official policy of CARL. Still, I'll address your issues: a. In the case of the encyclopedia and other databases that are made available on Online Catalogs, we are required by the database supplier's contract to limit the use of certain databases to the primary user population of our members. What that means is that, for instance, a U Wyoming student/faculty/staff person has full access to that database (the encyclopedia, for instance), but a citizen of the state of Wyoming (not known to the University..) does not have access. If we don't restrict access to only the primary user population, then the database provider can accuse us of breach of contract, and ultimately has the right to yank the database from us. Sadly, the 'limit access on your online system' strategy is being em- braced more and more by the database suppliers (see the discussion on the Library PACS-L Bitnet mailing List). I don't see it getting better, either, because the databse suppliers are scared that too much online use is going to transalate into fewer print subscriptions, which is what really pays their bills. By the way, the CARL privacy issue is not what you think. When you come into a password-controlled database, we set a switch to "1"; when you exit, we turn it back to "0". (You can't use a password controlled database on the same password at the same time). CARL doesn't log who used what database at what time - sure, we could, but no, we're not doing so. Final note, Jim - if you're on one of the hardwired terminals at Wyoming, you're not asked for a password at all. (The hardwired terminals are all located in the various libraries there). Only the remote dialups need passwords. -- Ted Koppel CARL - Colorado Alliance of Research Libraries = BITNET: TKOPPEL@DUCAIR UUCP: uunet!isis!tkoppel or tkoppel@du.edu ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8911122356.AA12784@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989102603022800> From: rjg@sialis.mn.org (Robert J. Granvin) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: Privacy vs on-line library Message-ID: <8911122356.AA12784@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 26 Oct 89 03:02:28 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 16 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Thu Oct 26 04:02:28 1989 > You can walk into the library and read the thing, because the library >is supported by the university and assumes that nobody NOT from the university >will use it (or at least the use will be minimal). Universities are supported by tuitions, grants and public and state funding. Universities are centers of knowledge and learning. The libraries of these universities are open and available to everyone. The information contained therein isn't restricted in any form to only students "And others as long as the use is minimal". -- ________Robert J. Granvin________ INTERNET: rjg@sialis.mn.org ____National Computer Systems____ BITNET: rjg%sialis.mn.org@cs.umn.edu __National Information Services__ UUCP: ...amdahl!bungia!sialis!rjg "Insured against Aircraft, including self-propelled missiles and spacecraft." ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8911092159.AA02842@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989102615365000> From: davecb@nexus.yorku.ca (David Collier-Brown) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: Privacy vs on-line library Message-ID: <8911092159.AA02842@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 26 Oct 89 15:36:50 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 19 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Thu Oct 26 16:36:50 1989 > Any such system CAN be abused almost trivially and without notice > to the users. [...] the information to exist, than to be assured (by >people who don't even understand the system) that such records aren't being >kept. A specific, known example: a crossmatch between a library systems and a pharmacy system running on the same timesharing service: from pharmacy, select females with perscriptions for birth controll pills crossmatch with library for address and age print where age < 30 and city = this one. --dave c-b -- David Collier-Brown, | davecb@yunexus, ...!yunexus!davecb or 72 Abitibi Ave., | {toronto area...}lethe!dave Willowdale, Ontario, | Joyce C-B: CANADA. 416-223-8968 | He's so smart he's dumb. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8911090858.AA09138@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989102704590000> From: MASROB@UBVMSC.CC.BUFFALO.EDU (CNSM CCR - Rob Rothkopf) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Universal Card System Message-ID: <8911090858.AA09138@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 27 Oct 89 04:59:00 GMT Sender: usenet@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 23 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Fri Oct 27 05:59:00 1989 The University of Buffalo is considering the feasabilities/possibilities of establishing a "universal" card-access system for all areas of University activity. This single card would be used by all faculties including: -- University Libraries: could be used with copiers -- Records/Admissions: could be used as positive student ID -- Could be used as "meal card" -- Keyless card-entry system into student dormitories -- Miscellaneous applications including single-vote verification, purchasing, student accounts (perhaps mom and dad could "easily" add money for students to later have access to for food, etc.) We've received some literature on the "Smart Card" and how it might fill our needs; since this is the beginning of this investigation we could use any input others may have from previous experiences with card systems. If anyone has experience with/knowledge of the "Smart Card" or *any* other established card access system, I'd appreciate the advice and info. Either reply direct or through the net (some might find this info. useful) Thanks in advance. --Rob Rothkopf ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8911051408.AA25745@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989102714174000> From: TENCATI@NSSDCA.GSFC.NASA.GOV (SPAN SECURITY MGR. (301)286-5223) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: Privacy vs on-line library Message-ID: <8911051408.AA25745@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 27 Oct 89 14:17:40 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 13 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Fri Oct 27 15:17:40 1989 On a related note - Did you know that the 976- , and 1-900 people also keep track of who calls, and sells your phone numbers to advertisers in the same manner that credit card companies sell your address? I'm not sure if this is also true for 1-800 calls, since they are AT&T or another carrier company, but apparently there are no rules against selling your number. Ron Tencati NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center Tencati@Nssdca.Gsfc.Nasa.Gov ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8911090224.AA05131@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989102714444500> From: UKA051@ukcc.BITNET ("Jack L. Coffman") Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: (none) Message-ID: <8911090224.AA05131@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 27 Oct 89 14:44:45 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 26 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Fri Oct 27 15:44:45 1989 We at the University of Kentucky run an IDMS data base at the central computing center. Most batch updating is performed at night by our central data control staff. We do have programmers distributed in user offices who now do some batch updating to the data base. Most user departments have people who execute reports using COBOL, MARKIV, OLQ, CULPRIT, and SAS against the data base and extract files. We are at the point of deciding how to set up libraries to allow user departments to update or execute reports from the data base or extract files. Does anyone have any exeprience or words of wisdom on how to approach this decision. Are we unique in allowing user departments to update the data base? Thanks Jack L. Coffman - UKA051@UKCC Security and Contingency Planning Officer 128 McVey Hall University of Kentucky Lexington, Ky 40506-0045 (606)257-2273 ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8911030319.AA11008@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989102723231000> From: eravin@dasys1.UUCP (Ed Ravin) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: Bike Locks Message-ID: <8911030319.AA11008@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 27 Oct 89 23:23:10 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 19 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Sat Oct 28 00:23:10 1989 One thing the enlightened cyclists are doing in Manhattan is two always lock the bike up with two different kinds of locks. The average bike thief is only prepared to break one kind of locking system. The usual combination is a U-lock and a flexible cable with padlock. That means the thief would have to carry two different sets of tools to get the bike. Most streetwise bikers also take some old chain links and rivet a little loop of chain between the bicycle seat and the frame, to discourage parts theives from taking the seat. Bike theft is disgusting in this city: even your 3-speed covered with rust isn't safe. The new unit of commerce is the crack vial: as long as your bike is worth at least one vial to someone, it is a potential theft target. -- Ed Ravin | hombre!dasys1!eravin | "A mind is a terrible thing (BigElectricCatPublicUNIX)| eravin@dasys1.UUCP | to waste-- boycott TV!" --------------------------+----------------------+----------------------------- Reader bears responsibility for all opinions expressed in this article. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102919032300> From: Joe Meister 31-OCT-1989 2:43:23 To: security@pyrite.rutgers.edu Subj: [489] RE: How to track people down? You might want to try a credit bureau. You will not be able to get credit information, but they often offer services that can trace name and address changes. It might cost from $2-$4 per find. Avoid services that charge just for looking. Also, some services will look for you, and others provide on-line lookups. Finally, we are an institutional user, I am not completely sure that individuals can use the service. Also, it is incredibly easier to use social security numbers. Good luck. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102919311100> From: conch!steve@uunet.uu.net (Steve Froeschke) 31-OCT-1989 3:11:11 To: misc-security@uunet.uu.net Subj: [308] Re: locks (again) We use several Sargent & Greenleaf locks where I work (U.S. Navy here in Key West FL), and I've found them to one of the best. They are well built, (read HEAVY to hold :-) ), and easier than most to do combination changes on. I can highly recommend them from over 8 years of working with them. Steve ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102919563700> From: Michael Stack 31-OCT-1989 3:36:37 To: SECURITY Digest Subj: [495] Re: How to track people down? I know this isn't exactly a "high-tech" answer, but our high school reunion committee made good use of city telephone directories they found at a local library. It means lots of phone calls, and it won't help with names changed through marriage, but the results were impressive. Only about five percent of our graduating class was not found twenty-five years later, and we'd be silly to believe that at least some of those didn't want to be found. Michael Stack Northern Illinois University ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102920242100> From: jimkirk@outlaw.uwyo.edu (Jim Kirkpatrick) 31-OCT-1989 4:04:21 To: SECURITY@pyrite.rutgers.edu Subj: [709] Re: locks (again) (Curiously, the original question's headers did not indicate the originator thus I must reply to the list) The Sargent & Greenleaf lock is the subject of a small book on how to manipulate combination (safe & vault) locks. A friend actually bought one to play with, and it is in fact somewhat easy to open. I have an old Yale that's essentially impossible. The book describes anti-manipulation features as: tightened tolerances, added mechanical features to prevent reading contact points, and added features to create false sounds or feelings. In the S&G manipulation-resistant type, the design prevents reading contact points and would appear to be much more difficult to open than the vanilla type. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102920275200> Date: 29 Oct 89 20:27:52 GMT From: stodol@diku.dk (David Stodolsky) Subject: Secure Distributed Databases for Epidemiological Control To: misc-security@dkuug.dk English update of: Stodolsky, D. S. (1989, August). Brugerforvaltet datakommunikationssystem til bekaempelse af seksuelt overfoerbare infektionssygdomme [Secure Distributed Databases for Epidemiological Control]. Research proposal submitted to the AIDS-Fund Secretariat, Danish Health Department. (Available from the author at the Psychology Department, University of Copenhagen ) ============================================================== Secure Distributed Databases for Epidemiological Control Abstract The project's objective is to develop a personal computer-based system for control of infectious agents. The overall goal is a better understanding of affects of enhanced social facilitation and health education on disease transmission. A theory of real- time epidemiological control, based on contact tracing, specifies a cryptographicly-secure distributed-database system providing situationally specific risk assessments that are based upon personal histories. Personal computer systems negotiate exchanges of information that permit preselection of conversation partners. The techniques used yield unprecedented protection for user's identities and data. Users communicate under the protection of pseudonyms. Data is kept private, but is releasable through exchange negotiations. The systems permit self-administration of questionnaires and distribution of health information, as well as communication with selected conversation partners. Information on changing health status and risk related behaviors are routinely gathered during system operation. In addition to giving users situationally specific risk assessments, these data permit new types of epidemiological analysis. A pilot project devoted to design and development of a prototype system is specified in detail. The plan includes discussions with potential organizational participants in the proposed experiment and other interested parties. ===================================================== 30 August, 1989 "I don't want to know your name, I want your history." (Painters and Dockers, 1988). Secure Distributed Databases for Epidemiological Control (Controlling Sexually Transmitted Diseases with Informational Barriers) 1. Objectives Information technology offers new techniques for the control of infectious agents that can complement medical and public health measures. The techniques described here are most useful when medical measures are of limited value and where privacy concerns predominate. The discussion is focused on control of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), even though the approach is of general applicability. For instance, HIV seropositive persons benefit even more from this approach than others, since it helps protect them from exposure to infectious agents that can activate the virus and cause other infections. The specific project objective is the development of information technology techniques for control of sexually transmitted diseases. The overall project objective is to investigate the impact of social facilitation and health education on disease transmission, that is achieved by using such techniques. Social facilitation has two roles. First, to enhance risk free contacts through preemptive detection of risky transactions. Second, to reduce the total number of transactions, and thereby risk, by stabilizing relationships through increasing the probability that continuing interactions results from mediated contacts. Both of these objectives require negotiations using significant amounts of sensitive information prior to actual contact. In the first case this information is of a medical nature, in the second it is of an ideological or social nature. The negotiation procedure can be highly restrictive, resulting in rejection of most potential contacts. Thus, if social support is to be maintained, the scope of potential contacts must be increased. This requirement is satisfied by using telematic systems and computer support in the negotiation process. Such automatic mediation also permits effective protection of sensitive personal information, thereby enhancing the likelihood that the data is complete and reliable. 1.1. Detection of risk Preemptive risk detection is facilitated by individualized real-time epidemiological modeling. Both the medical and behavioral history of each person is available during the negotiation process. Certain risky contacts are blocked by the mediating system. For instance, a HIV seropositive person would never be matched with a HIV seronegative person. In most cases, however, medical test results will not be available, thus behavioral information provide estimates of risk. Adequate data is maintained to permit contact tracing in real-time when a positive test result occurs. Thus, a single positive test result could propagate through a chain of contacts, changing the risk status of a large number of persons rapidly. Persons at high risk would be rejected as social contacts, in most cases, until a negative test result was obtained. This would lead to voluntary compliance with a program of selective testing for persons at greatest risk. Thus, preemptive risk detection operates in two ways. First, risky contacts are rejected by presumably uninfected persons, thereby blocking transmission of infectious agents. Second, at-risk persons are motivating to seek medical assistance for a change of risk status. 1.2. Stabilizing relationships As long as infectious agents are prevalent, risk of infection is proportional to the number of (risky) contacts. In the case that persons are seeking a stable relationship, a prior knowledge of objective factors including behaviors, and subjective factors such as interests, desires, attitudes, and beliefs can play a role in predicting outcome of a contact and thereby minimizing the number of contacts needed to find a stable relationship. While guarantees of privacy can improve the reliability of data contributed by persons, it is likely that feedback from prior contacts can be used to improve data accuracy. It certainly can play a role in confirming that self reports are complete and honest. 1.3. Security system development The success of the strategy proposed requires the ability to use data without disclosing it except when absolutely required. The highly sensitive nature of the data needed for this study presumes development of improved security models. Security that is dependent on trusted third parties may be adequate for the initial phase of this study, but elimination of such intermediaries is an objective. Thus, in the limit, each person would exercise control over their sensitive data directly. This would, of course, require a personal computer or "smart card" for each user. Such systems have been proposed and will become economically feasible in the near future. Specification and feasibility analysis of various security enhancements will be examined as part of the project. A first security enhancement step would be to provide the user with a card that in connection with a password or personal identification number (PIN) could be used to activate remotely held sensitive data. This level of security is currently available with electronic funds transfer (EFT) terminals (automated teller machines). A next level of security is to provide each user with a "key loader" that provides a sequence of binary digits that is used to decode remotely held data files that normally remain enciphered. Optimal security is available when data is under the direct physical control of the user as well as being secured by password and cryptographic security mechanisms. Currently available personal computers have adequate capacity to perform these functions. Central data would list pseudonyms (public-keys) of persons using compatible systems and provide mail boxes for messages. All exchanges of information would be encrypted. 2. Significance The AIDS epidemic has created a medical emergency of major proportions. It also threatens to create a crisis of social control unprecedented in modern times. The major reason for this is the lack of medical countermeasures against the virus. A second reason is the effect of the HIV on the brain, AIDS dementia complex (ADC), that can result in irresponsible behavior (AIDS not, 1987; Smith, 1989). A third reason is that some common institutions for social coordination may actually accelerate the spread of the disease. This deficiency can be overcome by a strategy that simultaneously enhances personal integrity and social control. Factors including changing population density, behavioral patterns, and infection pathways alter niches for pathogenic organisms which evolve under new conditions. AIDS is an example of a disease which has dramatized the availability of a new niche. Seale and Medvedev (1987) argue that the AIDS epidemic could not have started without the availability of multi-use hypodermics. An important characteristic of this disease is inapparent infection that inhibits its control. Effective control presumes the ability to visualize the infectious agent and take appropriate action to avoid further transmission. Cost effective medical testing alone cannot reliable visualize HIV, due to delayed seroconversion resulting from the virus remaining hidden inside cells, failures in seroconversion, and even loss of antibody response. Transmission can apparently not be reliably blocked by physical barriers. Related organisms pose an even greater threat prior to identification (Cancer virus, 1987). These limitations demand a new control strategy suitable to new conditions of disease transmission. The control strategy suggested here permits an approach to disease management independent of medical capabilities. It has the potential of being both effective and economical. Infection risk is visualized entirely through information handling. Thus, the technique can be applied without detailed knowledge of the infectious agent. Avoidance of infection is an integrated function of the information handling strategy, as is the motivational structure needed to promote cooperation. A most important aspect of the strategy is that it is a preventative approach. Brecher (1975) concluded that the three major strategies for control of sexually transmitted diseases, treatment of symptomatic cases, contact tracing, and routine screening are ineffective compared to simple preventative measures. He argues for health education and effective prophylaxis as likely to lead to reduced incidence. In the case of HIV, prophylaxis is the only strategy currently available, and thus it is crucial that informational as well as physical barriers be used to inhibit the spread of the virus. This is perhaps even more important when we consider the long term dynamics of disease. Often diseases evolve in the direction of reduced virulence, making them less apparent and often more prevalent (Seale & Medvedev, 1987). In the case of HIV, it is likely that the first successful medical countermeasures will consist of methods to extend the latent period of the disease. Thus, while currently, a person can remain symptom free for 5 to 7 years, a person receiving this first type of treatment for HIV may remain symptom free for 20 years or more. The key premise of this strategy asserts that HIV infection and AIDS are chronic, manageable conditions (Smith, 1989). During this time persons may pose a continuing infection risk. If these persons are to remain contributing members of society the informational barriers suggested here may be crucial. A wide range of compulsory measures directed towards individuals have been suggested and in some cases implemented, even though their negative side effects have been recognized. However, voluntary ones which could be equally effective have not been exploited. The potential of voluntary measures has been recognized by the public. The news report, "Blodgivarnaal blir 'friskhetsintyg'?", was occasioned by a sharp increase in blood donors in Malmo and reports that blood donor pins were being used at a dance hall as health certificates (Fredriksson, 1987). A corresponding increase was noted to not have occurred in Goteborg. In Malmo the pins are given out after the first blood donation, while in Goteborg they are given out after ten donations. So the difference in public response is hardly surprising, it results from a natural experiment on the control of sexually transmissible diseases. 3. Background 3.1. Informational precursors in social medicine The epidemiological approach taken here is similar to the highly effective public health measures taken in 18th and 19th century to control infectious diseases. Up until that time cities (e.g., Copenhagen and Stockholm) most often had no effective sewage or garbage disposal services. This led to a situation in many cities where maximum population levels were reached, with deaths due to infection balancing population inputs. Having recognized that many diseases were transmitted (by microorganisms) in wastes, public works programs were undertaken in order to segregate fluids carrying wastes from fluids used for consumption and for food preparation. These measures were taken well before effective medical procedures for dealing with many diseases were developed, and in most cases before the actual causative agents were identified. A key point is that knowledge about transmission of infectious agents preceeded their control. This control was implemented by a physical restructuring of fluid management through sanitary engineering. The fluids dealt with here are distinguished by the source individual. Due to higher population densities, changes in attitudes about sex, increases in uses of invasive procedures (use of blood and other bodily products in medicine, and use of injectable drugs) persons are now much "closer" in a physiological sense then in earlier times (Seale & Medvedev, 1987). It is not only recommended to avoid certain classes of fluids that are in general known to contain infectious agents, but to avoid contact with body fluids from classes of persons in risk groups (Prostitutes asked, 1987). The approach discussed here goes one step further in this line of development, it introduces measures permitting one to routinely avoid contact with fluids from specific individuals who are at risk or known to be carriers of an infectious agent. This requires the routine use of prior knowledge about these agents. That is, the availability of informational precursors associated with these agents. 3.1.1. Biological agents A clear understanding of the approach requires distinction between biological agents, informational agents making demands upon attention, and informational agents that require only processing by machines. If each person was to inform a potential contact of all infectious agents carried by that person, then we could say that an informational precursor existed for each infectious agent. This would give persons the option of avoiding contact with fluids containing infectious agents. 3.1.2. Informational demands upon attention Aside from the privacy problems and diagnostic uncertainties which would reduce the effectiveness of such a procedure, there are major informational demands upon attention associated with it. Particularly in the case where there is a reasonable prevalence of an infectious agent in a population, the simple communication of diagnostic information would be inadequate. With sexually transmitted diseases, in most cases, at least one new person has been infected by the time a given individual has been diagnosed as carrying the infectious agent. Thus, a person would have to communicate not only their own diagnostic information, but also the diagnostic information from previous contacts. Some of information concerning a given contact would only become available much after that contact had take place, thus inducing unrealistic informational demands upon communicators. 3.1.3. Information processible by machine A solution to this problem is to structure diagnostic data in standardized machine readable forms, thus permitting precursor information (both from direct diagnosis and from diagnostic information transmitted by contact tracing) to be exchanged by computers prior to an anticipated contact. This strategy also permits the introduction of an effective solution to the privacy problem. The idea is to make use of the information without revealing that information except when it is no longer sensitive (Stodolsky, in prep.). It also compensates to some degree for diagnostic uncertainties, since what is transmitted by automated contact tracing is information about risk, as opposed to direct diagnostic information. The automated contact tracing mechanism can also be implemented in a manner protecting personal integrity (Stodolsky, 1979a; 1979b; 1979c; 1983; 1986) 3.2. Theory of operation The system outlined here is most simply explained if we assume that each person has a personal computer capable of directly exchanging information with those of other persons. These computers can, in the simplest case, generate random numbers that are used to label transactions. A transaction is defined as an interaction capable of transmitting the infectious agent. After each transaction, therefore, a person has a unique label or code for that transaction. In the event that a person becomes ill or is identified as carrying an infectious agent, the transaction codes which represent transactions during which that agent could have been transmitted are then broadcast to all other computers. If a receiver's computer has a matching code, then that person is alerted to the possibility of the agent's presence, and can report to a medical center for testing and treatment. This iterates the process, thus identifying all carriers eventually. The effect is to model the epidemiological process, thereby identifying all (potential) carriers through forward and backward contact tracing. In order to clarify the procedure, consider a scenario in which there are two types of actors, persons (Pi) and doctors (Di) (Figure 1). Doctors operate only within a health center (HC). There are also two types of agents, biological and informational, that can be transmitted during a transaction. Informational agents are always transmitted with physical agents. Each actor has a computer that can exchange information with another actor's computer. A doctor's computer can also broadcast messages to all actors at once by sending them through a more powerful computer at the health center. Contact tracing is illustrated by the sequence in Figure 2. At time T1 person A (Pa) and person B (Pb) engage in a transaction. Their computers label this transaction with a number N1 and store the number. Pb then physically moves into contact with person C (Pc), this transaction is labeled N2 and recorded at time T2. At time T3, Pb becomes ill and reports to a doctor (Da). The doctor verifies the infectious nature of the illness and then reads the transaction codes, N1 and N2, out of Pb's computer. These are broadcast to all other computers at time T4. When Pa's computer receives the broadcast, the transaction code N1 matches the number stored in memory. This alerts Pa to the fact that s/he is in the chain of transmission of the infection ( in this case Pa was the initial carrier of the infectious agent). When Pc's computer receives the broadcast, the transaction code N2 matches the number stored in memory. This alerts Pc to the fact that s/he may have been infected (at T2). The alerting of Pa is an example of backward tracing from Pb. The alerting of Pc is an example of forward tracing. We assume in this simplest case, that when an alert is received, the affected person voluntarily reports to a doctor. In a more secure system, a person's computer would not be capable of generating new transaction codes if a matching code had been received. This would indicate to potential new contacts that contact with this person was risky. (Actually, the more secure procedure would require the exchange of updated health certificates.) 3.3. Operational alternatives An ideal system would ensure that all contacts were mediated by computer. Since the most appropriate technology, powerful wristwatch like computers with communication capabilities, is not available for the moment (though key components have become available [Ivey, Cox, , Harbridge, & Oldfield (1989)]), development will proceed on standard personal computers. While these machines are available in a hand held format, people can not be expected to carry them at all times. In many cases, people can organize their contacts using a personal computer from an office, public computer center, or their home, but clearly other options must be available. A voice-message system that duplicates all function of the personal computer, but with voice output and telephone key-pad input is an attractive option. It permits planned organization of contact opportunities with limited, but, for most persons, more than adequate security. In the case of chance meetings, persons would be required to make an inquiry prior to proceeding with a contact. The common magnetic strip credit card offers an adequate level of security, but requires a readily accessible teller machine. Such a verification system assumes cooperation of appropriate financial institutions. A telephone-based verification system used in a manner similar to credit card verification is another option. The various options will be considered during the first year of the project. 4. Research plan The overall research plan is based on a 2 factor design with repeated measures. One factor is risk group and the second is availability of an experimental health conferencing system. Dependent measures include health status and health related behaviors. The plan is designed to permit rigorous evaluation of results without interfering with effective service to the subject populations, and to permit rapid scaling up to a larger population if justified by the initial results. If the security needs are met, it is expected that demand for service will exceed supply. The waiting list management strategy will generate the control groups. The effect of the health conferencing system on infection and risk behaviors is of major interest, thus this effect is measured as a within subject factor. Each group will be compared to itself at a later time. Comparison to cross sectionally matched individuals controls for time effects. The differential effectiveness the experimental intervention on different risk groups is studied as a between subject factor in order to enhance the generalizability of the results. A nested multi-variate analysis of co-variance with repeated measures using matched controls is used for overall data evaluation. 4.1. Method A secure conferencing system permitting automated interviewing and selection of conversation partners, as well as mail delivery functions will be developed. The software will be installed on two identical systems. One system will be made available to the Organization of Gays and Lesbians in Denmark, the other to the (HIV) Positive Group in Denmark. Each person expressing interest in participating receives information describing the study and a preliminary self-administered interview. Person applying to the Positive Group must present evidence of seropositivity to be considered further. Persons applying to the Organization of Gays and Lesbians in Denmark must present results of a Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) investigation to be considered further. Upon presentation of appropriate medical evidence, the registrar assigns them a pseudonym and password. A comprehensive interview covering health history and health behaviors is then self-administered. Each person receives health education materials and is placed on the waiting list. When 500 persons are available from each organization they will be formed into matched groups and randomly assigned to either treatment or control conditions. The treatment groups receive a questionnaire for guiding the selection of conversation partners. Controls remain on the waiting list for six months at which time they are integrated into the treatment condition. Depending upon results of a risk assessment interview, serological testing may again be required. Participants are required to give feedback interviews after meeting conversation partners. This serves as a check on self-reported data and as a source of information on opportunities for transmission of infectious agents. Data on interactions with other persons and degree of risk associated with them is also collected routinely. Sexual transmitted infections and other conditions requiring medical intervention are reported routinely. Health behavior interviews are readministered on six month intervals just prior to integration of a new persons into the treatment groups. 4.2. Time frame The first year is devoted to preparations including software development, finalizing arrangements with participating organizations, and pilot testing (See "Specific tasks for preparation phase (First year)" below). The first six month period of the second year is reserved for training of registrars , and accumulating and interviewing of participants. The second six month period is for comprehensive testing of operational procedures as the first set of participants begins using the experimental system. Cross sectional data analysis techniques will be applied during this period. The third half-year of the operational phase of the project will be devoted to the integration of the first set of control groups into the treatment condition. After this, all procedures and software will have been finalized. Longitudinal data analysis procedures will be integrated with those already in use. At two additional six month intervals, half of those on the waiting list will be added to the experimental groups using the health conferencing system. 4.3. Specific tasks for preparation phase (First year) 4.3.1. Contact and discussions with organizations. The wide range of sensitive and important questions raised by the proposed study make it imperative that affected and concerned organizations and persons (Dansk Epidemiologisk Institut, Statens Serum Institut, Registertilsynet, Sundhedsstyrelsen, Landsforeningen for Boesser og Lesbiske, Positivgruppen, Frivillige Bloddonorer, selected journalists and politicians, etc.) have the opportunity to review and comment upon the proposal. This will include, but not be limited to those collaborating in the experiment proper. Invitations to a workshop series will be issued to those selected. The workshops will include lectures, demonstrations (both manual and computer), and discussions. Feedback from participants will be used as input to the experiment design. 4.3.2. Design of experimental trials The specifics of the design including control procedures will be structured to insure both scientific validity of collected data and acceptability of procedures to participants and their organizations. It is expected there will be conflicts between these two demands and the workshops will be used to anticipate and facilitate their resolution. A specific question to be addressed will be the potential conflict between demands for participation and capacity of organizations to respond to them without sacrificing rigor of the trials. While previously developed questionnaires will serve a base for data collection, specific concerns and interests of different organizations and interests groups will influence the actual data requested from participants. 4.3.3. Design of secure registration procedures Protection of the participants identity will be in part dependent upon the security of the registration and pseudonym assignment procedures. Abuse of the system that could result from persons obtaining multiple names will also be controlled by the registration system. Both administrative and cryptographic mechanisms will require careful specification. After a description of the cryptographic mechanisms for registration, organizational placement for administrative procedures will be determined. 4.3.4. Software development The most important factor in protection of the participants is the security of their own computer systems. Both privacy and protection of identity depends upon the integrity of the cryptographic software. The software is also plays an essential role of demonstrating the system so better understanding can be achieved by both users and representatives of organizations considering the adoption of the system. Certain components of the proposed system perform functions that have never been implemented on computer systems or that have not been implemented to perform the functions needed in this application. Preliminary software development will permit a better estimate of the overall effort required to satisfy the security and efficiency requirements in the proposed application. Preliminary development will also permit testing of the user interface to ensure easy operation under strict security requirements. 4.3.5. Simulation modeling Simulation modeling for predicting effects of the completed system can play both analytic and educational roles. Graphics can effectively illustrate the relative impact of preventative as opposed to treatment- based methods in epidemiology. Such simulations can influence organizational decision makers as well as potential users. Analytic questions concerning the relative impact of limited adoption of the technology on overall population morbidity and mortality can also be answered with simulation methods. This could answer cost effectiveness questions and be used to guide the rate of adoption of the new technology. Considering the very large expenses associated with clinical treatment of AIDS, the simulation models may be useful in estimating appropriate funding for operational stages of the project. 4.3.6. Publication of "Hormones" epidemiological model. While the general concept of real-time epidemiological modeling has been presented at a conference (Stodolsky, 1983), publication has been limited to an application involving control of electronic infections on computer networks (Stodolsky, 1989). Conference presentation and publication as a human population oriented application will strengthen theoretical review, and directly address specific questions concerning human and legal rights. The secure model was included in a recent conference presentation (Stodolsky, 1986). It would best be mathematized and then subject to a proof of correctness to insure that any flaws are identified before substantial software development efforts are made. 4.3.7. Publication of "Conditional privacy:..." The paper "Conditional privacy: Protecting expression by one-bit matchmaking" received public exposure in a conference presentation (Stodolsky, 1986). While the method is relatively straight forward cryptographicly, conference presentation and publication would increase the probability that any protocol errors are uncovered and perhaps suggest enhancements that integrate certification with information exchange. 4.3.8. Test data collection Once data requirements are identified, data collection procedures will be tested in a software environment approximating the final system. This will permit identification of user interface and security problems that could cause problems. 4.3.9. Pilot tests Test of the completed system, not including cryptographic security, can be conducted with non-sensitive data to insure operational procedures are functional. Participants could include students and interested person attending demonstrations. 5. References AIDS not gentle on the mind. (1987, March 26). New Scientist, (1153), 38-39. Brecher, E. M. (1975). Prevention of sexually transmitted diseases. The Journal of Sex Research, 11(4), 318-328. Cancer virus linked to drug users. (1987, May 21). International Herald Tribune, 8. Chaum, D. (1985). Security without identification: Transaction systems to make big brother obsolete. Communications of the ACM, 28(10), 1030-1044. Fredriksson, A. (1987, July, 15). Blodgivarnaal blir "friskhetsintyg"? Goteborgs-Posten, No. 88, 18. Hellerstedt, L. (1987, June 19). Homosexutredning: Aidstest "frikort" foer loesslaeppt sex. Dagens Nyheter. Ivey, P. A., Cox, A. L., Harbridge, J. r., & Oldfield, J. K. (1989, August). A single-chip public key encryption subsystem. IEEE Journal of Solid- State Circuits. Painters and Dockers (Rock musicians). (1988). "Safe Sex", Crocodile (Compact Disk EMA CD1). Export Music Australia. Prostitutes asked not to give blood. (1987, April 9). New Scientist, (1555), 29. Seale, J. R. & Medvedev, Z. A. (1987). Origin and transmission of AIDS. Multi-use hypodermics and the threat to the Soviet Union: discussion paper. Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 80, 301-304. Smith, D. (1989, July 14). AZT, Acyclovir, and the case for early treatment. AIDS Treatment News, Issue No. 83. Stodolsky, D. (1979a, April 9). Personal computers for supporting health behaviors. Stanford, CA: Department of Psychology, Stanford University. (Preliminary proposal) Stodolsky, D. (1979b, May 21). Social facilitation supporting health behaviors. Stanford, CA: Department of Psychology, Stanford University. (Preliminary proposal) Stodolsky, D. (1979c, October). Systems approach to the epidemiology and control of sexually transmitted diseases. Louisville, KY: System Science Institute, University of Louisville. (Preliminary project proposal) Stodolsky, D. (1983, June 15). Health promotion with an advanced information system. Presented at the Lake Tahoe Life Extension Conference. (Summary) Stodolsky, D. (1986, June). Data security and the control of infectious agents. (Abstracts of the cross disciplinary symposium at the University of Linkoeping, Sweden: Department of Communication Studies). Stodolsky, D. (1989). Net hormones: Part 1 - Infection control assuming cooperation among computers [Machine-readable file]. Van Wyk, K. R. (1989, March 30). Several reports available via anonymous FTP. Virus- L Digest, 2(77). Abstract republished in van Wyk, K. R. (1989, April 24). Virus papers (finally) available on Lehigh LISTSERV. Virus-L Digest, 2(98). (Available via anonymous file transfer protocol from LLL- WINKEN.LLNL.GOV: File name "~ftp/virus-l/docs/net.hormones" at Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Nuclear Chemistry Division and IBM1.CC.LEHIGH.EDU: File name "HORMONES NET" at Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University. And by electronic mail from LISTSERV@LEHIIBM1.BITNET: File name "HORMONES NET" at Lehigh University). Stodolsky, D. (in prep.). Conditional privacy: Protecting expression by one-bit matchmaking. ========================================================= /---[] [] | Pa | ---------------[]-------------- \---/ | [] | | | /---[] | /---[] /---[] | | Pb | | | Da | | Db | | \---/ | \---/ \---/ | | | | Health Center | /---[] ------------------------------- | Pc | \---/ ---------------------------------------------------------- Explanation of Symbols: /---\ Persons | Pi | \---/ /---\ Doctors | Di | \---/ Computers [] Figure 1 ============================================================ P h ----------- -----[]----- y | N1,N2 | | N1,N2 | s | Pb Da | | Da | i | | | | c ----------- ------------ a Pa Pa l N1 N1=N1 Pb Pa Pa P Pb l N2 N2=N2 a Pc Pc Pc Pc c e Pb Time -----------------------------------------------> T1 T2 T3 T4 ---------------------------------------------------------- Explanation of symbols: Person i Pi Doctor A Da Physical and Pi informational Ni Transaction codes Ni exchange Pj ---- Information Ni,Nj Health Center | | transmission Pi ---- Information Ni=Ni Health Center -[]- reception Pi Computer | | and matching Transmitting ---- Time of operation Ti Figure 2 =========================================================== David S. Stodolsky, PhD Routing: <@uunet.uu.net:stodol@diku.dk> Department of Psychology Internet: Copenhagen Univ., Njalsg. 88 Voice + 45 31 58 48 86 DK-2300 Copenhagen S, Denmark Fax. + 45 31 54 32 11 ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102920495100> From: judice@kyoa.enet.dec.com (Louis J. Judice 18_Oct_1989 2147) 18-Oct-1989 2147) 31-OCT-1989 4:29:51 To: "security@pyrite.rutgers.edu"@decwrl.dec.com Subj: [876] RE: USA Today: "Hackers can tap into free trip" I installed one of these in an installation about 2 years ago. It's a dial-back security device called a Traq-net (I believe), made by Lee-Mah Data Security. The tone is a prompt to enter a touch tone id-code. With the id-code, the device calls back the telephone # associated with the id-code, which then auto-answers or manually answers the line, establishing a modem connection. I believe there is also a provision for having it dial you at other pre-determined numbers when you are travelling. The Traq-net also logs all calls, both invalid and valid. It was a neat device, but there was significant user resistance to using it, so it eventually fell into dis-use. Combined with a strong security program it would probably work well in some environments. Lou Judice DEC Note: this posting is my opinion only and is not an endorsement of the product(s) mentioned. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- <1989102921181100> From: Jeffrey Walsh 31-OCT-1989 4:58:11 To: security@ohstvma Subj: [1323] Re: How to track people down... As far as I know, and I'm not sure if this is a NY state law or a federal law, but most information held by a college/university registrar concerning name, address of record, phone number, etc., is not confidential, unless the student/alumnus specifies so. If these people have or have had a relationship with an institution of higher learning, this might be one avenue. There's always the notion of posting something in the personals of a well-read paper (eg - Village Voice) where people look for that type of thing. If the group has something in common, focus in on that -- they might be peeved if last names are involved. The key here is, of course, where do you think they are geographically centered? If anyone in the group has even a remote connection with the military, try using the locators (usually free) in the branch publications: Army Times, Air Force Times, Navy Times... Even if they've served in a unit five years ago and aren't in anymore, there's the chance that someone who served with them might still be and be able to relay you information on their whereabouts. I'm not sure about the confidentiality laws that you queried about. Sorry. If you want the address for the locator service of the service papers, write me at the address below. Jeff Walsh "JEWALSH@FORDMURH" Fordham University ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8911140932.AA22559@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989103100570000> From: ECL4JS2@OAC.UCLA.EDU (Jeff Suttor) Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: Re: Re: Privacy vs on-line library Message-ID: <8911140932.AA22559@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 31 Oct 89 00:57:00 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 9 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Tue Oct 31 01:57:00 1989 > A few programmers can even construct the borrowing history of a given > individual (a moment's thought about how a library works will tell you this) This is not true for the Library I program for. When a circulation transaction is resolved, checked back in, the circ trans is archived but any link to the user record is zeroed out. This allows the archives to be used for stat anal but protects the privacy of the user. Most Libraries are strong believers in information rights and do whatever they can to protect the rights of their users. ----MESSAGE-END---- ----MESSAGE-BEGIN---- [8911141932.AA29853@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU] <1989103118055700> From: GSRLR@alaska.BITNET ("Robyn Robertson GSRLR@ALASKA") Newsgroups: misc.security Subject: How to track people down. Message-ID: <8911141932.AA29853@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 31 Oct 89 18:05:57 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The Internet Lines: 64 Approved: security@rutgers.edu Posted: Tue Oct 31 19:05:57 1989 Finding people? I have spent considerable time and effort doing this sort of work. The only solid rule for tracking people down is that there are no solid rules. In general, finding people depends upon knowing enough about the target subject(i.e. the person you want to find) to gain direction for the search. For instance, I was retained to search for a gentleman that had absconded from the Seattle area with substantial debts left behind. I knew very little about the guy other than his name, the fact that he had a trust fund administered from Los Angeles, and that he had been planning to wed a woman from Seattle when he was last heard from several weeks before. In this case, I managed to locate a marriage license in the King county (Seattle) Courthouse which yielded the name and address of the woman he had, by the time of this search, married. Although the man had covered most of his tracks pretty well, the woman he had married took no effort to obscure her path. Consequently, I had the woman's name and last known residence(in Renton, Washington, a suburb of Seattle)when I left the courthouse. Once I had this, the remaining follow up was reasonably simple. It turnt out that her prior residence she had been living in was up for sale. A visit to the real estate agent acting as broker afforded a reasonably fast face-to-face meeting with the fugative I sought. He, it developed, was handling all the business of his new wife. The real estate agaent very thoughtfully arranged the meeting, and also provided me with the seller's new home address. I tell this story as a means of illustrating an approach to finding people. While in general it is helpful to review information resources like the telephone book, Polk directory, etc., I believe that a general priciple is the best advice. Find out all you can about your target, then determine what, if any, information resources this knowledge of your target implies. If you are uncertain what information your basic knowledge of your target does imply, take what you know to an expert(like the records clerk in the city/county building where the target I mention above had filed his marriage license) and ask the expert what intelligence is necessarily implicit in the information you have as a foundation. Once this is accomplished, the remaining task is to exploit this information. As for expert assistance in developing the leads that you start with, there are as many sources for this intelligence as there are catagories worth exploiting. I know very little about tennis, for instance, but I know enough that if I found that a suspect I sought was a heavy tennis player, I could certainly locate a tennis expert to tell me what organizations associated with tennis might yield the suspect's location. Failing that, if the suspect is a serious tennis player, and I have a good idea what city he might be in, I might be able to develope leads by asking questions at atheletic clubs in the area. Although this approach seems like common sense, many people tend to forget what creatures of habit we humans are, and they consequently fail to exploit the obvious when searching for someone. Nonetheless, I have found this approach fairly useful. Just find out all you can about your target, then think! One must compile all available information on the target subject, then follow it up and exploit whatever leads this information developes. =========================================================================== Robyn Robertson | The opinions expressed here are BITNET: GSRLR@ALASKA | my own Internet: GSRLS@acad3.fai.alaska.edu | P.O.Box 81638 | Fairbanks, AK 99708 | ----MESSAGE-END----