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ARCHIVE: Rutgers 'Security List' (incl. misc.security) - Archives (1990)
DOCUMENT: Rutgers 'Security List' for January 1990 (36 messages, 35837 bytes)
SOURCE: http://securitydigest.org/exec/display?f=rutgers/archive/1990/01.txt&t=text/plain
NOTICE: securitydigest.org recognises the rights of all third-party works.
START OF DOCUMENT
-----------[000000][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 2 Jan 90 19:31:46 GMT From: CI60UCU@VM.TCS.TULANE.EDU (Charlene Charette) To: misc.security Subject: bill changers
We got into a discussion at work the other day and I thought that this would be the place to get an answer. Just how does a vending machine or bill changer determine what bill you've inserted? Some change 1's or 5's. How does it tell the difference between bills? --Charlene Charette
-----------[000001][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 2 Jan 90 22:05:56 GMT From: tn07+@ANDREW.CMU.EDU (Thomas Neudecker) To: misc.security Subject: Yale Pin Tumbler Padlock
About 25 years agos I came across a Yale Towne Pin Tumbler padlock. It is a cast iron lock with a brass bar and cylinder. The key is a thin aluminum stock with a 5 character number imprinted.I believe that the lock - lock series - was once used by the rail roads. One of my two keys was broken last week by someone trying to open the lock by twisting the key. After calling several locksmiths I found no one interested in finding a blank or milling a copy. Does any one have any info about this padlock. Is the key blank restricted? Thanks, Tom Neudecker Carnegie Mellon
-----------[000002][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 4 Jan 90 01:51:46 GMT From: jrm@LUCID.COM (Joe Marshall) To: misc.security Subject: forging documents with a laser printer
Forged court documents would be too easy to detect and rather difficult to pass. Would you give me your car if I showed you a court order that said you had to? The same is true for prescriptions: No one needs 5000 Qualudes. Letters of credit can be easily verified by telephoning the issuing party. I would think that the market for forged Motor Vehicle documents would be very lucrative. I would imagine that forged negotiables would also be popular. Forged identity papers would be useful, too. I can think of 3 techniques that are commonly used to hinder forgery. First, the medium for the document can be hard to obtain. Second, the use of paper documents can be eliminated. Third, the penalties for getting caught using forged documents can be increased. There are problems with these techniques. Increasing penalties is laughable: "Hey Mike, don't do that! It's against the law!" Making the medium hard to obtain means that governments and big businesses can make verifiable documents, but you can't. Eliminating paper altogether generally means putting all the data in a safe place like a Unix box. I think an approach that used encryption to make digital signatures would be terrific. Then individuals could make verifiable documents without compromising their privacy. In order to do this we would need to provide access to encryption to everyone. ~JRM
-----------[000003][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 4 Jan 90 02:32:16 GMT From: kelly@uts.amdahl.com (Kelly Goen) To: misc.security Subject: Re: without wires...
>My GRiD is "tempest shielded", which means you can't spy on me this way. HA HA HA!!! ever hear of a preamp??? attached to an induction pickup coil... or possibly one of those cute DECO or info unlimited xmitters wired internally to the serial port of your keyboard...TEMPEST also depends on GOOD physical security of your environment... otherwise it is indeed quite bypassable!!! cheers kelly p.s. I looked at the TEMPTEST shielded GRIDS... managed to make a NICE measurement on my FSM!!!grin!!
-----------[000004][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 7 Jan 90 23:02:34 GMT From: Kevin.Parris@p5.f12.n376.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Kevin Parris) To: misc.security Subject: A different kind of privacy
>employees have any rights when it comes to using the company computer for >personal reasons? Those activities are, for employees of the State of South Carolina, classified as misappropriation of government resources. While I have not heard of any actual cases, if such things are "noticed" by management, they constitute grounds for disciplinary action, including termination. KRP -- Kevin Parris == ...!usceast!uscacm!12.5!Kevin.Parris
-----------[000005][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 8 Jan 90 16:26:52 GMT From: jje@virtech.UUCP (Jeremy J. Epstein) To: misc.security Subject: Re: UNIX Security, X/OPEN, Orange Book
> 1) I've heard about Agreements or standards the X/OPEN-Foundation > published on this topic. Don't know about X/OPEN, but POSIX has a working group (P1003.6) which is defining security requirements. There are two rated UNIX systems: Gould (now Encore) has a C2 system called UTX/32S (achieved rating about 3 years ago) and AT&T System V/MLS which achieved B1 rating a couple of months ago. There are two vendors who specialize in making UNIX systems secure: SecureWare (Atlanta Georgia) Addamax (Champaign Illinois) Each has worked with several vendors to make B1 versions of their commercial offerings. AT&T also licenses their System V/MLS to other vendors for incorporation into UNIX systems. Sun has SunOS/MLS which is aimed at B1. Trusted Information Systems (TIS) has a B2 version of XENIX. Finally, AT&T is developing a new UNIX system aimed at B2 or B3 (I don't remember which), but it's a major new effort which will become System V Release 4 Version 1, sometime in late 1990 or early 1991. Besides all these, TIS is building a prototype B3 version of Mach, which is related to (but NOT the same as) UNIX. Not all of these systems have been submitted for evaluation. In particular, Secureware, Addamax, and TIS XENIX have been; AT&T has passed; Sun and TIS TMach are not even in the pipeline as far as I know. Some of the integrated systems (i.e., integrations of SecureWare, Addamax, or AT&T with the vendor) have been submitted to the NCSC, but I don't know which ones. Remember, anyone can claim security; unless it's rated by the NCSC (National Computer Security Center) or some equivalent body in another country, it's just talk. Jeremy Epstein TRW Systems Division jje@virtech.uu.net +1 703-876-4202
-----------[000006][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 9 Jan 90 13:41:00 GMT From: Kilgallen@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL To: misc.security Subject: PS2 Security and Physical Security
>Broken covers should be taken as evidence of compromised data. Presumably these caveats apply to almost all computer security threats, including theft of encrypted data (where the intrusion can also introduce a latent key-grabber in many situations). This is not to criticize Mr. Murray for reminding us -- just to iterate that data security almost always depends on physical security. Larry Kilgallen
-----------[000007][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 10 Jan 90 01:01:01 GMT From: bob@morningstar.com (Bob Sutterfield) To: misc.security Subject: Re: GNU and security
I must admit to dismay at having Stallman call someone else "careless", when the GNUmacs makefile hides a umask in a tar pipe to install everything with 777 protections. That's a very careful implementation of Stallman's attitude toward security. If someone else has a different attitude, they had better be similarly careful. If they didn't watch to see that they were implementing their attitude, then they were careless. No, I don't agree with Stallman on security. Yes, it surprised me too.
-----------[000008][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 10 Jan 90 03:53:00 GMT From: meister@GAAK.LCS.MIT.EDU (phil servita) To: misc.security Subject: Re: GNU and security
I must admit to dismay at having Stallman call someone else "careless", when the GNUmacs makefile hides a umask in a tar pipe to install everything with 777 protections. 777 is one heck of a lot different than 4777...
-----------[000009][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 11 Jan 90 00:36:52 GMT From: thomas@mvac23.UUCP (Thomas Lapp) To: misc.security Subject: RE: FACSCARD
We use the same type of system for buildings on our site. In talking
with someone in security, I found out that they are also known as
"chest readers" or "butt readers", since people can put their chest (with
card in shirt pocket) or butt (with card in wallet in back pocket) up
against the reader. I've often seen employees just put the whole
wallet up to the reader and it works fine. ;-)
- tom
--
internet : mvac23!thomas@udel.edu or thomas%mvac23@udel.edu
uucp : {ucbvax,mcvax,psuvax1,uunet}!udel!mvac23!thomas
Europe Bitnet: THOMAS1@GRATHUN1
Location: Newark, DE, USA
Quote : Virtual Address eXtension. Is that like a 9-digit zip code?
-----------[000010][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 11 Jan 90 04:15:20 GMT From: CTM@cornellc.BITNET (Homer) To: misc.security Subject: Re: Electronic-key Radar Detection Protection
How often does a hot car stereo get stolen from the guy who bought
it, and how often does the twice stolen stereo get sold to a second guy
only to be stolen again.
Does hot equipment just keep making the rounds?
-----------[000011][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 16 Jan 90 00:27:56 GMT From: faatzd@TURING.CS.RPI.EDU (Don Faatz) To: misc.security Subject: Re: Privacy
A recent court decision held that conversations on cordless telephones are not subject to "expected privacy" as are conversations on telephones with cords. Hence, police can simply LISTEN to cordless telephone conversations and make arrests based on the conversation. This, in principle, seems fine since one literally BROADCASTS one's conversation with a cordless phone - but what of the person on the other end of the call - he/she has no apriori knowledge of the _cordlessness_ of the callers phone. Does this other person unknowingly surrender his right of privacy .... <Don Faatz - Systems Engineer, RPI CSLab faatzd@cs.rpi.edu (518)276-2860
-----------[000012][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 16 Jan 90 02:47:09 GMT From: mark@UXA.CSO.UIUC.EDU (mark) To: misc.security Subject: I beleive some do ...
I have heard that .... I thought it was Volvo, but I could be wrong... some major auto company equips their car stereos with a 'key' that WILL NOT come out if the stereo is hocked, and it won't work without the 'key'(immediately) mark@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu
-----------[000013][next][prev][last][first]----------------------------------------------------
Date: 18 Jan 90 09:28:00 GMT
From: DEGROOT@rcl.wau.nl ("Kees de Groot, Computer Systems Security")
To: misc.security
Subject: responses on a question about books on security: thanks to all!
At the end of November in 1989 I sent a message on the above
subject to the security-list. I have appended the responses
to the original message for your interest.
Thank you for your response!
======================================================================
Subj: Request for info on student-security-course
Course on security
==================
Security implies a lot of things like defending
against malfunctional apparatus, viruses, fraudulous
people etc. For all these threats there are a lot of
measures like making regularly backups, double or
triple system-configurations and anti-virus
software. Also a good deal of thinking has to be
done to make your organisation internally secure.
There are a lot of books covering most of these
subjects. In my opinion security is a very important
subject to be taught to students.
1. Are there any books covering security in such a
way that the book can be used for a course on the
subject?
2. Are there security courses for students and if so
what subjects are covered?
==========================================================================
>From: "Charles P. Pfleeger" <pfleeger@TIS.COM>
Subject: Security textbooks
To: DEGROOT@RCL.WAU.NL
There are three books that I would consider using to teach a course in
computer security (which, incidentally, I did for several years while
on the faculty of The University of Tennessee). The books are Lance
Hoffman's Modern Methods for Computer Security (Prentice-Hall, 1977--
very dated), Dorothy Denning's Cryptanalysis and Data Security
(Addison Wesley, 1982--somewhat dated, rather narrowly focused,
although excellent within that focus), and my Security in Computing
(Prentice Hall, 1989). Without trying to give an obviously-biased
review, let me just mention that it covers encryption and cryptography
as a fundamental (but certainly not the only) tool in providing
security; studies problems and solutions for providing security in the
design of programs, operating systems, database management systems,
and networks; and covers risk analysis, physical and administrative
protection, legal issues and ethical issues. If you will contact your
local Prentice-Hall representative, or write to Prentice-Hall in
Englewood Cliffs NJ 07632 USA (there is also a european sales office,
but I do not have the address), I am sure you can get a copy for your
review.
--CPfleeger
======================================================================
>From: Ommang <harald%apple@hub.ucsb.edu>
I'm currently taking a class from Dr. Richard A. Kemmerer at UCSB, and
we use this book : Charles P. Pfleeger "Security in Computing", Prentice
Hall 1989. ISBN 0-13-798943-1.
I think the book is pretty good. Kemmerer has also used lots of papers on the
topic in his class. SOme of the topics covered : Terminology (trojan horse,
trap door, worm, virus, denial of service etc.) Security principles (least
privilege, economy of mechanism, complete mediation, separation of privilege,
etc.) Security models and principles (Bell-LaPadula, Integrity, Take-Grant,
Lattice and ono-interference). Security mechanisms (capabilities, access
control lists, authentication mechanisms, secure attention key etc)
Protection techniques (penetration analysis, info flow analysis, covert
channel analysis etc) Encryption (monoaplphabetic, polyalphabetic, rotors,
DES, Hill, etc).
Hope this is of some help to you !
Harald
====================================================================
>From: gasser@ultra.enet.dec.com (MORRIE GASSER, 508-264-5055, DTN 293-5055)
I saw your request for a book that could be used for a computer security
course. My book has been used in a number of courses...
Title: Building a Secure Computer System
Author: Morrie Gasser
Publisher: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., New York.
ISBN No.: 0-442-23022-2
U.K.: Van Nostrand Reinhold at
International Thomson Publishing Services Ltd,
North Way, Andover, Hants SP10 5BE.
# 26.95
U.S.: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co.
P.O. Box 668
Florence, Kentucky 41042
Mail order phone: 606-525-6600
$37.95
=====================================================================
>From: IN%"FITSILIS@GRPATVX1.BITNET" 12-DEC-1989 13:04:16.63
Dear Kees
We have just completed our thesis work on Computer Security in the
Department of Computer Engineering and Informatics at the University
of Patras,Greece.We admit that we faced a lot of difficulties in
finding adequate bibliography and references on this subject (which
shows how an important subject it is!).We believe that one of the best
books on Computer Security is "Cryptography and Data Security" by
Dorothy Elizabeth Denning,published by Addison-Wesley,ISBN 0-201-10150-5.
We supply a sample of the book's contents:
-ENCRYPTION ALGORITHMS (transposition,substitution,product(DES),exponential,
knapsack ciphers).
-CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES (block and stream ciphers,endpoints of encryption,
key management)
-ACCESS CONTROL (access matrix model,authorization lists,capabilities,take-
grant systems).
-INFORMATION FLOW CONTROLS (lattice model,execution based and compiler based
mechanisms,program verification).
-INFERENCE CONTROL (statistical database model,inference control mechanism,
methods of attack (trackers etc),methods of defence
(statistic restriction,noise addition etc)).
This book was published in 1982.If it looks out of date to you,we recommend
"Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy".These are the
procedings of an annual symposium on computer security,containing all the
recent work on the subject.We used the 1988 symposium proceedings,IEEE
Ctalogue Number 88CH2558-5,ISBN 0-8186-0850-1.Also you can find related
papers on the following magazines:
-ACM PRESS SIGSAC REVIEW (published 4 times a year).
-CRYPTOLOGIA (journal on cryptography).
In our opinion,this subject can be taught to students that have elementary
knowledge of operating systems,computer networks,databases and a good
mathematical background (i.e. information theory,number theory,complexity
theory).
We wonder if you could keep us informed on the progress of your cources,
since we are faced with similar problems (we are preparing a Computer
Security course to be taught next year in our department).Also if you
have (or received) any further recommendations on the subject,please
forward them to us.
Friendly,
CHARLES CAMEAS
PANOS FITSILIS
=====================================================================
Mr. de Groot,
One excellent text on the subject is SECURITY IN COMPUTING,
C. P. Pfleeger, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey (1989).
It is my understanding that this material was taught by the author
while he was a professor in the Computer Science Dept. at The University
of Tennessee. The author is currently working in private industry
as a computer security professional.
Regards,
Lloyd F. Arrowood
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Disclaimer: The views and opinions of the author do not necessarily state
or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency
thereof.
==========================================================================
-----------[000014][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 18 Jan 90 11:55:26 GMT From: bpistr@cgch.UUCP To: misc.security Subject: Re: vault doors, was: locks
but aren't vaults normally lined with fairly difficult stuff to penetrate? Like armor plate or something? Otherwise it would seem that potential transgressors wouldn't bother with vault door either... -jcp- ====================================================================== Joseph C. Pistritto 'Think of it as Evolution in Action' Ciba Geigy AG, R1241.1.01, Postfach CH4002 Basel, Switzerland Internet: bpistr@cgch.uucp Phone: (+41) 61 697 6155 Bitnet: bpistr%cgch.uucp@cernvax.bitnet Fax: (+41) 61 697 2435 From US: cgch!bpistr@mcsun.eu.net
-----------[000015][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 18 Jan 90 13:37:06 GMT From: chidsey@SMOKE.BRL.MIL (Irving Chidsey) To: misc.security Subject: Re: vault doors, was: locks
If I go into the local bank ( during business hours ) I can see the vault door standing open. It is a foot thick with massive bolts. I can also see the time clock the prevents opening during non business hours. Through the inner grate with 2-3 cm bars I can see the safe deposit boxes and their double locks. On the floor I can see the sacks full of coins and bills that the armored car just brought. The Vault and door exude solidity, safety, and protection. They let you know that this is the right place to keep your money and valuables. They also warn malefactors that the vault is hard to penetrate. The rest of the vault cannot be seen, but surely so solid a door would be part of an equaly strong, solid vault. Wouldn't it? Vault doors, like safe doors, are at least 50% public relations. Irv -- I do not have signature authority. I am not authorized to sign anything. I am not authorized to commit the BRL, the DOA, the DOD, or the US Government to anything, not even by implication. Irving L. Chidsey <chidsey@brl.mil>
-----------[000016][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 18 Jan 90 18:11:00 GMT From: A01MES1@niu.BITNET (Michael Stack) To: misc.security Subject: Re: RACF database
Most solid state DASD devices have a battery backup (which filters the normal power supply as long as it is available) which is used to dump the memory to some kind of backup device should the normal power fail. We had been preparing to place our JES2 checkpoint on our EMC box when we discovered an integrity problem - there is a circuit breaker on the back of the box (the ONLY visible switch) which apparently connects the memory to the battery; throw the switch and the memory DIES! Of course, we all learned long ago that after a power outage we should reset circuit breakers even though they don't appear to need it! :-< After a couple instances of this (fortunately this didn't happen while we were experimenting with our ACF2 clusters), we are holding off placing the master catalog and JES2 checkpoint there until we regain our confidence in the box. Michael Stack Northern Illinois University
-----------[000017][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 18 Jan 90 22:19:20 GMT From: jcmorris@MBUNIX.MITRE.ORG (Morris) To: misc.security Subject: Re: RACF database
In several of the solid-state DASD boxes I've had pitched to me recently the designer has included a battery and a small PC-style fixed disk. If the power mains die the box disconnects from the channel and dumps its entire contents onto the fixed disk before shutting down. When the power mains come alive again the data can be restored to the semiconductor memory. Sorry, I don't recall which vendors provide this, but you should consider the idea if you're about to trust the security database to the tender mercies of your power company.
-----------[000018][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 19 Jan 90 02:15:48 GMT From: kelly@uts.amdahl.com (Kelly Goen) To: misc.security Subject: Re: vault doors, was: locks
>but aren't vaults normally lined with fairly difficult stuff
>to penetrate? Like armor plate or something? Otherwise it
I missed the first part of this thread... but THERMIC LANCES will normally
penetrate 3' of reinforced concrete within about 2 minutes... and if that
will not do the job THERE are PORTABLE(yeah RIGHT!!) Plasma cutting torches
avaiable that exceed 16,000 centigrade...(according to the sales literature)
I would think this to be adequate for the job...
cheers
kelly
-----------[000019][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 19 Jan 90 19:13:44 -0500 From: cjs%cwru@cwjcc.ins.cwru.edu (Christopher J. Seline (CJS@CWRU.CWRU.EDU))
The following is a prepublication draft of an article on TEMPEST. I am posting
it to this news group in the hope that it will:
(1) stimulate discussion of this issue;
(2) expose any technical errors in the document;
(3) solicit new sources of information;
(4) uncover anything I have forgotten to cover.
I will be unable to monitor the discussions of the article. Therefore, PLEASE
post your comments to the news group BUT SEND ME A COPY AT THE ADDRESS LISTED
BELOW.
I have gotten a number of mail messages about the format of this
article. Some explanation is in order: The numbered paragraphs
following "____________________" on each page are footnotes. I suggest
printing out the document rather than reading it on your CRT.
Thanks you in advance.
Christopher Seline
cjs@cwru.cwru.edu
cjs@cwru.bitnet
(c) 1990 Christopher J. Seline
=============================================================================
<Start Print Job>
<New Page>
Eavesdropping On
the Electromagnetic Emanations
of Digital Equipment:
The Laws of Canada,
England and the United States
This document is a rough
draft. The Legal
Sections are overviews.
T h e y w i l l b e
significantly expanded in
the next version.
We in this country, in this generation, are -- by
destiny rather than choice -- the watchmen on the
walls of world freedom.[1]
-President John F.
Kennedy
_____________________
1. Undelivered speech of President John F. Kennedy, Dallas
Citizens Council (Nov. 22, 1963) 35-36.
<New Page>
In the novel 1984, George Orwell foretold a future
where individuals had no expectation of privacy because the
state monopolized the technology of spying. The government
watched the actions of its subjects from birth to death. No
one could protect himself because surveillance and counter-
surveillance technology was controlled by the government.
This note explores the legal status of a surveillance
technology ruefully known as TEMPEST[2]. Using TEMPEST
technology the information in any digital device may be
intercepted and reconstructed into useful intelligence
without the operative ever having to come near his target.
The technology is especially useful in the interception of
information stored in digital computers or displayed on
computer terminals.
The use of TEMPEST is not illegal under the laws of the
United States[3], or England. Canada has specific laws
criminalizing TEMPEST eavesdropping but the laws do more to
hinder surveillance countermeasures than to prevent TEMPEST
surveillance. In the United States it is illegal for an
individual to take effective counter-measures against
TEMPEST surveillance. This leads to the conundrum that it
is legal for individuals and the government to invade the
privacy of others but illegal for individuals to take steps
to protect their privacy.
The author would like to suggest that the solution to
this conundrum is straightforward. Information on
_____________________
2. TEMPEST is an acronym for Transient Electromagnetic Pulse
Emanation Standard. This standard sets forth the official views
of the United States on the amount of electromagnetic radiation
that a device may emit without compromising the information it is
processing. TEMPEST is a defensive standard; a device which
conforms to this standard is referred to as TEMPEST Certified.
The United States government has refused to declassify the
acronym for devices used to intercept the electromagnetic
information of non-TEMPEST Certified devices. For this note,
these devices and the technology behind them will also be
referred to as TEMPEST; in which case, TEMPEST stands for
Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Surveillance Technology.
The United States government refuses to release details
regarding TEMPEST and continues an organized effort to censor the
dissemination of information about it. For example the NSA
succeeded in shutting down a Wang Laboratories presentation on
TEMPEST Certified equipment by classifying the contents of the
speech and threatening to prosecute the speaker with revealing
classified information. [cite coming].
3. This Note will not discuses how TEMPEST relates to the
Warrant Requirement under the United States Constitution. Nor
will it discuss the Constitutional exclusion of foreign nationals
from the Warrant Requirement.
<New Page>
protecting privacy under TEMPEST should be made freely
available; TEMPEST Certified equipment should be legally
available; and organizations possessing private information
should be required by law to protect that information
through good computer security practices and the use of
TEMPEST Certified equipment.
I. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
Spying is divided by professionals into two main types:
human intelligence gathering (HUMINT) and electronic
intelligence gathering (ELINT). As the names imply, HUMINT
relies on human operatives, and ELINT relies on
technological operatives. In the past HUMINT was the sole
method for collecting intelligence.[4] The HUMINT operative
would steal important papers, observe troop and weapon
movements[5], lure people into his confidences to extract
secrets, and stand under the eavesdrip[6] of houses,
eavesdropping on the occupants.
As technology has progressed, tasks that once could
only be performed by humans have been taken over by
machines. So it has been with spying. Modern satellite
technology allows troop and weapons movements to be observed
with greater precision and from greater distances than a
human spy could ever hope to accomplish. The theft of
documents and eavesdropping on conversations may now be
performed electronically. This means greater safety for the
human operative, whose only involvement may be the placing
of the initial ELINT devices. This has led to the
ascendancy of ELINT over HUMINT because the placement and
_____________________
4. HUMINT has been used by the United States since the
Revolution. "The necessity of procuring good intelligence is
apparent & need not be further urged -- All that remains for me
to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible.
For upon Secrecy, Success depends in Most Enterprises of the
kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however
well planned & promising a favorable issue." Letter of George
Washington (Jul. 26, 1777).
5. "... I wish you to take every possible pains in your powers,
by sending trusty persons to Staten Island in whom you can
confide, to obtain Intelligence of the Enemy's situation &
numbers -- what kind of Troops they are, and what Guards they
have -- their strength & where posted." Id.
6. Eavesdrip is an Anglo-Saxon word, and refers to the wide
overhanging eaves used to prevent rain from falling close to a
house's foundation. The eavesdrip provided "a sheltered place
where one could hide to listen clandestinely to conversation
within the house." W. MORRIS & M. MORRIS, MORRIS DICTIONARY OF
WORD AND PHRASE ORIGINS, 198 (1977).
<New Page>
monitoring of ELINT devices may be performed by a technician
who has no training in the art of spying. The gathered
intelligence may be processed by an intelligence expert,
perhaps thousands of miles away, with no need of field
experience.
ELINT has a number of other advantages over HUMINT. If
a spy is caught his existence could embarrass his employing
state and he could be forced into giving up the identities
of his compatriots or other important information. By its
very nature, a discovered ELINT device (bug) cannot give up
any information; and the ubiquitous nature of bugs provides
the principle state with the ability to plausibly deny
ownership or involvement.
ELINT devices fall into two broad categories:
trespassatory and non-trespassatory. Trespassatory bugs
require some type of trespass in order for them to function.
A transmitter might require the physical invasion of the
target premises for placement, or a microphone might be
surreptitiously attached to the outside of a window. A
telephone transmitter can be placed anywhere on the phone
line, including at the central switch. The trespass comes
either when it is physically attached to the phone line, or
if it is inductive, when placed in close proximity to the
phone line. Even microwave bugs require the placement of
the resonator cone within the target premises.[7]
Non-trespassatory ELINT devices work by receiving
electromagnetic radiation (EMR) as it radiates through the
aether, and do not require the placement of bugs. Methods
include intercepting[8] information transmitted by satellite,
microwave, and radio, including mobile and cellular phone
transmissions. This information was purposely transmitted
with the intent that some intended person or persons would
receive it.
Non-trespassatory ELINT also includes the interception
of information that was never intended to be transmitted.
All electronic devices emit electromagnetic radiation. Some
of the radiation, as with radio waves, is intended to
transmit information. Much of this radiation is not
intended to transmit information and is merely incidental to
_____________________
7. Pursglove, How Russian Spy Radios Work, RADIO ELECTRONICS,
89-91 (Jan 1962).
8. Interception is an espionage term of art and should be
differentiated from its more common usage. When information is
intercepted, the interceptor as well as the intended recipient
receive the information. Interception when not used as a term of
art refers to one person receiving something intended for someone
else; the intended recipient never receives what he was intended
to receive.
<New Page>
whatever work the target device is performing.[9] This
information can be intercepted and reconstructed into a
coherent form. With current TEMPEST technology it is
possible to reconstruct the contents of computer video
display terminal (VDU) screens from up to a kilometer
distant[10]; reconstructing the contents of a computer's
_____________________
9. There are two types of emissions, conducted and radiated.
Radiated emissions are formed when components or cables act as
antennas for transmit the EMR; when radiation is conducted along
cables or other connections but not radiated it is referred to as
"conducted". Sources include cables, the ground loop, printed
circuit boards, internal wires, the power supply to power line
coupling, the cable to cable coupling, switching transistors, and
high-power amplifiers. WHITE & M. MARDIGUIAN, EMI CONTROL
METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES, 10.1 (1985).
"[C]ables may act as an antenna to transmit the signals
directly or even both receive the signals and re-emit them
further away from the source equipment. It is possible that
cables acting as an antenna in such a manner could transmit the
signals much more efficiently than the equipment itself...A
similar effect may occur with metal pipes such as those for
domestic water supplies. ... If an earthing [(grounding)] system
is not installed correctly such that there is a path in the
circuit with a very high resistance (for example where paint
prevents conduction and is acting as an insulator), then the
whole earthing system could well act in a similar fashion to an
antenna. ... [For a VDU] the strongest signals, or harmonics
thereof, are usually between 60-250 MHz approximately. There
have however been noticeable exception of extremely strong
emissions in the television bands and at higher frequencies
between 450-800 MHz. Potts, Emission Security, 3 COMPUTER LAW
AND SECURITY REPORT 27 (1988).
10. The TEMPEST ELINT operator can distinguish between different
VDUs in the same room because of the different EMR
characteristics of both homo and heterogeneous units. "[T]here
is little comparison between EMR characteristics from otherwise
comparable equipment. Only if the [VDU] was made with exactly
the same components is there any similarity. If some of the
components have come from a different batch, have been updated in
some way, and especially if they are from a different
manufacturer, then completely different results are obtained. In
this way a different mark or version of the same [VDU] will emit
different signals. Additionally because of the variation of
manufacturing standards between counties, two [VDUs] made by the
same company but sourced from different counties will have
entirely different EMR signal characteristics...From this it way
be thought that there is such a jumble of emissions around, that
it would not be possible to isolate those from any one particular
source. Again, this is not the case. Most received signals have
<New Page>
memory or the contents of its mass storage devices is more
complicated and must be performed from a closer distance.[11]
The reconstruction of information via EMR, a process for
which the United States government refuses to declassify
either the exact technique or even its name[12], is not
limited to computers and digital devices but is applicable
to all devices that generate electromagnetic radiation.[13]
TEMPEST is especially effective against VDUs because they
produce a very high level of EMR.[14]
_____________________
a different line synchronization, due to design, reflection,
interference or variation of component tolerances. So that if
for instance there are three different signals on the same
frequency ... by fine tuning of the RF receiver, antenna
manipulation and modification of line synchronization, it is
possible to lock onto each of the three signals separately and so
read the screen information. By similar techniques, it is
entirely possible to discriminate between individual items of
equipment in the same room." Potts, supra note 9.
For a discussion of the TEMPEST ELINT threat See e.g.,
Memory Bank, AMERICAN BANKER 20 (Apr 1 1985); Emissions from Bank
Computer Systems Make Eavesdropping Easy, Expert Says, AMERICAN
BANKER 1 (Mar 26 1985); CRT spying: a threat to corporate
security, PC WEEK (Mar 10 1987).
11. TEMPEST is concerned with the transient electromagnetic
pulses formed by digital equipment. All electronic equipment
radiates EMR which may be reconstructed. Digital equipment
processes information as 1's and 0's--on's or off's. Because of
this, digital equipment gives off pulses of EMR. These pulses
are easier to reconstruct at a distance than the non-pulse EMR
given off by analog equipment. For a thorough discussion the
radiation problems of broadband digital information see e.g.
military standard MIL-STD-461 REO2; White supra note 9, 10.2.
12. See supra note 2.
13. Of special interest to ELINT collectors are EMR from
computers, communications centers and avionics. Schultz,
Defeating Ivan with TEMPEST, DEFENSE ELECTRONICS 64 (June 1983).
14. The picture on a CRT screen is built up of picture
elements (pixels) organized in lines across the screen. The
pixels are made of material that fluoresces when struck with
energy. The energy is produced by a beam of electrons fired from
an electron gun in the back of the picture tube. The electron
beam scans the screen of the CRT in a regular repetitive manner.
When the voltage of the beam is high then the pixel it is focused
upon emits photons and appears as a dot on the screen. By
selectively firing the gun as it scans across the face of the
CRT, the pixels form characters on the CRT screen.
<New Page>
ELINT is not limited to governments. It is routinely
used by individuals for their own purposes. Almost all
forms of ELINT are available to the individual with either
the technological expertise or the money to hire someone
with the expertise. Governments have attempted to
criminalize all use of ELINT by their subjects--to protect
the privacy of both the government and the population.
II. UNITED STATES LAW
In the United States, Title III of the Omnibus Streets
and Crimes Act of 1968[15] criminalizes trespassatory ELINT as
the intentional interception of wire communications.[16] As
originally passed, Title III did not prohibit non-
_____________________
The pixels glow for only a very short time and must be
routinely struck by the electron beam to stay lit. To maintain
the light output of all the pixels that are supposed to be lit,
the electron beam traverses the entire CRT screen sixty times a
second. Every time the beam fires it causes a high voltage EMR
emission. This EMR can be used to reconstruct the contents of
the target CRT screen. TEMPEST ELINT equipment designed to
reconstruct the information synchronizes its CRT with the target
CRT. First, it uses the EMR to synchronize its electron gun with
the electron gun in the target CRT. Then, when the TEMPEST ELINT
unit detects EMR indicating that the target CRT fired on a pixel,
the TEMPEST ELINT unit fires the electron gun of its CRT. The
ELINT CRT is in perfect synchronism with the target CRT; when the
target lights a pixel, a corresponding pixel on the TEMPEST ELINT
CRT is lit. The exact picture on the target CRT will appear on
the TEMPEST ELINT CRT. Any changes on the target screen will be
instantly reflected in the TEMPEST ELINT screen.
TEMPEST Certified equipment gives off emissions levels that
are too faint to be readily detected. Certification levels are
set out in National Communications Security Information
Memorandum 5100A (NACSIM 5100A). "[E]mission levels are
expressed in the time and frequency domain, broadband or narrow
band in terms of the frequency domain, and in terms of conducted
or radiated emissions." White, supra, note 9, 10.1.
For a thorough though purposely misleading discussion of
TEMPEST ELINT see Van Eck, Electromagnetic Radiation from Video
Display units: An Eavesdropping Risk?, 4 Computers & Security 269
(1985).
15. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197. The Act criminalizes
trespassatory ELINT by individuals as well as governmental
agents. cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Fourth
Amendment prohibits surveillance by government not individuals.)
16. 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(a).
<New Page>
trespassatory ELINT,[17] because courts found that non-wire
communication lacked any expectation of p2IIIrivacy.[18] The
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986[19] amended
Title III to include non-wire communication. ECPA was
specifically designed to include electronic mail, inter-
computer communications, and cellular telephones. To
accomplish this, the expectation of privacy test was
eliminated.[20]
As amended, Title III still outlaws the electronic
interception of communications. The word "communications"
indicates that someone is attempting to communicate
something to someone; it does not refer to the inadvertent
transmission of information. The reception and
reconstruction of emanated transient electromagnetic pulses
(ETEP), however, is based on obtaining information that the
target does not mean to transmit. If the ETEP is not
intended as communication, and is therefore not transmitted
in a form approaching current communications protocols, then
it can not be considered communications as contemplated by
Congress when it amended Title III. Reception, or
interception, of emanated transient electromagnetic pulses
is not criminalized by Title III as amended.
III. ENGLISH LAW
In England the Interception of Communications Act
1985[21] criminalizes the tapping of communications sent over
_____________________
17. United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (found
no legislative history indicating Congress intended the act to
include radio-telephone conversations). Further, Title III only
criminalized the interception of "aural" communications which
excluded all forms of computer communications.
18. Willamette Subscription Television v. Cawood, 580 F.Supp
1164 (D. Or. 1984) (non-wire communications lacks any expectation
of privacy).
19. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
2510-710) [hereinafter ECPA].
20. 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(a) criminalizes the interception of "any
wire, oral or electronic communication" without regard to an
expectation of privacy.
21. Interception of Communications Act 1985, Long Title, An Act
to make new provision for and in connection with the interception
of communications sent by post or by means of public
telecommunications systems and to amend section 45 of the
Telecommunications Act 1984.
<New Page>
public telecommunications lines.[22] The interception of
communications on a telecommunication line can take place
with a physical tap on the line, or the passive interception
of microwave or satellite links.[23] These forms of passive
interception differ from TEMPEST ELINT because they are
intercepting intended communication; TEMPEST ELINT
intercepts unintended communication. Eavesdropping on the
emanations of computers does not in any way comport to
tapping a telecommunication line and therefore falls outside
the scope of the statute.[24]
IV. CANADIAN LAW
Canada has taken direct steps to limit eavesdropping on
computers. The Canadian Criminal Amendment Act of 1985
_____________________
22. Interception of Communications Act 1985 1, Prohibition on
Interception:
(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, a
person who intentionally intercepts a communication in the
course of its transmission by post or by means of a public
telecommunications system shall be guilty of an offence and
liable--
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding the
statutory maximum;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding two years or to a fine or to both.
***
23. Tapping (aka trespassatory eavesdropping) is patently in
violation of the statute. "The offense created by section 1 of
the Interception of Communications Act 1985 covers those forms of
eavesdropping on computer communications which involve "tapping"
the wires along which messages are being passed. One problem
which may arise, however, is the question of whether the
communication in question was intercepted in the course of its
transmission by means of a public telecommunications system. It
is technically possible to intercept a communication at several
stages in its transmission, and it may be a question of fact to
decide the stage at which it enters the "public" realm. THE LAW
COMMISSION,WORKING PAPER NO. 110: COMPUTER MISUSE, 3.30 (1988).
24. "There are also forms of eavesdropping which the Act does
not cover. For example. eavesdropping on a V.D.U. [referred to
in this text as a CRT] screen by monitoring the radiation field
which surrounds it in order to display whatever appears on the
legitimate user's screen on the eavesdropper's screen. This
activity would not seem to constitute any criminal offence..."
THE LAW COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER NO. 110: COMPUTER MISUSE, 3.31
(1988).
<New Page>
criminalized indirect access to a computer service.[25] The
specific reference to an "electromagnetic device" clearly
shows the intent of the legislature to include the use of
TEMPEST ELINT equipment within the ambit of the legislation.
The limitation of obtaining "any computer service" does
lead to some confusion. The Canadian legislature has not
made it clear whether "computer service" refers to a
computer service bureau or merely the services of a
computer. If the Canadians had meant access to any
computer, why did they refer to any "computer service".
This is especially confusing considering the al-
encompassing language of (b) 'any function of a computer
system'.
Even if the Canadian legislation criminalizes
eavesdropping on all computers, it does not solve the
problem of protecting the privacy of information. The
purpose of criminal law is to control crime.[26] Merely
making TEMPEST ELINT illegal will not control its use.
First, because it is an inherently passive crime it is
impossible to detect and hence punish. Second, making this
form of eavesdropping illegal without taking a proactive
stance in controlling compromising emanations gives the
public a false sense of security. Third, criminalizing the
possession of a TEMPEST ELINT device prevents public sector
research into countermeasures. Finally, the law will not
prevent eavesdropping on private information held in company
computers unless disincentives are given for companies that
do not take sufficient precautions against eavesdropping and
simple, more common, information crimes.[27]
_____________________
25. 301.2(1) of the Canadian criminal code states that anyone
who:
... without color of right,
(a) obtains, directly or indirectly, any computer service,
(b) by means of an electromagnetic ... or other device,
intercepts or causes to be intercepted, either directly or
indirectly, any function of a computer system ... [is guilty of
an indictable offence].
26. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL (1988) (Principles Governing the Redrafting of
the Preliminary Guidelines "g." (at an unknown page))
27. There has been great debate over what exactly is a computer
crime. There are several schools of thought. The more
articulate school, and the one to which the author adheres holds
that the category computer crime should be limited to crimes
directed against computers; for example, a terrorist destroying a
computer with explosives would fall into this category. Crimes
such as putting ghost employees on a payroll computer and
<New Page>
V. SOLUTIONS
TEMPEST ELINT is passive. The computer or terminal
emanates compromising radiation which is intercepted by the
TEMPEST device and reconstructed into useful information.
Unlike conventional ELINT there is no need to physically
trespass or even come near the target. Eavesdropping can be
performed from a nearby office or even a van parked within a
reasonable distance. This means that there is no classic
scene of the crime; and little or no chance of the criminal
being discovered in the act.[28]
If the crime is discovered it will be ancillary to some
other investigation. For example, if an individual is
investigated for insider trading a search of his residence
may yield a TEMPEST ELINT device. The device would explain
how the defendant was obtaining insider information; but it
was the insider trading, not the device, that gave away the
crime.
This is especially true for illegal TEMPEST ELINT
performed by the state. Unless the perpetrators are caught
in the act there is little evidence of their spying. A
trespassatory bug can be detected and located; further, once
found it provides tangible evidence that a crime took place.
A TEMPEST ELINT device by its inherent passive nature leaves
nothing to detect. Since the government is less likely to
commit an ancillary crime which might be detected there is a
very small chance that the spying will ever be discovered.
The only way to prevent eavesdropping is to encourage the
use of countermeasures: TEMPEST Certified[29] computers and
_____________________
collecting their pay are merely age-old accounting frauds; today
the fraud involves a computer because the records are kept on a
computer. The computer is merely ancillary to the crime. This
has been mislabeled computer crime and should merely be referred
to as a fraud perpetrated with the aid of a computer. Finally,
there are information crimes. These are crimes related to the
purloining or alteration of information. These crimes are more
common and more profitable due to the computer's ability to hold
and access great amounts of information. TEMPEST ELINT can best
be categorized as a information crime.
28. Compare, for example, the Watergate breakin in which the
burglars were discovered when they returned to move a poorly
placed spread spectrum bug.
29. TEMPEST Certified refers to the equipment having passed a
testing and emanations regime specified in NACSIM 5100A. This
classified document sets forth the emanations levels that the NSA
believes digital equipment can give off without compromising the
information it is processing. TEMPEST Certified equipment is
theoretically secure against TEMPEST eavesdropping.
<New Page>
terminals.
In merely making TEMPEST ELINT illegal the public is
given the false impression of security; they lulled into
believing the problem has been solved. Making certain
actions illegal does not prevent them from occurring. This
is especially true for a TEMPEST ELINT because it is
undetectable. Punishment is an empty threat if there is no
chance of being detected; without detection there can be no
apprehension and conviction. The only way to prevent some
entity from eavesdropping on one's computer or computer
terminal is for the equipment not to give off compromising
emanation; it must be TEMPEST Certified.
The United States can solve this problem by taking a
proactive stance on compromising emanations. The National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST[30]) is in charge
of setting forth standards of computer security for the
private sector. NIST is also charged with doing basic
research to advance the art of computer security. Currently
NIST does not discuss TEMPEST with the private sector. For
privacy's sake, this policy must be changed to a proactive
one. The NIST should publicize the TEMPEST ELINT threat to
computer security and should set up a rating system for
level of emanations produced by computer equipment.[31]
Further, legislation should be enacted to require the
labeling of all computer equipment with its level of
emanations and whether it is TEMPEST Certified. Only if the
public knows of the problem can it begin to take steps to
solve it.
Title III makes possession of a surveillance device a
crime, unless it is produced under contract to the
government. This means that research into surveillance and
counter-surveillance equipment is monopolized by the
government and a few companies working under contract with
_____________________
NACSIM 5100A is classified, as are all details of TEMPEST.
To obtain access to it, contractor must prove that there is
demand within the government for the specific type of equipment
that intend to certify. Since the standard is classified, the
contractors can not sell the equipment to non-secure governmental
agencies or the public. This prevents reverse engineering of the
standard for its physical embodiment, the Certified equipment.
By preventing the private sector from owning this anti-
eavesdropping equipment, the NSA has effectively prevented the
them from protecting the information in their computers.
30. Previously the Bureau of Standards. The NIST is a division
of the Commerce Department.
31. In this case computer equipment would include all peripheral
computer equipment. There is no use is using a TEMPEST Certified
computer if the printer or the modem are not Certified.
<New Page>
the government. If TEMPEST eavesdropping is criminalized,
then possession of TEMPEST ELINT equipment will be criminal.
Unfortunately,this does not solve the problem. Simple
TEMPEST ELINT equipment is easy to make. For just a few
dollars many older television sets can be modified to
receive and reconstruct EMR. For less than a hundred
dollars a more sophisticated TEMPEST ELINT receiver can be
produced[32].
The problem with criminalizing the possession of
TEMPEST ELINT equipment is not just that the law will have
little effect on the use of such equipment, but that it will
have a negative effect on counter-measures research. To
successfully design counter-measures to a particular
surveillance technique it is vital to have a complete
empirical understanding of how that technique works.
Without the right to legally manufacture a surveillance
device there is no possible way for a researcher to have the
knowledge to produce an effective counter-measures device.
It is axiomatic: without a surveillance device, it is
impossible to test a counter-measures device.
A number of companies produce devices to measure the
emanations from electrical equipment. Some of these devices
are specifically designed for bench marking TEMPEST
Certified equipment. This does not solve the problem. The
question arises: how much radiation at a particular
frequency is compromising? The current answer is to refer
_____________________
32. The NSA has tried to limit the availability of TEMPEST
information to prevent the spread of the devices.
For a discussion of the First Amendment and prior restraint
See, e.g. The United States of America v. Progressive, Inc. 467
F.Supp 990 (1979, WD Wis.)(magazine intended to publish plans for
nuclear weapon; prior restraint injunction issued), reh. den.
United States v. Progressive Inc. 486 F.Supp 5 (1979, WD Wis.),
motion den Morland v. Sprecher 443 US 709 (1979)(mandamus),
motion denied United States v. Progressive, Inc. 5 Media L R
(1979, 7th Cir.), dismd. without op. U.S. v. Progressive, Inc 610
F.2d 819 (1979, 7th Cir.); New York Times, Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971)(per curium)(Pentagon Papers case: setting
forth prior restraint standard which government was unable to
meet); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970);
Balance Between Scientific Freedom and NAtional Security, 23
JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1982)(current laws and regulations limiting
scientific and technical expression exceed the legitimate needs
of national security); Hon. M. Feldman, Why the First Amendment
is not Incompatible with National Security, HERITAGE FOUNDATION
REPORTS (Jan. 14, 1987). Compare Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1 (First Amendment
applies only to political speech); G. Lewy, Can Democracy Keep
Secrets, 26 POLICY REVIEW 17 (1983)(endorsing draconian secrecy
laws mirroring the English system).
<New Page>
to NACSIM 5100A. This document specifies the emanations
levels suitable for Certification. The document is only
available to United States contractors having sufficient
security clearance and an ongoing contract to produce
TEMPEST Certified computers for the government. Further,
the correct levels are specified by the NSA and there is no
assurance that, while these levels are sufficient to prevent
eavesdropping by unfriendly operatives, equipment certified
under NACSIM 5100A will have levels low enough to prevent
eavesdropping by the NSA itself.
The accessibility of supposedly correct emanations
levels does not solve the problem of preventing TEMPEST
eavesdropping. Access to NACSIM 5100A limits the
manufacturer to selling the equipment only to United States
governmental agencies with the need to process secret
information.[33] Without the right to possess TEMPEST ELINT
equipment manufacturers who wish to sell to the public
sector cannot determine what a safe level of emanations is.
Further those manufacturers with access to NACSIM 5100A
should want to verify that the levels set out in the
document are, in fact, low enough to prevent interception.
Without an actual eavesdropping device with which to test,
no manufacturer will be able to produce genuinely
uncompromising equipment.
Even if the laws allow ownership of TEMPEST Certified
equipment by the public, and even if the public is informed
of TEMPEST's threat to privacy, individuals' private
information will not necessarily by protected. Individuals
may choose to protect their own information on their own
computers. Companies may choose whether to protect their
own private information. But companies that hold the
private information of individuals must be forced to take
steps to protect that information.
In England the Data Protection Act 1984[34] imposes
sanctions against anyone who stores the personal
information[35] on a computer and fails to take reasonable
_____________________
33. For example, the NSA has just recently allowed the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) to purchase TEMPEST Certified computer
equipment. The DEA wanted secure computer equipment because
wealthy drug lords had were using TEMPEST eavesdropping
equipment.
34. An Act to regulate the use of automatically processed
information relating to individuals and the provision of services
in respect of such information.
-Data Protection Act 1984, Long Title.
35. "Personal data" means data consisting of information which
relates to a living individual who can be identified from that
<New Page>
measures to prevent disclosure of that information. The act
mandates that personal data may not be stored in any
computer unless the computer bureau or data user[36] has
registered under the act.[37] This provides for a central
registry and the tracking of which companies or persons
maintain databases of personal information. Data users and
bureaux must demonstrate a need and purpose behind their
possession of personal data.
The act provides tort remedies to any person who is
damaged by disclosure of the personal data.[38] Reasonable
care to prevent the disclosure is a defense.[39] English
_____________________
information (or from that and other information in the possession
of the data user), including any expression of opinion about the
individual but not any indication of the intentions of the data
user in respect of that individual.
-Data Protection Act 1984 1(3)
36. "Data user" means a person who holds data, and a persons
"Holds" data if --
(a) the data form part of a collection of data processed or
intended to be processed by or on behalf of that person as
mentioned in subsection (2) above; [subsection (2) defines
"data"] and
(b) that person (either alone or jointly or in common with
other persons) controls the contents and use of the data
comprised in the collection; and
(c) the data are in the form in which they have been or are
intended to be processed as mentioned in paragraph (a) above
or (though not for the time being in that form) in a form
into which they have been converted after being so processed
and with a view to being further so processed on a
subsequent occasion.
- Data Protection Act 1(5).
37. Data Protection Act 1984, 4,5.
38. An individual who is the subject of personal data held by a
data user... and who suffers damage by reason of (1)(c) ... the
disclosure of the data, or access having been obtained to the
data without such authority as aforesaid shall be entitled to
compensation from the data user... for any distress which the
individual has suffered by reason of the ... disclosure or
access.
- Data Protection Act 1984 23.
39. ... it shall be a defense to prove that ... the data user
... had taken such care as in all the circumstances was
reasonably required to prevent the... disclosure or access in
question.
Data Protection Act 1984 23(3)
<New Page>
courts have not yet ruled what level of computer security
measures constitute reasonable care. Considering the
magnitude of invasion possible with TEMPEST ELINT it should
be clear by now that failure to use TEMPEST Certified
equipment is prima facie unreasonable care.
The Remedies section of the act provides incentive for
these entities to provide successful protection of person
data from disclosure or illicit access. Failure to protect
the data will result in monetary loss. This may be looked
at from the economic efficiency viewpoint as allocating the
cost of disclosure the persons most able to bear those
costs, and also most able to prevent disclosure. Data users
that store personal data would use TEMPEST Certified
equipment as part of their computer security plan, thwarting
would-be eavesdroppers.
The Data Protection Act 1984 allocates risk to those
who can bear it best and provides an incentive for them to
keep other individuals' data private. This act should be
adopted by the United States as part of a full-spectrum plan
to combat TEMPEST eavesdropping. Data users are in the best
position to prevent disclosure through proper computer
security. Only by making them liable for failures in
security can we begin to rein in TEMPEST ELINT.
VII
Recommendations
Do not criminalize TEMPEST ELINT. Most crimes that
TEMPEST ELINT would aid, such a insider trading, are already
illegal; the current laws are adequate.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology
should immediately begin a program to educate the private
sector about TEMPEST. Only if individuals are aware of the
threat can they take appropriate precautions or decide
whether any precautions are necessary.
Legislation should be enacted to require all
electronic equipment to prominently display its level of
emanations and whether it is TEMPEST Certified. If
individuals are to choose to protect themselves they must be
able to make a informed decision regarding how much
protection is enough.
TEMPEST Certified equipment should be available to
the private sector. The current ban on selling to non-
governmental agencies prevents individuals who need to
protect information from having the technology to do so.
Possession of TEMPEST ELINT equipment should not be
made illegal. The inherently passive nature and simple
design of TEMPEST ELINT equipment means that making its
possession illegal will not deter crime; the units can be
easily manufactured and are impossible to detect. Limiting
their availability serves only to monopolize the
countermeasures research, information, and equipment for the
government; this prevents the testing, design and
<New Page>
manufacture of counter-measures by the private sector.
Legislation mirroring England's Data Protection Act
1984 should be enacted. Preventing disclosure of personal
data can only be accomplished by giving those companies
holding the data a reason to protect it. If data users are
held liable for their failure to take reasonable security
precautions they will begin to take reasonable security
precautions, including the use of TEMPEST Certified
equipment.
-----------[000020][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 19 Jan 90 18:00:04 GMT From: ratzan@RWJA.UMDNJ.EDU (Lee Ratzan) To: misc.security Subject: biological computer viruses
Just a thought... We anthropomorphize certain computer programs and call them viruses in order to better conceptualize their actions for the sake of our internal cognitive models. The biological model is used:computer viruses replicate, they can be malignant, they can infect and be disinfected etc. It is the biological model which drives the image to explain the computer model. What if this situation be reversed? If we would try to explain the biological phenomena of a virus in terms of how a computer virus operates perhaps we might obtain insight into the biology which is now lacking because of cognitive blinders? Just thinking... Lee Ratzan Unix systems University of Medicine/Dentistry of NJ
-----------[000021][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 19 Jan 90 22:59:33 GMT From: morgan@PARIS.ICS.UCI.EDU (Tim Morgan) To: misc.security Subject: Cardkey locks
Does anyone have information on cheap but effective cardkey lock systems? How about manufacturers who sell off-the-shelf components which can be connected to a computer (eg, a card reader that sends ASCII over RS-232). Thanks, Tim Morgan UC Irvine ICS Dept.
-----------[000022][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 21 Jan 90 20:54:53 GMT From: rlk@THINK.COM (Robert L. Krawitz) To: misc.security Subject: GNU and security
777 is one heck of a lot different than 4777... This is true, but forcibly installing everything writable leaves a lot of holes open for trojan horses (there's precious little that you can't do with Emacs Lisp), and it's hard to see any compelling technical reason for this installation mode.
-----------[000023][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 22 Jan 90 05:55:21 GMT From: KINSLER@usmcp6.BITNET (MARK KINSLER) To: misc.security Subject: Home security
Nothing works like heavy doors, strong (not complex--drug addicts don't pick locks), and window grates. This won't win you the House Beautiful award, but you'll be safe. It's not obvious to me how panes of glass are supposed to deter intruders. Best philosophy: Put yourself in the place of an intruder and see how you could break in. An alarm is a good idea, of course, but it should be a backup for physical security. If the decorator doesn't like your home reinforcements then you are probably on the right track. If you can open a door with a good kick or three then you need to reinforce it... <kinsler@usmcp6.bitnet>
-----------[000024][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 22 Jan 90 13:44:00 GMT From: AEWALSH@fordmurh.BITNET (Jeffrey Walsh) To: misc.security Subject: Re: Bill Changers
I've been told that the bill changer scans the portrait to determine the type of bill that has been inserted. As far as determining authenticity, I don't know. Remind me to tell you about an interesting way that con-artists can construct what appears to be a bill of higher denomination than the one that actually exists. Jeffrey AEWALSH@FORDMURH.BITNET
-----------[000025][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 23 Jan 90 03:19:59 GMT From: Craig.A.Summerhill.SUMMERHI@WSUVM1.Berkeley.EDU To: misc.security Subject: Cuckoo's Egg
Stoll, Clifford.
The cuckoo's egg : tracking a spy through the maze of computer
espionage / by Clifford Stoll. 1st ed. New York : Doubleday, 1989.
vi, 326p; 25 cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 325-326)
ISBN 0385249462 : $18.95
Take this citation to any "ordinary" bookstore, and they can order it if they
don't have it in stock. The ISBN number is used by the book trade industry
as a stock control number and an order number to request copies from jobbers,
wholesalers, etc...
In the unlikely event the book is "sold out." Then I would suggest you
contact a library and have it borrowed for you from elsewhere if they don't
own it. I would imagine TRW has a corporate information center of some kind
that can have the material delivered to your office.
Regards,
Craig A. Summerhill
Assistant Systems Librarian
-----------[000026][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 23 Jan 90 13:18:02 GMT From: jik@PIT-MANAGER.MIT.EDU (Jonathan I. Kamens) To: misc.security Subject: Re: Policy
I am somewhat involved with the administration of news here at Project Athena, and I have never heard "mechanized privacy invasion" given as the primary reason why we do not run the arbitron scripts here, although it may be one of the reasons (the discussion hasn't come up since I've been here, so it's quite possible that at one point privacy concerns were discussed but I missed the discussion). The main reason we don't run the arbitron scripts is that because of the way Project Athena works, the arbitron script wouldn't be able to read most users' .newsrc files in order to compile the statistics. At Project Athena, users' files are stored in NFS (or AFS, for a small number of users) filesystems. The news service at Athena is run by the Student Information Processing Board (SIPB), which is INDEPENDENT of Project Athena's administration, and therefore does not have any super-user privileges on any Project Athena user fileservers. Since user accounts have a top-level directory permission of 711 and a umask of 077 by default, .newsrc files are not world-readable by default, and therefore any arbitron script run by the SIPB wouldn't be able to read them. Short form of the above: yes, the arbitron scripts may be an invasion of privacy; however, even if the SIPB didn't think they were, we still wouldn't be able to use them to generate statistics. Just one of the prices you pay for working in a distributed computing environment, I guess.... Jonathan Kamens USnail: MIT Project Athena 11 Ashford Terrace jik@Athena.MIT.EDU Allston, MA 02134 Office: 617-253-8495 Home: 617-782-0710
-----------[000027][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 23 Jan 90 14:06:33 GMT From: bob@morningstar.com To: misc.security Subject: Policy
...the arbitron scripts may be an invasion of privacy... I may have misunderstood or misremembered Ambar's comments, but that was one point I thought she made. It may not have been the primary reason Athena doesn't run arbitron, but would be one of interest to a security mailing list/newsgroup. however, even if the SIPB didn't think they were, we still wouldn't be able to use them to generate statistics [because of a healthy policy of not trusting root across the wire to read users' files]. OSU CIS similarly mistrusts root across the wire, and has similar default user account modes and umasks. With some mildly clever hacquery, Karl Kleinpaste has modified the arbitron script to send a proxy of itself to each file server holding users' home directories, where it runs as root to peruse users' .newsrc files. The results are then collated into a single chunk that is sent in to Arbitron Central. I'd be quite interested to know whether Athena's practice is policy or pragmatics! (I have no beef with either, I'm just curious.) Just one of the prices you pay for working in a distributed computing environment, I guess.... There are other ways of running a computing environment that can legitimately call themselves "distributed"! Athena's model is right honorable and obviously successful and well-known, but not unique, exclusive nor necessarily the best for everyone.
-----------[000028][next][prev][last][first]----------------------------------------------------
Date: 23 Jan 90 14:27:39 GMT
From: MFOWLER@gtri01.BITNET ("Melissa A. Fowler")
To: misc.security
Subject: tapes and x-ray machinesI have frequently carried tapes through airports and recently took 3 3480s to Australia. X-ray will not damage the tapes, I put the tapes in my checked baggage (which going internationally is x-rayed). I have also had no problem handing a tape to a security guard when going through the metal detectors. For the record, X-ray machines will not damage film less than 1000 speed. Most film used is 200 or 400. I also sent all my (exposed and unexposed) film through the X-ray machines in multiple airports with no problems. If you are still worried, you can purchase a lead film bag. I would suspect traveling internationally, the bag might draw attention. Melissa A. Fowler
-----------[000029][next][prev][last][first]----------------------------------------------------
Date: 23 Jan 90 14:52:55 GMT
From: mchinni@PICA.ARMY.MIL ("Michael J. Chinni, SMCAR-CCS-E")
To: misc.security
Subject: MORRIS CONVICTED
The following is an excerpt from a message sent by one of our computer
security people.
[It was also the Big News Item all around Usenix... _H*]
/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
Michael J. Chinni
Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey
ARPA: mchinni@pica.army.mil UUCP: ...!uunet!pica.army.mil!mchinni
/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
Verdict: "GUILTY"
Student "worm" whiz is found guilty. A U.S. court jury returned its verdict
about 9:30 pm after approximately six hours of deliberation. Robert T. Morris
was found guilty of federal computer tampering charges for unleashing a rogue
program that crippled a nationwide computer network (Internet system). A date
for sentencing has not yet been set. Morris faces up to five years in prison
and a $250,000 fine. He is the first person brought to trial under a 1986
federal computer fraud and abuse law that makes it a felony to break into a
federal computer network and prevent authorized use of the system. Morris
testified that he had made a programming error that caused a computer "worm"
to go berserk and cripple the Internet system back on November 2, 1988. The
"worm" he designed immobilized an estimated 6,000 computers linked to Internet,
including ones at the NASA, some military facilities and a few major universi-
ties. Morris's attorney Thomas Guidobomi argued that Morris never intended to
prevent authorized access. However testimony showed Morris did in deed deliber-
ately steal computer passwords from hundreds of people so the "worm" could
break into as many computers as possible. It was brought out in the trial that
he took deliberate and conscious steps to make the rogue program difficult to
detect and eliminate. Morris camouflaged sending of the program by unleashing
it from the computer system at Massachusetts Institute of Technology in
Cambridge and made it look like it had been sent from the University of
California at Berkeley so authorship of the program could not be traced to him
at Cornell. Other evidences showed Morris had at least six eariler versions of
the "worm", which had been found on his Cornell computer accounts and that his
own comments on the "worm" program used the words "break-in" and "steal".
-----------[000030][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 23 Jan 90 15:20:08 GMT From: gregm@csd4.csd.uwm.edu (Greg Mumm) To: misc-security@uunet.uu.net Subject: Slim-Jim purchase
Anyone know where I can get a Slim-Jim from? I think that's what they call those thin metal devices that cops use to unlock car doors with. How much do they cost? Are they legal? I would like to purchase it as a joke for my brother. Internet: gregm@csd4.csd.uwm.edu Bitnet: gregm%csd4.csd.uwm.edu@INTERBIT Uucp: uunet!gregm@csd4.csd.uwm.edu Name : Greg Mumm [Moderator add-on: US General Tools had 'em, last I checked. "Not legal for sale in NY or NJ." I had the item cut out and tacked on my door for a while, with the header line modified to read "Never get locked out of your [neighbor's] car again!" But why buy one when they show you a *picture* of what the thing looks like, complete with a cutaway view of the car door?!?!? Find a piece of packing strap and take a pair of shears to it. _H*]
-----------[000031][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 23 Jan 90 20:50:39 GMT From: ratzan@RWJA.UMDNJ.EDU (Lee Ratzan) To: misc.security Subject: grants
Now that the Morris case has been at least legally resolved there is a high probability that the publicity will engender more realization on aspects of computer security. To this end there may be agencies, schools or companies who would be willing to fund innovative approaches or assist in the development of security related issues. Does anyone know of present sources of funding in this regard? It would be in our best interest as professionals in the field to be aware of such support. Lee Ratzan Univ Med/Dent NJ
-----------[000032][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 27 Jan 90 11:59:40 GMT From: rbl@UUNET.UU.NET To: misc.security Subject: Re: RACF database
I designed (one of) the first solid state disks. One of my former graduate students did his dissertation on performance issues in using one under UNIX. My design was marketed as the "EMU" by Monolithic Systems Corp, Englewood, CO. For those concerned about data loss on power fail, a Battery Backup Unit was offered as an option. For best UNIX performance, I'd suggest a dual-port solid state disk, with /tmp or /usr/tmp on one port and either your database or the commonly-used system programs on the other. The bottleneck is then moved from the electromechanics of the classic disk drive to the device driver. Most device drivers are VERY wasteful of time because they have to wait about 17,000 - 36,000 microseconds for the desired sector to come around. When that latency is removed by installing a solid-state disk, a driver latency of about 1,000+ microseconds then appears. Questions gladly answered! Rob Lake BP Research uunet!nitrex!rbl
-----------[000033][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 30 Jan 90 08:10:16 EST From: AZM@cu.nih.gov To: security@pyrite.rutgers.edu Subject: Re: Finding a key blank
> [Moderator add-on: Most hardware stores and other places that have blanks
> *will* sell you blanks, especially if you express indignation at their weak
> attempts to not do so. Keep at it. _H*]
I do not know what part of the country you are in, but I live in
Maryland (the ancestral home of goody twoshoes, and test market for
all future restrictions on American's rights). Here no locksmith, or
locksmith supply house, or hardware store will sell you key blanks.
Of course, the real reason for the restriction is to "lock up" the
keymaking business as a big money-maker for the locksmiths. What they
tell those who try to buy blanks is that you must be a licensed lock-
smith. I tried to buy a lousy flat blank to make a key for a microscope
cabinet and was refused out of hand. I even tried bringing the cabinet
with me to show them what I wanted it for, but was still refused. At
least here in Maryland these are not weak attempts, they are absolute
and total restrictions. For my part, rather than give ANY money at all
to these profit-hungry, blood-sucking "artisans" I will go to my grave
never having seen the insides of the nine cabinets that I need keys
for.
Now that I have vented my spleen on the subject of refusal on the
part of locksmiths to dispense keyblanks I DO have a constructive
solution to the problem. At virtually every flea market you will
find one or more people selling rings, or strings, or cans or
boxes full of old keys, and at ridiculously low prices (I paid $3
for a can containing 147 keys). Although it may involve consider-
ably more effort than working from "blank" key blanks, it is
quite possible to reshape existing keys to fit other locks. In a
few cases it is possible to find keys that require only a touch
of the jewelers file here and there to fit another lock. I have
done this successfully on quite a few occasions. In other cases
I have found exact matches, sometimes in unusual ways. I bought
a small, nineteenth century, mahogany box that was locked and
required a small "skeleton" key. At another time I bought a small
Reichert microscope from the turn of the century that came with
a locked, leather-covered box. Just on a whim I tried the micro-
scope key in the mahogany box and found it an exact match. The
two locks are half a century apart in manufacture.
I guess the bottom line is, that as our country becomes more and
more restrictive, it will be necessary to counter by becoming more
and more innovative.
Kokkor Hekkus
AZM@NIHCU
-----------[000034][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 31 Jan 90 07:08:40 GMT From: KINSLER@usmcp6.BITNET (MARK KINSLER) To: misc.security Subject: Do hot stereos make the rounds?
Yup, they sure do. Often they get blown out a few times in the process. I ran a stereo repair shop in the Garfield section of Pittsburgh and saw machines that had to have been swiped several times. The lifespan seems to average about three thefts. An electronic key would be an excellent deterrent to car stereo theft. <kinsler@usmcp6.bitnet>, U of Southern Mississippi, Gulf Coast
-----------[000035][next][prev][last][first]---------------------------------------------------- Date: 31 Jan 90 07:12:01 GMT From: KINSLER@usmcp6.BITNET (MARK KINSLER) To: misc.security Subject: Remote alarm systems
Mostly they still use the 100 year old dc current loop system. A rented phone line with a current change sensor on it is all they've used since ADT started in about 1860. <kinsler@usmcp6.bitnet>, U of Southern Mississippi, Gulf Coast
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